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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis was to explore perceptual processing in individuals with 
autism and Asperger's syndrome, and to assess the extent to which the theory of 
weak central coherence could account for any abnormalities in this area. 
In Experiment 3: 1 we presented individuals with autism with four illusions on a 
computer and asked them to adjust certain parts to appear the same. The results 
showed just as susceptible to illusions as those without autism on a computer task 
contrary to previous literature (Happe, 1996). In Experiment 3: 2 we presented the 
same illusions on card and asked participants to judge whether parts of the stimuli 
were the same or different as in Happe's procedure. Our results showed that 
autistic populations succumbed to illusions regardless of whether they verbally 
judged or manually made adjustments to the stimuli. This ruled out the possibility 
that procedural differences could account for our failure to replicate Happe's 
findings. These results show that coherence is intact at low levels of perceptual 
processing in autism. 
Our second study (Experiment 4: 1) explored whether individual differences in 
coherence may be able to explain why the results of Experiments 3: 1 and 3: 2 were 
not consistent with Happe's findings. We presented a battery of visuo-spatial 
tasks (block design, embedded figures, Rey complex figure test) and the visual 
illusion computer task to participants. Performance on these tasks was unable to 
predict susceptibility to visual illusions, suggesting that perception of illusions 
may not be related to weak central coherence. 
Our final investigation explored whether autistic populations were more inclined 
to rely on visual rather than semantic properties when asked to pair atypically 
coloured pictures (e. g. blue banana) with colour patches (e. g. yellow or blue). 
Those with autism relied on background knowledge like control participants 
choosing the semantically related colour. We then considered whether requiring 
the participants to name the object before selecting a colour may have influenced 
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them to choose the semantic alternative in Experiment 5: 2. Those with autism 
performed similarly to comparison groups choosing the semantic rather than the 
visual option. This demonstrated that background knowledge was just as salient 
to those with autism and Asperger's syndrome as those without autism. 
There was little evidence from our investigations to suggest a deficit in coherence 
ability at the perceptual and verbal-semantic levels of processing. The theory of 
weak central coherence may need to be refined in order to account for our failure 
to find deficits in coherence in these areas. Other theories that may offer a more 
suitable explanation for our pattern of results are discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Review of the literature: Background on autism 
1: 1 Early accounts of autism 
As with the present time, early accounts of autism defined the syndrome at the 
behavioural level. The first published accounts have been accredited to Leo Kanner 
(1943) of the USA and Hans Asperger of Austria (1944). Although these reports 
were written independently, they are very similar in their descriptions. In Kanner's 
paper he mentions many features which are still associated with autism today. The 
two main features described by Kanner are autistic aloneness and obsessive desire for 
sameness. By `autistic aloneness' he meant a lack of social responsiveness and 
difficulties relating to people. This was not just a problem of shyness, but a serious 
impairment in the ability to experience affective contact with others. The second 
primary feature he describes is desire for sameness. Evidence of this was observed on 
occasions where autistic children were extremely upset by any changes in routine or 
aspects of their environment. In addition to these Kanner mentions other features he 
considers seconcjary such as repetitive behaviour and speech, lack of spontaneous 
activity, and oversensitivity to stimuli. 
Kanner also acknowledges that despite these impairments autistic children may have 
`islets of ability' which are preserved areas of functioning. For example, autistic 
children were found to have exceptional rote memory skills. Hans Asperger had 
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noted many of these characteristics in the children he had observed. Asperger not 
only used the term `autistic' to describe the children as Kanner had, but also 
mentioned the same constellation of features. In regards to the nature of autism, both 
Kanner and Asperger agreed that the disorder was innate and that it lasted throughout 
life into adulthood. 
Despite the striking similarities between these two accounts, they were not in total 
agreement. The population that Asperger identified differed from Kanner's patients in 
some very distinctive ways. They were not only more fluent in verbal ability, but 
seemed better at spontaneous and abstract thought. However, in the area of motor 
ability Asperger reported clumsiness and poor co-ordination much more among his 
sample of children. The mismatch between Kanner and Asperger's accounts does not 
necessarily mean that they were describing different types of children. It has 
generally been accepted that Asperger was describing a subgroup on the autistic 
spectrum which today is referred to as Asperger's Syndrome. I shall discuss this in 
more detail in the following section. 
1: 2 Biological roots of autism 
Currently there is increasing evidence supporting a biological rather than an 
environmental explanation of autism. The prevalence of autism seems to be one or 
two per 1000 births. Of those with autism there is a significantly greater number of 
boys than girls. Ratios for lower functioning individuals with autism are said to be 2 
boys for every I girl (Ciadella & Mamelle, 1989), while the ratio of boys to girls is 
5: 1 in those at the more able end of the autistic spectrum (Lord & Schopler, 1987). 
Findings in genetic research carried out with twins and siblings provides evidence that 
susceptibility to autism can be inherited. A review by Piven and Folstein (1994) 
explains that the likelihood of another sibling or fraternal twin having autism is 
slightly less than 3 per cent. Although this seems low, the occurrence of autism is 50- 
100 times greater than if the children were not related. Studies on identical twins 
showed a rate of concordance between 30 and 80 per cent. The large variance is 
likely due to the small sample size and considerable difficulty finding identical twins 
who are autistic. This evidence allows us to conclude that there can be a strong 
genetic component in autism. However, since there is not 100 per cent concordance 
of autism in identical twins environmental factors must also play a role 
Recently attention has focused on those aspects of autism that characterise the 
relatives of an individual with the syndrome. Piven and Folstein (1994) found that 30 
per cent of parents having children with autism showed some autistic mannerisms 
themselves. Some of the characteristics the parents showed included difficulties with 
turn taking in conversation and problems understanding others' utterances or implied 
meanings. Further to this Baron-Cohen and Hammer (1997a) found that fathers of 
autistic children do very well on the embedded figures test. Exceptional performance 
by those with autism on this test has been taken as evidence of an `islet of ability' that 
is associated with the syndrome. Another study (Happe, Briskman, & Frith, 
unpublished data) found further evidence to support an extended phenotype in autism. 
The fathers in this study performed similarly to their autistic children on various tasks 
such as superiority on the embedded figures test and block design test, and less 
susceptibility to illusions. There does seem to be some evidence that characteristics 
of autism (both assets and deficits) exist in parents of autistic individuals. 
Although the evidence here suggests a more direct causal relationship between genes 
and autism, the syndrome may develop through an indirect route. There is evidence 
that children with phenylketonuria (PKU) are at risk of developing autism. PKU is 
caused by defective genes that stop the intestine from producing an enzyme that is 
essential for breaking down a certain amino acid (phenylalanine) in the diet. If caught 
at an early stage it is possible to alleviate the problem with a phenylalanine free diet; 
if it is undetected it may cause brain damage. The outcome of this damage may lead 
to autistic like behaviour in the child. In this way autism has a genetic basis that is 
mediated by an environmental factor such as diet. 
1: 3 Diagnostic Criteria Today 
Many of the features described by Kanner and Asperger are included amongst the 
diagnostic criteria used to identify autism at the present time. In these earlier 
accounts, features such as perceptual abnormalities or special skills were just as 
important as deficits in language and communication in diagnosing autism. Today 
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diagnostic tests have become increasingly more focused on social impairments as the 
criteria for classification. This shift in focus can be largely attributed to Wing and 
Gould (1979) who carried out an important epidemiological study to find the core 
impairments in autism. Problems of defining subgroups, and also with distinguishing 
autism from other related childhood conditions called for a reassessment of the 
classification system. 
Wing and Gould (1979) attempted to address these problems by carrying out a survey 
of children showing evidence of language impairments, socialisation problems, or 
stereotypical behaviour. Their aims were to find the prevalence as well as the co- 
occurrence of these features. They also wanted to use their fmdings to help identify 
subgroups and clarify the relationship of these three abnormalities with mental 
disability. This study lead Wing and Gould (1979) to conclude that autism could be 
best described as a constellation of impairments in the areas of socialisation, 
communication, and imagination. The grouping of these features together has 
become known as Wing's triad. This study has had a significant impact on current 
psychological theories of autism which now tend to focus on explaining this triad of 
impairments. 
Checklists such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association (DSM HIR, 1987 or DSM IV, 1994) and the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD-10: World Health Organisation, 1993) also reflect the importance of 
these core features. Such checklists have assisted many psychiatrists in diagnosing 
individuals with autism. These diagnostic tools are widely used and provide 
practitioners with a list of behavioural characteristics specific to the syndrome or 
disorder. Many of the items focus on the atypical language development found in 
autism like echolalia and pronoun reversal. Other items such as "pervasive lack of 
responsiveness to other people" reflect social impairments or "autistic aloneness". 
Resistance to change is included under the statement "Bizarre responses to various 
aspects of the environment". The National Autistic Society has constructed a poster 
which illustrates some of these behavioural characteristics (see Figure 11). In order 
to avoid any confusion with other disorders like schizophrenia, the criteria require "an 
absence of delusions, hallucinations, loosening of associations and incoherence". 
These checklists are frequently revised as new findings in research are continuously 
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changing the way we think about autism. More recently attention has turned towards 
identifying subgroups within the autistic spectrum. 
Figure 1: 1 
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1: 4 Subgroups of autism 
Earlier I mentioned that the children Kanner and Asperger described may actually 
have been from different subgroups. Specifically, the children described by Asperger 
were more able than those Kanner observed. In 1981 Loma Wing first used the term 
"Asperger's syndrome" to distinguish between those who did not fit Kanner's 
description of a socially withdrawn individual with minimal language skills. 
Although Asperger's syndrome has been suspected to be a subgroup of autism for 
some time, official diagnostic criteria for the syndrome have only been established in 
the last decade (World Health Organisation, 1990; DSM-IV, 1994). Both autism and 
Asperger's syndrome are classified as Pervasive Developmental Disorders and 
therefore have many features in common. These include impairments in social 
interaction, communication, and restricted range of interests. The main difference 
between Asperger's syndrome and autism seems to lie in the degree of impairment. 
For example, DSM-IV specifies that an individual with Asperger's syndrome should 
not possess a "clinically significant general delay" in language. Thus they should be 
competent in speaking single words by age 2 and simple communicative phrases by 
age 3. It is important to note that these individuals are still likely to experience 
difficulties understanding language when context is important (e. g. irony, jokes). A 
further specification is that they should not have a "clinically significant" cognitive 
delay. It is possible that some individuals with Asperger's syndrome may have 
learning difficulties, however most have average or above average intelligence. 
Another condition specified in DSM-IV is that the person does not meet criteria for 
another pervasive developmental disorder or schizophrenia. 
Although guidelines have been set out for a diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome, it is 
still controversial as to whether it is a separate and distinct disorder from autism. 
Arguably, Asperger's syndrome is simply another term to describe individuals with 
higher-functioning autism. Indeed, the line between these two afflictions is thin, and 
clinicians may disagree about a diagnosis. Also, there are instances of a person being 
diagnosed with autism at a younger age, but fitting a diagnosis of Asperger's 
syndrome at an older age. This issue may raise several problems and has implications 
for the social services and treatment an individual will receive. For instance, some 
services may not provide the appropriate assistance if a person does not have the 
correct label. Also, the educational needs or treatment of an individual may vary 
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depending on their diagnosis. By conducting further research comparing individuals 
with autism and Asperger's syndrome we may hope to gain a better understanding as 
to the exact relationship between these two disorders. 
1: 5 Historical Background 
There is evidence that the syndrome of autism existed long before the term was first 
introduced. Initially individuals with autism were thought to be suffering from 
`childhood schizophrenia' or were referred to as `idiots'. They may have been 
abandoned or put in mental institutions because of their unexplainable, odd behaviour. 
Today autism is acknowledged as a pervasive developmental disorder that is clearly 
distinguishable from schizophrenia. Individuals with schizophrenia may suffer from 
delusions, unlike people with autism. Also, schizophrenia emerges in adolescence 
while evidence of autism can be found as early as two. 
Given what we currently know about autism, it is possible to look back through 
history to find evidence of its existence before we had identified the syndrome as 
`autism'. Some support for this dates as far back as the eighteenth century in accounts 
of feral children who grew up on their own in the wild. Uta Frith (1989) discusses the 
similarities between these cases and autism. One story describes an adolescent boy 
named Victor who was found in a forest in France. The boy, who has become known 
as the wild boy of Aveyron, was devoid of any language or social skills. He was 
taken under the care of Itard, who set out to try and educate the child. In Itard's work 
with Victor he mentions many autistic-like characteristics such as sensory 
abnormalities, stereotypical behaviour, and impairments in intelligence and 
imagination. 
Some researchers are sceptical as to whether Victor actually suffered from autism 
(Lane, 1977). Victor was noted as showing responsiveness to people, flexibility in 
routine, practical ability, and communication skills which may not be compatible with 
a diagnosis of autism. Frith (1989) disagrees with Lane by explaining how Victor's 
competence in these areas does not exclude autism as a possible diagnosis according 
to what we know about the syndrome currently. Despite his strengths, there was still 
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an element of `autistic aloneness' in Victor's behaviour, and improvement was slow 
and cumbersome. 
If we accept the case of Victor as an example of autism, then we must address the 
question of whether social isolation was a primary cause of his developing the 
syndrome. Frith (1989) mentions several reasons why it is likely that Victor was 
abandoned when parents might have suspected the child's atypical development. 
Reports of Victor's appearance by villagers just a few years before his capture suggest 
he might have been abandoned around 10 years of age. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
a very young child could have survived on its own in the wild, especially with a 
disability. It appears from this evidence that Victor's abandonment was a result of his 
disorder rather than the cause. Still, it is unknown what fostering Victor may have 
had up until his desertion. Thus, the question remains. as to whether severe social 
deprivation may result in autistic-like behaviour. 
An account of a young girl called Genie sheds some light on this debate (Curtiss, 
1977). Genie was documented medically as having normal development at an early 
age. However, after suffering from years of seclusion in a small room she was 
discovered at thirteen to have many difficulties including no language. Unlike Victor, 
Genie adapted quickly to her new environment showing emotional responsiveness and 
a desire to engage in social play. The case of Genie provides strong evidence that 
extreme social deprivation does not yield autism. In fact, individuals who suffer from 
social isolation have been found to have a good chance of recovery (Clarke and 
Clarke, 1976). This also contradicts early explanations of autism such as `refrigerator 
parenting' which assumed parental style was to blame (Bettleheim 1956,1967). This 
view is now strongly rejected, especially as no causal relationship between social 
class or family environment and autism has been proven. This does however provide 
an example of how notions about the nature and cause of autism have changed since 
its discovery. 
1: 6 Theory of mind 
One account of autism embraces the idea that the syndrome may be a consequence of 
a failure to read minds. The notion of theory of mind with respect to typical human 
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development was first put forward by Wimmer and Penner (1983). They presented 
children with the now widely used unexpected transfer test using play dolls. The story 
was about a character named Maxi who had placed some chocolate in a green 
cupboard in the kitchen. After Maxi had left the room his mother enters the kitchen 
and moves the chocolate to the blue cupboard. Then Maxi who is completely 
unaware the chocolate has been moved re-enters the room. The children were then 
asked where Maxi would look for the chocolate. An illustration of this story can be 
seen in Figure 1: 2. Wimmer and Perrier found that children aged 4-5 had erred in 
judging where the ignorant Maxi would look for the object. It was argued that older 
children were able to do the task successfully because they had developed the ability 
to represent mental states. This means they could understand that Maxi's belief about 
where the chocolate would be was different from its actual location in reality. In 
other words most children over age four could comprehend false-belief This started 
off an era of research that was conducted to eliminate other possible explanations of 
this phenomenal finding. 
Figure 1: 2 
Unexpected transfer test of false belief 
Scene I 
Green 
Maxi 
Scene 2 
_. -ý (ý o 
Green 
Blue 
-------------- 
0 
Biue 
Mum 
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In 1985 Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith extended these findings by asking whether 
children with autism have a theory of mind. They presented a variation of the test 
used by Wimmer and Perrier (1983) to individuals with autism and control subjects. 
Their test involved two dolls named Sally and Ann. Sally had a basket and Ann had a 
box. Sally had a marble which she put in her basket when she was finished playing. 
After Sally had left the room, Ann tranferred the marble to the box. Participants had 
to judge where Sally would look for her marble when she returned to get it. The 
results showed that individuals with autism were significantly less successful at this 
task than controls. Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) concluded that there was a distinctive 
problem with understanding the mental states of others in autism. 
One might rightfully assume that difficulty with the theory of mind task may be due 
to their failure to comprehend the story or memory problems. However, participants 
did not have any difficulty recalling that the marble was originally in the basket when 
asked. Since individuals with autism have learning difficulties, we might also 
question whether their problems with the task are due to this factor or to their autism. 
If poor performance is due to low verbal mental ability (VMA) than we would expect 
other non-autistic individuals with learning difficulties to perform similarly to those 
with autism. However, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) included a group of individuals 
with learning difficulties (Down's syndrome), who despite having slightly lower 
VMA than those with autism, did not have difficulty passing false belief. This 
suggests that difficulty inferring mental states is a particular feature of individuals 
with autism. 
A further criticism pointed out by de Gelder (1987) is that failure on a false belief task 
may be due to difficulties with imagination and make-believe activities rather than 
inferring mental states. Leslie and Frith (1988) tackled this issue by adapting the 
unexpected transfer test to a real-life situation. The use of people rather than dolls did 
not result in better performance in children with autism. Therefore, the 
methodological criticism proposed by de Gelder was not upheld. Although the theory 
of mind hypothesis has been very popular as an explanation of autism, the account 
still has its limitations. A more damaging criticism has been the finding that about 
20% of children with autism are able to pass theory of mind tests. Although many in 
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this minority have difficulties with a higher order theory of mind task (Baron-Cohen, 
1989; Pemer & Wimmer, 1985), there still remain a few individuals with autism who 
can consistently pass even these tasks (Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff, Rogers, & 
Pennington, 1991). 
Besides the lack of universality found in autism, mentalising deficits are not found to 
be specific to autism. A study by Peterson and Siegal (1995) presented individuals 
who were born deaf with an adapted version of the false belief task Although they 
had normal non-verbal intelligence, most of this group failed a simple test of theory of 
mind. The authors concluded that participants' difficulty with the task was a result of 
them being deprived of a rich linguistic environment. Furthermore, Minter, Hobson, 
and Bishop (1998) found that individuals who were bom blind also had difficulty 
passing false belief tests. Thus, this shows us that two populations other than those 
with autism have difficulties inferring mental states. 
Together, the above findings seem to undermine the theory of mind hypothesis on the 
basis of lack of universality and specificity. Although a mentalising deficit is still 
considered to be a feature associated with autism, alternative explanations have 
emerged to try to offer a more comprehensive account. 
1: 7 Executive Function 
Although the theory of mind hypothesis addresses the communication, language and 
social impairments in autism, it has neglected other features of the syndrome. Some 
of these include insistence on sameness, rigidity in routine, and narrowed range of 
interests. These difficulties seem to be more associated with attentional focus rather 
than mentalising. For example, an autistic individual may become so preoccupied 
with the texture or appearance of a ball that he or she is uý-iable to engage in a game 
with another individual. The inability to shift attentional focus is referred to as 
executive dysfunction. Problems with executive dysfunction are characteristic of 
individuals with damage to the frontal area of the brain. This may result in the 
perseverance in the current attentional focus or the tendency to be easily distracted by 
irrelevant stimuli. A couple of tasks, the Tower of Hanoi and Wisconsin Card Sort, 
have become accepted as standard tests of executive functioning. In the Wisconsin 
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Card Sort individuals sort cards according to a particular rule (e. g. shape). The person 
is given feedback as to whether the card was correctly placed or not. Then the rule is 
changed (e. g. sort by colour) which requires the individual to adapt to a different 
sorting strategy. It is when individuals have to use a new rule that difficulties with 
executive functioning become apparent. Those with frontal damage are unable to 
adopt the new rule and tend to persevere with using the first sorting strategy. 
The other test which reveals problems with attentional shifting, inhibition, and 
forward planning, is the Tower of Hanoi. The task involves 3 pegs and discs of 
varying sizes. The goal is to transfer the discs on the far left peg to the one on the far 
right without placing a larger disc on top of a smaller disc. In doing this, only one 
disc at a time can be moved. Individuals who have a lot of difficulty in performing 
this task are defined as having executive dysfunction. 
These two tasks were used by Ozonoff, Pennington, and Rogers (1991) who wanted 
to investigate executive functioning tasks in autistic individuals. They found that even 
those autistic individuals who passed theory of mind tasks, all had deficits in 
executive function. Individuals with autism showed evidence of preponent responses 
with perseveration compared to control groups. These results are quite damaging to 
the claim that a mentalising deficit is the primary cause of autism. They also raised 
questions about the association between theory of mind and executive function 
abilities, and whether deficits in executive control may cause problems with 
mentalising. 
Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, and Tidswell (1991) took on the task of trying to clarify 
this relationship. They devised the Windows task in which participants are presented 
with two closed boxes, one having a chocolate reward hidden inside. The goal is for 
the participant to obtain the reward by pointing to the empty box rather than where the 
chocolate actually is. Since the individual cannot see in either of the boxes they learn 
this rule through a preliminary phase of the experiment. They point at random and 
learn that each time they happened by chance to chose the empty box they were given 
a chocolate. Then in the next part of the experiment windows on the boxes are opened 
so the participant is able to see which box has the reward. This task was presented to 
children with normal development aged 3 and 5 and individuals with autism. They 
13 
found that children aged 5 had little difficulty pointing to the empty box in order to 
obtain the reward. However, the children with autism and the 3 year olds were unable 
to inhibit pointing to the box with the chocolate. 
Although this seems to be a clear test of executive dysfunction one could argue that 
an element of mentalising might be involved because it could involve deception. That 
is, they have to point to the empty box to prevent the other person getting the reward. 
Therefore, Hughes and Russell (1993) presented another version of the task which did 
not involve another person looking in the location that the child indicated. Children 
with autism still had difficulties with this version of the task which clearly is 
indicative of a problem with executive dysfunction. Russell et al. (1991) argue that it 
is this difficulty with executive function that could explain failure on false belief tests 
rather than problems with mentalising. They say when children are asked where Maxi 
will look for his chocolate they impulsively react and point to where the chocolate is. 
In conclusion, we find that even individuals who pass theory of mind tasks are still 
impaired on executive functioning. We also know that executive function abilities 
can account for performance on the standard false belief task. The executive 
functioning hypothesis therefore seems like a strong contender to help explain autism. 
However, this theory is not without its criticisms. There are individuals with frontal 
brain damage that have executive dysfunction who are not autistic. This challenges 
this theory as an explanation of autism. 
Studies by Leslie and Thaiss (1992) and Leekam and Pemer (1991) provide evidence 
that individuals with autism have the executive control capabilities necessary to 
acknowledge false belief They presented the false-photo test to individuals with 
autism and found them to do quite well compared to control subjects. In this task a 
photo is taken of a doll sitting on a mat. Afterwards the doll is then moved so it is 
sitting on a box. Children are then asked to judge where the doll will be sitting in the 
developing photo. As the executive functioning demands posed by the false photo 
task were similar to that of the false belief task it cannot be argued that the differences 
across tasks were due to problems in this area. However, the false photo task was 
different in that it did not require one to infer another's mental state. Indeed, this 
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gives us reason to think that children with autism may have a specific difficulty 
reading the contents of another's mind after all. 
Other criticisms of executive function theory include its vagueness. While there are 
so many aspects of executive control (e. g.. forward planning, attention switching, 
inhibition) it is difficult to formulate a coherent idea of the theory. As many of these 
areas are intertwined it is also difficult to pinpoint if one alone is the primary 
difficulty or if it is the combination of them. Also, there are still some areas of autism 
which cannot be explained by executive dysfunction such as exceptional skills found 
in autism. This theory has contributed a lot towards our understanding of autism, 
however there is still a great need for further investigation. 
1: 8 Hobson's account 
Hobson (1993) defines problems associated with autism in affective terms. This 
account differs from the other theories which suggest that autism is primarily due to a 
cognitive deficit. For instance, the theory of mind account holds the view that ability 
to infer mental states develops in typical children around 4 years of age. It is the 
failure to develop a theory of mind which accounts for the social, language, and 
communication impairments in autism. However, this would suggest that children 
with autism should not have social or affective difficulties prior to age 4 as this 
predates the time that a theory of mind has developed. 
A study that clarifies this was carried out by Klin, Volkmar, and Sparrow (1992). 
They carried out a survey on parents of autistic children using the Vineland Adaptive 
Behaviour Scales. They found that individuals with autism did not reach out in 
anticipation of being picked up by parents. In children with typical development this 
behaviour devel9ps around 18 months of age. The failure to respond this way was 
unique to the individuals with autism and was not found in those with other 
developmental problems such as Down's syndrome. This poses a problem for the 
theory of mind hypothesis as it shows evidence of a deficit in socialisation and 
communication that would originate before theory of mind is believed to develop. 
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Thus, there seems to be a more basic affective impairment in autism which cannot be 
explained by the lack of a theory of mind. 
Hobson, like Kanner, thought that individuals with autism are impaired in the ability 
to perceive emotion states in others. He argues that autistic individuals are unable to 
share experiences with others because they are unaware of the affective perspectives 
of others. Evidence to support this theory has mainly involved tests exploring the 
processing of facial expressions (Hobson 1990,1993,1994). In a study by Hobson, 
Ousten and Lee (1988) autistic children were less able to sort faces according to 
emotions compared to controls when certain facial features were left out. They argued 
that autistic individuals were less sensitive in emotion perception than individuals 
with normal development. 
A further finding by Hobson et al. (1988) showed that autistic subjects were better 
than control participants at categorising faces by emotional expression when 
presented upside-down. It was concluded that individuals with autism may be 
perceiving the face as a group of individual elements rather than as a meaningful 
integration of features. If the face were perceived as a whole with a specific 
orientation, an individual might become confused and under-perform as a 
consequence. It is suggested that this inability to determine others' affective attitudes 
is directly related to tardy development in understanding the mind. Other studies also 
support the idea of a deficit in the socio-emotional domain in autism (Hobson, 
Ousten, and Lee, 1989). Although many researchers would agree that individuals 
with autism have difficulties perceiving emotions, the exact nature of this problem is 
still debated. Specifically, the relationship between Hobson's account and theory of 
mind is still in need of clarification. 
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1: 9 Limitations of accounts of autism 
Although these theories have offered many ideas as to the possible causes of autism, 
none of them can explain autism in terms of a straight forward single cognitive 
deficit. The theory of mind and executive functioning accounts have not proven to be 
specific or universal to autism, while Hobson's theory still needs further investigation. 
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Another important problem with all these accounts is that they have primarily focused 
on explaining the main triad of impairments found in autistic individuals. They have 
neglected other non-social characteristics of the syndrome such as perceptual 
abnormalities, savant skills, islets of ability, preoccupation with parts of objects, 
restricted range of interests and excellent rote memory. These features in 
combination with the other social impairments create an uneven profile of abilities 
that are unique to the disorder. Recently there has been a substantial increase in the 
amount of literature pertaining to non-social features of autism. These findings are 
making it inappropriate to formulate a theory of autism that focuses narrowly on 
social and communicative impairments. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Review of the literature: Weak central coherence 
2: 1 Weak Central Coherence 
In 1989 a theory was proposed by Uta Frith, which was the first to try and explain the 
non-social as well as the social features of autism. This theory which is grounded in 
the information processing literature is known as weak central coherence. Frith 
explains that `central coherence' in individuals with normal development involves 
"the ability to draw together diverse information to construct higher level meaning". 
Alternatively then, a person with weak coherence would be more likely to process 
information locally rather than globally. That is he or she would focus on the details 
rather than attending to the meaningful whole. For, example when watching a movie 
we may recall the main story line but perhaps forget names or what actors were 
wearing. Individuals with autism may remember these details, but not be able to 
comprehend or recall the gist of the movie. This would also mean that they would fail 
to take context into account when processing information. Frith predicts that those 
with autism would do poorly on a task which would require the processing of global 
meaning, but would do well on tasks where attention to detail or component parts was 
required. This thgory may then be able to explain both the assets and deficits in autism 
as stemming from a single cause at the cognitive level. 
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2: 2 Visuo-spatial tasks 
One area where individuals with autism have been shown to excel is on visuo-spatial 
tasks. Early ideas contributing to the development of a theory of weak central 
coherence were drawn from research into perceptual abilities in autism A landmark 
study by Shah and Frith 1983 found that autistic individuals were superior at finding 
embedded figures compared to control subjects. The embedded figures test requires 
an individual to ignore the meaningful more complex figure (e. g. rocking horse) in 
searching for a smaller figure hidden (e. g. house) within it (see Figure 2: 1). Shah and 
Frith (1983) argued that control participants performed poorly because they were 
compelled to attend to the global meaning of the stimuli (rocking horse), whereas 
individuals with autism experienced `less capture by meaning' and therefore found 
the task easy. This surprising finding sparked interest into the `islets of ability' found 
in autism. In 1993 Shah and Frith found another intact area of ability when they 
presented individuals with autism with the block design test. 
Figure 2: 1 
Embedded Figures Test 
:: 1 
This test require. 5 an individual to replicate a pattern using individual blocks (see 
Figure 2: 2). Unlike the embedded figures test there is no obvious meaning to the 
stimuli. The patterns are abstract and not identifiable as any particular object 
although they do involve regular geometrical forms. Individuals without autism found 
it quite difficult to recreate the pattern using the blocks. However, when the pattern 
was segmented their performance greatly improved. In contrast, the individuals with 
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autism performed well irrespective of whether the pattern was segmented or not. This 
provided evidence that individuals with autism were able to visually segment the 
pattern into its component pieces quite easily. They argued that these findings along 
with their 1983 findings with the embedded figures test, offer support for the theory 
of weak central coherence. 
Figure 2: 2 
Block Design Test 
2: 2 Savant abilities 
As we have already said the theory of weak central coherence stands apart from other 
accounts because it addresses the prevalence of savant abilities in autism. In the 
autistic population about 10% of individuals show savant abilities (Rimland & Fein, 
1988). Despite having many social and language impairments, they are remarkably 
talented in a specific domain of knowledge. One ability that has been fairly well 
researched is artistic talent. The skills needed to draw or paint include being able to 
visually analyse what one is illustrating. The artist needs to view a scene in its 
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component parts and then build it up piece by piece to form a complete picture. If 
individuals focus too much on the whole then they might find themselves with a final 
sketch that doesn't look at all like what they wanted to draw. However, gifted autistic 
savants seem to be able to break away from viewing a scene in holistic terms, which 
allows them to paint or draw in a very realistic manner. One such individual who is 
able to do this is Stephen Wiltshire (Wiltshire, 1987). He is particularly well known 
for his amazing drawings of buildings, such as the British National library. The 
precision and realism of his drawings are outstanding. Another famous savant artist is 
Nadia (Seife, 1977), who is particularly talented at drawing horses. 
Figure 2: 3 
Drawings by savant artists 
Although there is quite a bit of literature on savant artistic ability, there are other 
domains where exceptional skills have been noted such as music or mental 
calculation. A number of accounts on musical savants have been compiled by Miller 
(1989). He explains how 12 of the thirteen individuals discussed have absolute pitch. 
This can be understood in terms of a strong preference to process information locally 
or in an analytical way which would further support weak central coherence (WCC). 
There are also those with autism who have phenomenal mathematical skills. A study 
on one particular autistic individual showed he excelled on tasks such as the Peabody 
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Individual Achievement Test (mathematics section), the Block design test (WAIS), 
and the Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices Test which all involved mathematical 
concepts (Steel, Gorman, and Flexman, 1984). In contrast, they found him to be 
significantly impaired on tests of verbal ability. 
2: 3 WCC and social and language difficulties 
The theory of weak central coherence also attempts to explain the social and language 
difficulties commonly associated with autism. In everyday conversation we encounter 
many ambiguous words (e. g. sun-son). We need to attend to the context of the 
sentence in order to know what meaning of the word a person is trying to convey. An 
experimental study by Snowling and Frith (1986) demonstrated how individuals with 
autism failed to use context appropriately when presented with ambiguous 
homographs. They asked autistic individuals to read sentences such as " The actor 
took a bow". The correct pronunciation of the word `bow' would require an 
individual to process the meaning of the whole sentence. They found that autistic 
individuals gave the incorrect (tie on a present) but more commonly used 
pronunciation of the word `bow'. 
The tendency to process elements individually rather than in relation to each other 
could also explain their problems interpreting ambiguous utterances. Often autistic 
individuals are noted to interpret statements literally rather than in the way the 
statement was intended. Happe found evidence of this in the strange stones task she 
presented to individuals with autism (1994b). She presented stories to individuals 
with autism that involved understanding irony, white lies, sarcasm, or jokes. The 
findings showed that those with autism had difficulty understanding these concepts as 
they interpreted the speaker's statement in a literal way. The difficulty individuals 
with autism experienced on this task could be explained as a problem with processing 
information in context. 
Individuals with autism also fail to use contextual information to assist recall of 
sentences or for related items (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1967a; Tager-Fluseberg, 1991). 
These require the individual to infer meaning in order to perform successfully. For 
instance, in a study of free recall of related and unrelated words individuals with 
22 
autism did better at recall of the unrelated items than controls. However, on recall of 
the related items they did quite poorly. It seems individuals with typical development 
make use of the thematic links between the items to facilitate recall while those with 
autism did not. This failure to utilise meaning has been argued to give support to the 
theory of central coherence as an explanation of autism. 
2: 4 Levels of coherence ability 
The theory has been criticised for being a bit vague and attempting to explain too 
much. Happe (1994a) agrees that the theory may suffer from over-extension and that 
there is need of further investigation. The theory of WCC can be seen as having two 
aspects, a perceptual and a conceptual level of explanation. A "failure to integrate 
information in context" can apply to both these levels. Context can either be 
meaningful (ambiguous homographs) or non-meaningful (block design). Therefore, 
an individual who displays weak coherence at a perceptual level may be unable to 
visually synthesize elements to formulate a whole. At a conceptual level an 
individual with a deficit in coherence may neglect to attend to or apply meaning to 
what they see. According to Frith's initial account of WCC, individuals with autism 
have problems with coherence at " higher levels", but not "lower levels" of 
processing. We can see how a failure to process meaningful context (conceptual 
level) is related to higher-levels of processing. Skills such as language comprehension 
involve inferential or abstract processing requiring an individual to perceive the 
meaningful context. However, the extent to which WCC might affect performance on 
various activities involving categorisation or memory is still uncertain. Happe 
(1994a) says that the theory "is perhaps in danger of trying to take on the whole 
problem of meaning" (page 126). 
Agreeing on the level at which perceptual integration occurs is far more difficult. 
Accumulating evidence suggests there may be deficits at very early perceptual- 
attentional levels of processing in autism. Some researchers argue that this may be 
indicative of coherence problems at a much lower level than Frith (1989) initially 
thought (Happe, 1996; Plaisted, Swettenham, & Rees, 1999). If coherence is weak at 
a very low attentional- perceptual level, this would carry serious implications for how 
individuals with autism perceive their world. However, it has also been suggested 
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that deficits in the perceptual domain which appear to be lower-level, may actually be 
due to problems with higher level processing. We need to differentiate the levels at 
which coherence is a problem so that we can assess the extent to which WCC explains 
features in autism. In the following sections we will consider research addressing 
these issues. 
2: 5 Information Processing and WCC 
As mentioned earlier the theory of WCC is grounded within an information 
processing framework. Frith (1989) describes a model of the mind that differentiates 
between central thought processes (global) and peripheral (local) input/output 
processes. She argues that in autism it is the central processing system, not the 
peripheral system, that fails to function properly. The peripheral processes are 
responsible for transforming sensations into perceptions. They are highly specialised 
modules that deal with various specific domains (e. g. speech). Information that has 
been processed by the peripheral system is usable at this stage, however it can be sent 
to the central processor to be interpreted even further. Here information can be 
compared, reinterpreted, and stored. It is the central processor which allows an 
individual to draw inferences. If the central processing system is weak, as in the case 
of autism, then an individual may be unable to draw together pieces of information in 
order to create meaning. The person is then left with fragments of information that 
may be of limited use. 
The local/global distinction made by Frith (1989) is comparable to "bottom-up" and 
"top down" processing. Bottom-up processing refers to how we obtain information 
about our environment directly through our senses. This information can be coded 
and sent to higher levels within the nervous system. Top down processing can be 
described as the perception of stimuli involving inferential processes. This includes 
higher-level functions such as learning, recognising meaningful stimuli, and 
processing information in context. Solely relying on top-down processing can lead us 
to make errors in judgements by only perceiving what we expect to perceive. For 
example, amateur painters often make mistakes in selecting colours for a scene. They 
may use brown for a tree trunk because they know this to be the colour associated 
with it. They are often disappointed because of the unconvincing appearance of their 
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tree. In order to create a more realistic looking tree trunk one might need to include 
purples, greens, or other colours that are less obvious. Likewise, if we are presented 
with some ambiguous information, we may not adequately comprehend it using 
bottom-up processing. 
Top-down and bottom-up processes must work together in order for effective 
perception. According to Frith's theory of WCC we would expect bottom-up 
processing, like local processing, to be intact in autism. However, many researchers 
in the 1950's and 1960's believed that deficits in lower-level perceptual-sensory 
systems were a primary deficit in autism. They argued that maybe individuals with 
autism have problems making sense of the world because information is not registered 
through the senses to begin with. Several hypotheses were put forward. Among these 
are the sensory dominance hypothesis (Goldfarb, 1956,1961; Schopler, 1965,1966) 
and the perceptual inconstancy hypothesis (Ornitz & Ritvo, 1968). 
2: 6 Sensory dominance hypothesis 
The sensory dominance hypothesis was popular around the 1960's (Goldfarb 
1956,1961; Schopler 1965,1966). This idea proposed that autistic children used 
proximal receptors more efficiently than the distal receptors. The proximal receptors 
that include the senses touch, taste, and smell, were associated with early stages of 
development. On the other hand vision and audition (distal receptors) were thought to 
develop at a later stage. Given that communication is most closely connected to 
seeing and hearing, it seemed a plausible explanation for the socialisation and 
language deficits found in autism. However, contrary experimental findings made it 
difficult to uphold the sensory dominance hypothesis. In one study Hermelin and 
O'Connor (1964) presented autistic and non-autistic individuals with stimuli from 
different modalities. Participants could hear a buzz (auditory), see a light (visual), or 
feel a gentle tug at their ankles (tactile). They were presented with two stimuli 
simultaneously, each on opposing sides (left or right). Each child was told that when 
they saw, felt, or heard a signal, they could have a sweet from the box on the same 
side. Since two stimuli were always presented together, the child had to select one 
over the other. The results showed that children with autism, like comparison groups, 
responded predominantly to the visual stimulus. This fails to support the sensory 
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dominance hypothesis that predicts individuals with autism make better use of 
proximal receptors. Furthermore, Rutter (1966) found evidence suggesting there may 
be abnormalities in proximal receptors in autism, such as low sensitivity to 
temperature or pain. In sum, the sensory dominance hypothesis was difficult to 
maintain as an explanation for autism. 
2: 7 The perceptual inconstancy hypothesis 
Ornitz and Ritvo (1968) proposed another hypothesis of a more physiological nature. 
They suggested that there may be problems with the vestibular system which resulted 
in the inability to regulate sensory input and also with integrating sensory input in 
coordination with motor output. Difficulties with this hypothesis arose from the 
vagueness in the terminology involved such as `perceptual inconstancy' and 
`intersensory integration'. So for example, it was unclear what exactly intersensory 
integration included and at which level it would be deficient. Many of these same 
criticisms have been a challenge for the more recent theory of WCC. The fact that 
some low functioning individuals with autism could read aloud gave evidence that 
they were capable of a certain level of intersensory integration. Also, results from 
sensorimotor tests (Sigman & Ungerer, 1981) show that autistic individuals could 
comprehend perceptual constancies such as size and shape. If perceptual inconstancy 
exists in autism, then we would expect there to be some difficulty with performance 
on such tasks requiring this type of perceptual judgements. Therefore, little evidence 
was found to support this argument. In addition, evidence of perceptual abnormalities 
was found primarily in younger, low-functioning individuals with autism. Thus, these 
theories failed to account for developmentally advanced autistic children. 
2: 8 Stimulus Overselectivity Hypothesis 
Not long after, another hypothesis based on low-level sensory perception was 
proposed (Lovaas, Schreibman, Koegel, & Rehm, 1971). The stimulus 
overselectivity hypothesis suggested that autistic children focus on only one cue in 
their environment while seeming to ignore all other cues. This idea would help 
explain why autistic individuals sometimes attend to minor and often irrelevant 
features in their environment. The stimulus overselectivity hypothesis has been 
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influential in the development of behaviour modification programmes used to teach 
children with autism. These programmes make use of operant conditioning techniques 
to help focus the child's attention on other more relevant cues in their environment. 
There have-been some criticisms of this account however, especially in research that 
has found stimulus overselectivity in non-autistic individuals with mental disabilities 
(Anderson & Rincover, 1982; Gersten, 1983; Koegel & Lovaas, 1978; Litrownik, 
McInnis, Wetzel-Prtchard, & Filipelli, 1978; Schover & Newson, 1976; Wilhelm & 
Lovaas, 1976). Therefore, overselectivity was not found to be specific to autism. 
2: 9 Summary of early research 
As the accumulating evidence seemed to indicate that lower level sensory processes 
were intact, attention was turned towards higher level cognitive processes in autism. 
Researchers became more interested in exploring the processes behind knowledge 
acquisition and wanted to know what concepts and skills autistic individuals possess. 
More recently however, a renewed interest in perceptual abnormalities has emerged. 
New findings suggest that we may have ruled out the possibility of a deficit at the 
perceptual-attentional level too soon. 
2: 10 Autobiographical accounts 
Reports from autistic individuals themselves give evidence of perceptual 
abnormalities in autism (Grandin, 1992; Williams, 1994). These autobiographies offer 
a valuable insight into the lives of individuals with this disability. One characteristic 
that is commonly reported by individuals with autism is hyper- and hyposensitivity to 
stimuli. Evidence of this has been found in all areas such as sound, touch, taste, 
smell, and vision. Grandin (1992) describes how sounds at a normal volume for 
others, would b(, ) amplified to a painful extent in her ears. She also explains how a 
simple hug or touch would be a suffocating experience, as her sensory system would 
go into overload. One way of dealing with the overloading would be to block out 
everything and withdraw into her own world. Also, people with autism find certain 
scents or tastes aversive because of their overwhelming intensity (Stehli, 1991). 
Problems in the area of vision include distorted and blurred eyesight which have been 
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said to cause miscalculations in depth or spatial perception (White & White, 1987). 
These visual abnormalities in combination with problems in other sensory systems, 
such as proprioception, may underlie the poor motor control or clumisiness sometimes 
found in autism. Other anecdotes mention multichannel perceptions or confusion 
when receiving information through more than one modality at a time. 
Although, these firsthand accounts tell us about the inner world of an individual with 
autism, O'Neill and Jones (1997) argue that there are several problems with relying 
too heavily on personal accounts. They raise the point that these autobiographies are 
often written by individuals at the more able end of the autistic spectrum. This creates 
a certain amount of uncertainty as to how individuals who are less able perceive their 
world. Another issue they raise is that these autobiographies could be influenced by 
the interpretation of co-authors or by the popular theories of the day. This may lead 
to a bias in the way the facts are stated in order to support a certain theoretical 
standpoint the authors hold. For this reason it is important to rely on other sources, 
such as psychological research or clinical reports, to learn about the perceptual 
difficulties associated with autism. 
2: 11 Clinical Research 
Clinical reports include several accounts of autistic individuals showing abnormal 
responses to sensory stimuli (DeMyer, 1976; Goldfarb, 1961; Hermelin & O'Connor, 
1970; Ornitz, 1974; Rimland, 1964; Rutter, 1966). Some autistic individuals are 
commonly known to notice minute changes in their environment, or find small objects 
on a patterned carpet. This can be another manifestation of weak coherence in that 
they are focusing on details rather than the whole of their surroundings. These clinical 
accounts are often obtained through parental reports, interviews, or questionnaires. A 
number of studies using these methods have found high numbers of autistic children 
showing disturbances in the sensory system (Bettison, 1994; Dawson, 1983; Ornitz, 
Guthrie, & Farley 1977,1978; Volkmar, Cohen, & Paul, 1986). However, these types 
of studies are less systematic and could be susceptible to a certain amount of bias by 
relying on parental observations. Parents' knowledge that their child is autistic may 
cause them to incorrectly report autistic tendencies that are not actually there. 
28 
Nonetheless, Ornitz (1989) argues that there is strong evidence from clinical studies 
to suggest that most young autistic children display abnormal sensory perception. 
2: 12 WCC and lower level perception 
Frith (1989) initially proposed that local processing would be intact in autism. She 
argued that to some extent a "cohesive force" operates at a local level in autism. If 
coherence were completely absent, even at local levels, then a person would have 
severely fragmented perception. Some of the clinical and autobiographical accounts 
do suggest this may be the case for at least some autistic individuals. It could be that 
coherence is indeed weak at very low-levels in autism. Recently there has been 
evidence from empirical studies to suggest that this may be true. 
Happe (1996) presented individuals with 6 visual illusions and asked them to make 
judgements about their appearance. She argues this would be a way of testing 
whether coherence was weak at very low levels, such as perceptual-attentional 
control. In order to perceive the illusory effect one must view all elements of the 
stimuli as a whole. Therefore, an individual who processed information locally rather 
than globally would not fall for the illusion. Surprisingly the results showed that 
individuals with autism did not succumb to visual illusions, as control subjects had 
done. These findings were taken as evidence of coherence deficits at low levels in 
autism. 
Further support for this argument comes from a study by Jarrold and Russell (1997). 
They explored how the theory of weak coherence might affect ability to count 
canonical forms. They asked individuals with autism, moderate learning difficulties, 
and typical development to count dots that were either canonical or distributed. The 
distributed stimuli included black dots randomly spread on a white background with 
some distracters" (white squares). The dots on the canonical stimuli were positioned as 
they would appear on a dice. Recognition of the pattern of dots in canonical form 
should allow an individual to state the number without the need to count the 
individual elements (subitizing). It was expected that control participants would find 
it easier to count the canonical stimuli resulting in a faster response time. However, if 
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individuals with autism rely on local processing this would put them at a disadvantage 
when enumerating canonical stimuli. 
Their findings showed somewhat mixed support for the theory of weak central 
coherence. On a group level, performance in the autistic individuals was not 
enhanced with the canonical stimulus to the extent it had been with controls. 
However, an analysis of individual patterns of performance found no significant 
differences between the autistic and MLD groups in regards to the number of global 
counters in each. Therefore, although there is evidence of difficulties with counting 
globally in autism, they were not found to be entirely specific to the syndrome in this 
particular study. 
Together these studies offer some support that holistic processing may be deficient in 
autism at a fairly low level. Both these studies seem to indicate a problem with the 
basic laws of grouping proposed by Gesltalt psychology such as proximity, similarity, 
closure, and good continuation (Rock & Palmer, 1990). As grouping has been argued 
to occur early in visual processing, it is difficult to imagine how an individual could 
function in life if they failed to use these Gestalt principles. These studies are 
consistent however with the extremely fragmented perception reported in the clinical 
and autobiographical accounts discussed earlier. It is possible that coherence may be 
deficient at a lower-level than Frith initially thought. This idea is challenged by 
recent findings suggesting that individuals with autism are capable of holistic 
processing at lower-perceptual levels. 
2: 13 Evidence suggesting intact holistic processing 
Mottron and Belleville (1993) carried out a case study of an autistic savant artist who 
could process information at a global level. They presented individuals with 
a hierarchical task to investigate global/local processing of information. This task 
presents a larger unit (global) which consists of many smaller parts (local). The two 
levels may be congruent such as a large C made up of smaller C's. In those with 
typical development information is usually detected more quickly at the global rather 
than at the local level (Navon, 1977). This finding is typically known as the "global 
advantage" effect. According to the theory of WCC, if an individual prefers to 
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process information at a local level then they would display a "local advantage" rather 
than a "global advantage". 
However, Mottron and Belleville (1993) found that the autistic savant artist (E. C. ) 
made more local than global errors like control participants. E. C. showed an increase 
in the number of global but not local errors when presented with incongruent stimuli 
(a large C made up of small O's). This "interference effect" was not apparent in the 
non-autistic control participants. The results lead Mottron and Belleville to conclude 
that individuals with autism process at the global level in a normal way, and the 
global does not have any special status over the local level. This theory makes 
different predictions than the theory of WCC. It suggests that individuals with autism 
are capable of handling visual information at both the global and local levels, however 
it is the relationship between these two levels which is impaired. Although these 
findings suggests that holistic processing may be intact at lower-levels, we must keep 
in mind that they are based on a case study of an autistic savant. 
It has been argued that the ability to process globally in autism may be restricted to 
certain types of procedures. Indeed, there are many variations in paradigms of 
perceptual hierarchisation tasks that could elicit very different results such as stimuli 
size, angle, or exposure time (Kimchi, 1992). A recent study by Plaisted, 
Swettenham, and Rees (1999) demonstrates this by presenting two versions of the 
Navon task to individuals with autism. They argued that the discrepant findings 
between Motttron and Belleville (1993) and Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, and Filloux 
(1994) could be due to the nature of the tasks administered. It was proposed that 
individuals with autism may show local precedence on a divided attention task but not 
on a selective attention task. A divided attention task was employed in Mottron and 
Belleville's (1993) study which required an individual to describe a letter at the local 
or global level on each trial. For instance, participants were asked to press one button 
if the letter `A' was present and a different button if `A' was not present. This would 
require one to apprehend the stimuli at both a global and local level. In the selective 
attention task used by Ozonoff et al. (1994) participants had to respond to a target at 
the local level in one block of trials. They were instructed before a given block of 
trials to attend to a particular level (global or local). If they were told to attend to the 
local level they were instructed to press one button if it was an `H' and the other if it 
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was an `S'. The results found that individuals showed normal global processing on 
the selective attention task but not on the divided attention task. 
Several explanations were considered to try and account for these results and the 
difference between the tasks. The most obvious distinction was that in the selective 
attention task individuals were explicitly told to attend to either the global or local 
level. On the divided attention task however, they had to search at both the local and 
global levels simultaneously. Thus, participants were overtly primed in the selective 
attention procedure but not in the divided attention task. 
As a result of these findings Plaisted et al. (1999) suggest that WCC may be thought 
of as an inability to filter out information at the local level, rather than a deficit in the 
ability to draw together information to make up the whole. Hyper-activity in channels 
of local processing may be responsible for the failure to process information globally 
when individuals are not primed. This is different from Frith's original conception of 
WCC as it suggests abnormal processing at local levels in how information is 
received. 
Plaisted et al. (1999) also suggest that an individual with autism may voluntarily 
choose to attend to the local unless instructed to focus on the global level. This 
implies a `cognitive style' rather than a `deficit' since individuals with autism are 
capable of processing information globally, but they choose not to do so. However, 
they may attend to the local level only because they find it difficult to shift their 
attention to the global level as required on the divided attention task. The divided 
attention task requires individuals to search at one level for the target, then shift their 
attention to the other level. This would explain the difference in autistic performance 
on the two tasks, but it would not allow for us to find any advantage or interference 
effects. Therefore, they concluded that a deficit in attention switching may be 
enlightening, but it could not explain their findings entirely on its own. 
In conclusion, Plaisted et at (1999) suggest that their results may be explained by 
more efficient local processing when an individual is not primed, in combination with 
a deficit in shifting attention to the global level. The study carries implications for 
both weak central coherence and the hierarchisation hypotheses because it shows 
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individuals with autism are capable of global processing under certain conditions. 
Although this seems damaging to both accounts, it may just indicate a need for them 
to be more specific about what circumstances they expect global processing to be a 
problem. There is still much to learn about these theories, and perhaps new findings 
in this area may help clarify rather than refute them. 
2: 14 Higher-level explainations of lower-levels 
Perhaps apparent difficulties with perception can be explained at a different level of 
processing. Frith and Baron-Cohen (1987) argued that many deficits at lower-levels 
in perception could actually result from abnormalities in higher-level (top down) 
processing. For example one behavioural characteristic associated with autism is 
avoidance of eye contact which was has been described by Asperger (1944). He 
stated, "They do not make eye contact... they seem to take in things with short 
peripheral glances (page 10, Frith 1989). An important study by O'Connor and 
Hermelin (1967b) investigated eye gaze in children with and without autism. They 
presented photographs of a face and a geometric pattern mounted on a black 
background to participants. Individuals with autism showed shorter fixation times 
than other groups and spent more time looking at the background. O'Connor and 
Hermelin argued this to be evidence of abnormal preference patterns in autism. 
Evidence of abnormal eye gaze behaviour in individuals with autism has also been 
found in other studies (Mirenda, Donellan, & Yoder, 1983; Hutt & Ounsted, 1966). 
Abnormal eye gaze patterns may seem to be a result of a lower level perceptual 
deficit. However, some researchers believe that higher level socio-cognitive problems 
may explain this behaviour. Argyle (1972) argues that eye gaze regulates turn taking 
during conversation. It may be that eye contact avoidance in autism is due to their 
inability to understand and apply social rules when interacting. 
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Brian and Bryson (1996) agree with this line of thinking. They argue that the superior 
performance of individuals with autism on the embedded figures test could either be 
due to "less capture by meaning" or "less capture by wholeness". It could be that 
meaning is less salient to those with autism, resulting in them being able to find the 
embedded figure easily. However, those with autism might perform well on the task 
regardless of whether the stimuli were meaningful or not. "Less capture by meaning" 
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would indicate a problem with coherence at higher levels, while "less capture by 
wholeness" would involve deficits at a lower perceptual level. They varied the 
meaningfulness of their stimuli to test these alternatives. Although they did not find a 
superiority effect in the autistic group, their study emphasises the need to consider 
explanations at different levels. It is necessary to consider "higher" and "lower" 
processing separately in order to determine where the problem lies so we can make 
specific predictions using the theory of WCC. 
In light of this discussion we might reconsider the argument of deficits in coherence at 
very low levels. In the study of subitizing by Jarrold and Russell (1997), individuals 
with autism may have had difficulties understanding the convention of canonical 
stimuli. Perhaps individuals with autism did not utilise their prior knowledge of the 
patterns of dots on a die to facilitate counting. Performance could then be attributed 
to problems with higher-levels of processing. However, in Happe's study (1996) of 
visual illusions it is difficult to see how a deficit in processing at higher levels might 
explain why individuals with autism failed to succumb to illusions. In fact relying on 
one's previous knowledge of illusions might be more likely to result in an individual 
not falling for the illusion. For instance, a person might say that the two lines within 
an illusion were the same because they were familiar with how the illusion worked, 
even if they visually perceived the lines as different. Therefore, evidence from 
Happe's study may indeed point to a deficit in coherence at low levels, unless most 
autistic individuals in her sample were not reporting what they truly perceived. 
Happe's findings may call for the need to modify the original theory of WCC. Frith 
acknowledged that to some extent a "cohesive force" operates at a local level in 
autism. If coherence were completely absent, even at local levels, then an individual 
would have severely fragmented perception. She assumes that visual illusions operate 
at low levels. Since those with autism are thought only to have difficulty processing 
information at high levels, their perception of illusions should not differ from those 
with typical development: 
"Optical illusions are an example of cohesive effects of a specialised input processor, 
occurring at an early stage of processing. However much we try we cannot escape 
their influence. A triangle defined only by three dots looks like a triangle even when 
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there are no connecting lines. There is no evidence to suggest that in this respect there 
would be a difference between autistic and non-autistic children. The difference 
might lie solely with the cohesive force that acts at a high level in the central 
processing system" (Frith 1989, Page 97) 
Happe's findings are indeed surprising in relation to Frith's original expectations 
about coherence deficits. Thus, it is important to investigate coherence at low levels 
to understand more about the boundaries of WCC. 
2: 15 Conceptual level of WCC 
In the previous sections we have argued that there is a need to establish the lowest 
level at which coherence is weak in autism. However, as we mentioned earlier there 
is also a conceptual component to the theory of WCC. This part of the theory is also 
in need of further clarification. The theory argues that individuals with autism fail to 
process information in context, or fail to integrate parts into a meaningful whole. This 
explanation remains unclear as the terms "context" and "meaningful" are relative. 
As we mentioned before context can either be meaningful or non-meaningful. As in 
the case of visual illusions the contextual elements, circles and lines, are meaningless. 
We do not even need to know that these are called lines or circles in order to perceive 
the distorting effects of the illusory context. If we see a painting depicting an 
umbrella, a shovel, a towel, a shell, sand, and an ocean, we would be able to identify 
the location as the seaside. If someone only painted a towel and asked where the 
scene was we might be puzzled. We need to consider the relationship between the 
various objects (i. e. things found at the seaside) in order to recognise the picture as the 
seaside. Likewise, we must consider each word in a sentence in relation to each other 
(e. g. I would like a glass of water), in order to perceive the meaning behind the 
utterance. Context is the overall meaning that is built up from all the individual parts. 
Therefore, an individual who is unable to see relationships between the parts (context) 
and draw them together may have terrible difficulties understanding their world. 
According to the theory of WCC individuals with autism do have an underlying 
problem processing information in context. However, we would not expect them to 
have a problem identifying the beach scene or understanding the request for water. 
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Many empirical studies offer evidence suggesting that "taking context into account" is 
problematic for individuals with autism. A discussion of these may help us 
understand the particular situations where difficulties arise. 
2: 16 Empirical studies suggesting a failure to process meaningful context 
Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) found individuals with autism failed to use the 
meaningful context of the sentence in order to aid recall of word strings. They 
presented individuals with a list of words, some of which formed a proper sentence 
(e. g. where-is-the-ship-what-see-was-leaf). Those without autism recalled the 
sentence no matter where it occurred in the word list, while those with autism 
consistently recalled the last words on the list. So when the sentence was at the end of 
the list they did repeat it. If an individual with autism was presented with the 
sentence "where is the ship? " we would have no reason to doubt they could 
understand its meaning. However, why would they not recognise the sentence within 
the word list and recall it? Frith (1989), suggests that the problem may not be with 
perceiving similarities between stimuli, but with an inability to see the need to do this. 
If we accept this position, then we would say that individuals with autism can process 
meaningful context, but they simply do not choose to attend to it or utilise it to their 
benefit. This reinforces the idea of WCC as a cognitive style rather than a deficit. 
Findings from a few studies offer evidence in support of a "cognitive style" in autism. 
As mentioned earlier, individuals have difficulty utilising meaning to assist recall of 
thematically related words (Tager- Flusberg, 1991). However, in a second part of this 
study a cue word from a superordinate category was given (e. g. fruit) to the 
participants. The results showed that with this cue individuals with autism were able 
to see the links between words and use it to aid recall. The results showed no 
difference between the clinical and control groups for this condition of the task. 
Further evidence of a cognitive style comes from a study on ambiguous homographs 
(Snowling & Frith, 1986). Individuals usually give the incorrect but more common 
pronunciation of a homograph because they fail to take the context of the sentence 
into account. However, Snowling and Frith found that with some training the 
individuals with autism were able to give the correct response. Therefore, it is not an 
inability to process information in a particular way, rather it is a stylistic preference of 
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the individual. We might ask why things we perceive as most salient or important in 
our environment are not so obvious to individuals with autism. 
2: 17 Meaning and attention 
It may be that individuals with autism do not attend to the same things in our 
environment as we do because they do not hold the same meaning. Snyder and 
Barlow (1988) argue that what we perceive in our visual field conforms to certain 
patterns. Our perception can be more efficient if we have certain expectations of what 
we are to see. Snyder and Thomas (1997) suggest that typically developing 
individuals have mental representations that pick up on the salient or ecologically 
significant aspects in the environment. If we do not impose certain expectations on 
what is to be seen then we might perceive all details as equally important. 
A study by Weeks and Hobson (1987) explored the salience of emotional expression 
in individuals with autism. They showed participants photographs of people which 
could be classified according to hat type, emotional expression, sex, and age. 
According to Hobson, those with autism have an impairment in understanding 
affective attitudes. He would then predict that emotional expression would not be 
paramount as a criterion. Indeed, when autistic individuals were asked to sort photos 
any way they like, they used hat type as a strategy. However, when asked again to sort 
according to another feature they were able to sort according to facial expression. In 
contrast, the majority of children without autism sorted according to facial expression 
before hat type. 
According to the theory of WCC we might argue Hobson's findings are not 
necessarily a problem with processing affective expression, rather they suggest a more 
general problem with "less capture by meaning". The fact that the individuals with 
autism were able to sort by facial expression when given a second chance 
demonstrates they are able to recognise emotion. We might ask whether individuals 
attend to different aspects of a scene that are non-social in nature. 
The theory of WCC is powerful in that it has been able to account for many of the 
strengths and weaknesses associated with autism. It is capable of explaining atypical 
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behaviour at different levels of processing, although these levels are in need of further 
investigation. We have also argued that WCC is a "cognitive style" rather than a 
deficit. This raises the question "To what extent can a difference in cognitive style 
explain general features of autism? ". 
2: 18 Theory of Mind and WCC 
Initially Frith (1989) suggested that weak central coherence may account for 
impairments in theory of mind. However, more recently it has been argued that 
deficits in coherence ability may be additional and separate from problems with 
mentalising. Evidence to support this comes from a study by Happe (1991) where she 
presented autistic individuals with a battery of theory of mind tests as well as a 
homograph reading test. She found that even those who consistently passed all theory 
of mind tests still failed to use the context appropriate word on the homograph reading 
task. This provided evidence that the relationship between mentalising and coherence 
ability was not causal. 
Further support for this comes from another study by Happe (1994c) investigating 
theory of mind and performance on the WISC-R and WAIS (subtests). She found that 
individuals with autism who failed theory of mind tasks also had difficulty with the 
comprehension subtest. However, they did very well on the Block Design Task (non- 
verbal performance) regardless of their mentalising ability. Happe (1994b) presented 
autistic individuals with a more naturalistic version of the theory of mind task. Even 
those who passed second order false belief tests had difficulty inferring information 
from a story. Weak central coherence might then help account for impairments in 
those individuals with autism who are able to pass false belief tasks. This suggests 
that there may be two different cognitive deficits that underlie autism rather than a 
single factor. These findings would be compatible with the idea that theory of mind is 
a modular ability which relies on a fixed neural network which is domain specific 
(Fodor, 1983). Baron-Cohen and Leslie (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1987; Leslie & 
Roth, 1993; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) have argued in support of this view. If we assume 
the ability to mentalise is domain specific, then we would not expect it to be linked 
with other abilities such as weak central coherence. 
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However, studies employing more complex mentalising tasks and tests of central 
coherence have suggested there may be a link between the two abilities. Some 
evidence for this comes from a study by Baron-Cohen and Hammer (1997). They 
tested 30 adults with typical development and 30 parents of children with Asperger's 
Syndrome with an equal number of males and females in each group. The embedded 
figures test was employed as a test of weak central coherence, while the eyes reading 
task was used as a measure of mentalising ability. In the `eyes' task, participants 
were presented with photos of the eye region of the face only. After a few seconds 
the picture is removed, and the individual is asked to choose which of two words best 
describes what the person is thinking or feeling (e. g. sad or happy). They found a 
significant sex difference in performance on the two tasks, with the males doing better 
on the embedded figures test and worse on the `eyes' task than females. Baron- 
Cohen, Joliffe, Mortimore, and Robertson (1997) also found a sex difference on the 
'eyes' task in their study. Together, these findings suggest that theory of mind and 
WCC abilities may not be as independent as we thought. They also suggest that the 
inverse relationship between these abilities found in the male population is even more 
pronounced in autistic individuals. 
Is it plausible to think that two such distinctly different abilities could be related in 
some way? One might ask whether the tasks used in these studies are actually testing 
what they are supposed to. For instance, can we be assured that the success on the 
`eyes' test relies primarily on mentalising ability? Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, and 
Jimenez (1999) argue that this task may not be a valid test of theory of mind for 
several reasons. They say that the `eyes' task involves representation of an agent's 
attitude but not the content of that attitude. For instance, one might be able to tell 
whether one's eyes appear happy or anxious, but they could not infer the reasons 
behind these emotions. Many would argue that the representation of both attitude 
and content is needed to qualify as metarepresentational ability (Perner, 1991; Jarrold, 
Carruthers, Smith, Boucher, 1994). Therefore, the `eyes' task may not be regarded as 
a pure test of theory of mind. 
In fact, there may even be a component of central coherence involved in the task as 
Jarrold et al. (1999) point out. They argue that one needs to visually integrate the 
various cues (e. g. angle of eyebrows, direction of gaze) in order to perceive the 
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mental state behind the eyes. If any of these cues were processed in isolation we 
might expect one to be less accurate in their judgements on the task. This would 
explain why an individual with a local processing style would do poorly on the `eyes' 
task and well on the embedded figures test. 
Jarrold et al. (1999) made attempts to investigate the relationship between WCC and 
theory of mind by using theory of mind tests that were not visual in nature and were 
accepted as a true test of metarepresentational ability. Several measures of theory of 
mind were administered as well as two tests of central coherence. The results 
revealed significant correlations between these two abilities, which remained when 
verbal mental ability was accounted for. Thus, the relationship found between theory 
of mind and WCC can be explained in terms of individual differences rather than 
developmental differences. 
2: 19 Executive function and WCC 
We have already discussed the possibility that characteristics of autism may result 
from impairments in executive functioning. A number of abilities are considered to 
be under executive control that we may also find in areas such as theory of mind and 
weak central coherence. In our pursuit to understand more about WCC, we must 
clarify how it differs from executive functioning. Frith and Happe (1994) argue that 
the two theories do make distinctly different predictions. They suggest that 
"inhibition of pre-potent but incorrect responses" may have two components 
(inhibition and recognition of context-appropriate response). It may be that 
individuals have problems with inhibiting action only when context is relevant. This 
would show difficulties with processing context, as the theory of weak central 
coherence would predict. However, it could be that autistic individuals have 
problems inhibiting action even when context is irrelevant. This would suggest a 
more fundamental problem with inhibitory control in general, as predicted by the 
theory of executive dysfunction. 
Recently, studies on perceptual ability and attention in autism have considered the 
role of executive dysfunction more closely. This research is of considerable interest 
because it allows us to understand more about the overlap between executive 
40 
functioning and weak central coherence. As mentioned earlier, attention shifting is an 
executive ability that is thought to be impaired in autism. Impairments in shifting 
attention can be linked to "tunnel vision" which is reminiscent of earlier perceptual 
theories of overfocused attention (Lovaas, Schreibman, Koegel, & Rehm, 1971; 
Rincover & Ducharme, 1987). If an individual is intensely focused on a particular 
stimulus, they may not be able to disengage their attention to look elsewhere even 
when a task requires them to do so. Evidence of this has been found both within the 
visual modality (Casey, Gordon, Mannheim, & Rumsey, 1993; Townsend & 
Courchesne, 1994; Wainwright-Sharp & Bryson, 1993) as well as between visual and 
auditory modalities (Courchesne, Akshoomoff, & Ciesielski, 1990). 
Of particular interest however, is a study by Wainwright and Bryson (1996) looking at 
visuo-spatial orienting in autism. They presented 3 different experiments to high 
functioning adults with autism. The first task required participants to detect a single 
target that would appear either on the left or the right side after an initial fixation cue 
in the centre of the computer screen. The participants were required to press a button 
as soon as they saw the stimulus which then recorded their response time in seconds. 
Typically, individuals with normal development would show a left field-right 
hemisphere advantage for attending to stimuli. The researchers were interested in 
whether or not the same would be true of those individuals with autism. Indeed, the 
results showed that autistic individuals, like controls, had a typical left visual field 
advantage. 
The second experiment was exactly the same except stimuli could appear at the centre 
as well as to the left and right of the screen. In this experiment those with autism 
performed differently than controls in that they responded more quickly to central 
than to lateralised stimuli. Moreover, the left field advantage previously found in the 
first experiment disappeared. Difficulty disengaging focus from the centre of the 
screen was taken as evidence of overfocused attention in autism. In the final 
experiment the processing demands of the task were increased which required a 
participant to identify as well as detect a target (Le. a cross). 
The results of this experiment indicated that the advantage of central over lateral 
targets was enhanced in autistic individuals even further with the additional 
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requirement of identification. In controls however, the left field advantage 
disappeared. These findings together support the idea that individuals with autism 
have problems shifting their attentional focus through space. Furthermore, as a result 
of this difficulty with attention shifting they might be less able to handle additional 
processing demands such as target identification in the final experiment. 
Again, it is important to note that slight changes in the procedures of the 3 
experiments yielded different results in the autistic group. In the first experiment, 
autistic individuals showed the normal left field advantage like controls when 
detecting the target. It is only when the additional central target is added in 
Experiment 2 that this advantage disappears in autistic individuals. The autistic group 
may experience difficulty disengaging attention from the fixation point to the lateral 
target, which controls are able to do more quickly. Thus, if those with autism were 
overly focused on the centre of the screen after the fixation point was displayed this 
would allow them to detect the central target more quickly. Even though they detected 
the left field target more quickly than the right in the first experiment, the autistic 
groups' mean detection time was still much slower than the controls. 
We could perhaps compare this to the global/local hierarchisation task discussed 
earlier. In the study by Plaisted et al. (1999) those with autism show a normal global 
advantage on a selective attention task, but not on a divided attention task. The 
researchers argued that problems on the divided attention task may be due to 
difficulty switching attention to the global level after initially searching at the local 
level for the target. 
Another study by Plaisted, O'Riordan, and Baron-Cohen (1998a) explores these 
issues further. They argue that overselective attention may underlie problems with 
transferring newly acquired skills in autism. They presented adults with autism and 
controls with a perceptual learning test. This involved recognising patterns on a 
screen which were composed of seven beachball like circles. Three of the seven 
circles were always in the same position, however the remaining four were in 
different locations for each stimulus. They anticipated that those with typical 
development would be better able to discriminate pre-exposed stimuli than they 
would non-pre-exposed stimuli thus showing a perceptual learning effect. For the 
42 
autistic group they proposed that individuals would be better at processing unique 
features than common features between stimuli. Thus, participants with autism would 
not be expected to show a perceptual learning effect. The results did indeed support 
the predictions 
Plaisted, O'Riordan, and Baron-Cohen (1998a) argue weak central coherence cannot 
account for their pattern of results. They remark that the global pattern differed for 
each of the stimuli. Thus, perception of a global pattern by the control group would 
predict a weak rather than a strong effect. Since they did find a strong perceptual 
learning effect in the control group, they concluded that performance was not based 
on the perception of the overall pattern. 
Alternatively, they suggest that there may have been a problem shifting attention 
between different stimuli. In order to discriminate between two stimuli one needs to 
search the screen to find differences in the relative spatial positions of the circles. If 
individuals with autism restrict their attention to just one particular area and do not 
visually search the other parts of the screen then this might explain their poor 
discrimination of pre-exposed stimuli. Plaisted, O'Riordan, and Baron-Cohen 
(1998a) argue that this cannot however explain the better performance by individuals 
with autism by the end of the preexposure phase and in the non-preexposed condition. 
Therefore, they propose a new hypothesis of reduced generalisation which can 
account for this. The hypothesis suggests that individuals with autism are good at 
processing unique features of a stimulus, but are poor at processing common features 
compared to those without autism. In conclusion they suggest this new hypothesis in 
combination with reduced attention switching may account for their findings. The 
results of this perceptual learning study are important in that it shows an area those 
with autism excel in (enhanced discrimination of novel stimuli) which cannot be 
accounted for by the theory of weak central coherence. This suggests a need to 
consider more carefully alternative explanations to WCC when investigating 
perceptual differences in autism. 
2: 20 Why study WCC? 
The extent to which WCC can account for symptoms of autism is still under debate. 
Although other theories have so far failed, it is possible the theory of WCC may be 
43 
able to explain all features of the syndrome (social as well as non-social features). 
However, the more likely alternative is that autism involves "weak coherence" in 
addition to other deficits such as mentalising or executive dysfunction. 
As we have seen, a large amount of research pertaining to WCC focuses on perceptual 
abilities in autism. One might argue that understanding perceptual abnormalities is 
not vital for our understanding autism as it is not a "core" impairment. Although 
severely atypical perception is not evident in all individuals with autism, 
abnormalities in perception may exist to a lesser extent in the general clinical 
population. For example, in a population of 20 individuals with autism we may find 
that all excel on the block design test, however only a few might have severely 
fragmented perception. These few might even fail to succumb to illusory effects. 
This would also be supportive of the idea that "weak coherence" is a cognitive style 
that varies within a population as well as between populations. Nonetheless, 
perceptual abnormalities are certainly more common in autism than in other 
developmental disorders. Advances in perception research may reveal areas of 
dysfunction that we could not detect with less refined theories and with the outdated 
technology used in earlier years. 
I have also discussed how the theory of WCC attempts to explain the more primary 
impairments found in autism such as language and socialisation. This has been 
referred to as the component of the theory that involves conceptual knowledge. More 
research is needed at this level to specify which areas would be affected by "a failure 
to take context into account". Almost everything involves context to an extent. 
Evidence suggests that those with autism are able to use contextual information under 
some circumstances. This area needs to be investigated so that we can better 
understand under which conditions individuals with autism fail to process information 
in context. Only by doing this will we be able to understand the exact nature of the 
problem individuals with autism have with attending to "context". 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Do individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome show weak 
central coherence at low levels? 
This chapter is a modified version of the paper by Ropar and Mitchell (1999), "Are 
individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome susceptible to visual illusions? ", 
published in the Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 40, pp. 1283-1293. 
3: 1 Coherence at very low levels 
In chapter two I discussed the evidence for a deficit in coherence ability at lower 
perceptual levels. It seems that most individuals with autism are able to perceive 
information from their environment (Frith & Baron-Cohen, 1987). For instance, they 
can identify pictures, objects, or sounds. They can even translate information across 
modalities as evidenced by their ability to read aloud. Nonetheless, there is sufficient 
counter-evidence from experimental studies as well as clinical reports to suggest that 
individuals with autism may have problems integrating information at lower 
perceptual-sensory levels. Among this evidence was a study by Happe (1996) which 
found individuals with autism to be less susceptible to visual illusions. She argues that 
coherence may indeed be weak at very low levels. Her findings contradict Frith's 
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initial predictions about the level at which coherence is weak. Happe's study may 
indicate a need to re-define or extend the theory of WCC to account for her findings. 
Therefore, it is essential that Happe's findings be replicated using more sensitive 
measures of illusion susceptibility in order to know the lower boundary at which we 
might find weak coherence in autism. 
Experiment 3: 1 
3: 2 Introduction 
The results of a study by Happe (1996) suggest that individuals with autism might be 
less susceptible to visual illusions than those with typical development. In her study, 
participants inspected a variety of lines and shapes presented in a context that affected 
illusory distortion. Participants were invited to judge whether two lines or shapes 
were the same or different in size, or were asked if a line was straight or curvy. As 
expected, those with typical development were susceptible to the illusions, and 
judged, for example, that two lines of physically identical length were different. In 
contrast, significantly more participants with autism made judgments about the stimuli 
in accordance with their physical properties. Participants with typical development 
benefited from having the stimuli pre-segmented with added colour and depth, 
whereupon they were less likely to succumb to the illusion. Individuals with autism 
gained no such benefit because their judgments were already at or near ceiling in the 
condition without pre-segmentation. If individuals with autism are not susceptible to 
visual illusions, then the implications are profound. Since the effects probably stem 
from basic perceptual processes, it is possible that an individual who was not 
susceptible would be perceiving the world in a radically different way. 
Happe (1996) explained her remarkable finding by suggesting that participants with 
autism might have "weak central coherence" at a basic level, such that they did not 
perceptually integrate the target stimuli with the visual context. The hypothesized 
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failure of integration might thus neutralize the effect of context. In Happe's study, 
participants made verbal judgments about the stimuli. In the current research, I 
question whether the effect would also be apparent with nonverbal measures. I begin 
by considering Happe's finding in relation to the hypothesis of weak central 
coherence and with respect to aspects of perceptual functioning in people with typical 
development and with autism. 
There are many anecdotal reports of unusual experiences of perception in autism, 
which generally indicate heightened awareness of the fine detail of a scene. For 
example, one child reputedly was able to find small objects on a patterned carpet 
more rapidly than an individual with typical development (Frith & Baron-Cohen, 
1987). There are also reports of savant artists who demonstrate outstanding drawing 
ability without ever having formal artistic training (Seife, 1978; Wiltshire, 1991). 
Investigation into these special abilities has suggested that individuals with autism 
have certain perceptual characteristics which may actually be an advantage on some 
visuo-spatial tasks. 
Supporting evidence was reported by Shah and Frith (1983), who presented an 
embedded figures task and found that individuals with autism were able to locate a 
target hidden within a more complex figure more accurately than control subjects. In 
a later study, Shah and Frith (1993) presented a block design task, in which blocks 
with parts of a design on one face have to be assembled to recreate an entire pattern. 
Once again, autistic subjects completed the task more quickly and with fewer 
mistakes than individuals with typical development. While children with typical 
development bdnefitted from seeing the target design pre-segmented, those with 
autism performed well whether the design was pre-segmented or unsegmented. The 
finding suggests that those with autism differed from other participants in that they 
were easily able to apprehend the target shape in its component parts even when 
presented as an unsegmented whole. These areas of preserved functioning have been 
referred to as "islets of ability" by Kanner (1943). The superior performance of 
autistic individuals on these tasks has been explained by Frith (1989) to arise from 
"weak central coherence". 
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Weak central coherence has been described as showing a preference to process 
information locally rather than globally, or a failure to process information in context 
(Frith 1989). This stands in contrast to perception in individuals with typical 
development, where global analysis takes precedence over local (Navon, 1977). 
Global precedence might be uniquely human, since Baboons actually show preference 
for local perceptual processing. In view of this, Fagot and Deruelle (1997) suggest 
that global precedence in humans might not have a purely perceptual or sensory basis. 
Frith's theory explains autistic success on various visuo-spatial tasks such as the 
embedded figures, where weak central coherence seems advantageous (Shah & Frith 
1993; 1983). Autistic individuals with weak coherence will not be captured by the 
global shape, which will free them to focus on the individual lines and thus detect the 
hidden shape swiftly. 
Having weak central coherence is often a disadvantage, of course, and it could be 
responsible for difficulties in some aspects of impaired reading comprehension. A 
study by Frith and Snowling (1983) suggested that autistic individuals failed to take 
account of the sentence context when reading ambiguous homographs. Subjects were 
asked to read sentences like, "He took a bow when everybody clapped". The autistic 
subjects tended to give the more common pronunciation of "bow" (as a way of 
fastening a shoe lace). Although the theory of weak central coherence has been fairly 
successful in explaining both the deficits as well as the assets found in autism it is 
unclear at which level of processing coherence is supposed to be weak. 
Researchers have not been able to find much evidence of a deficit in lower level 
processing in autism (Hermelin & O'Connor, 1970). A review by Frith and Baron- 
Cohen (1987) concluded that any perceptual abnormalities should be explained in 
terms of higher levels of intellectual functioning. They claim that basic processes are 
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sufficiently intact to allow depth perception and separation of figure from ground. If 
aspects of low-level perception are not affected by autism, then we would expect 
individuals to be susceptible to visual illusions, since these are thought to occur at a 
low level of processing (Robinson, 1972; Bruce, Green, & Georgeson, 1996). 
Consistent with this, Mottron and Belleville (1993) reported the case of EC, a savant 
artist with Asperger's syndrome, who showed precisely the same susceptibility as 
controls to a selection of visual illusions, including the Hering, the Ponzo, the 
Poggendorf and the Muller-Lyer. The illusory effect was apparent in both a verbal 
and nonverbal measure. In the verbal task, E. C. was asked which line looked the 
longest, and he reliably indicated the line which merely appeared longer. In the 
nonverbal measure, E. C. was asked to draw the stimuli, and the illusory effect was 
evident as a systematic distortion in his drawings. 
Despite research against the idea of a deficit in lower level processing, several clinical 
accounts give a strong indication that perceptual differences do exist in autism. 
Jolliffe, Lansdown, and Robinson (1992) report how one autistic person describes her 
difficulties looking at people and pictures. She explains, "I am not looking at the 
whole but rather just the outline or the part. I cannot look at a picture completely, 
but only a small section at a time" (Jolliffe et al. 1992, p. 15). There are also reports 
of autistic individuals having difficulties with depth perception when attempting to go 
down a staircase (Grandin, 1995). Similarly, Donna Williams (1992) recalls 
numerous visual abnormalities throughout her autobiography. Given the clinical 
reports, in conjunction with a reasoned account of how weak coherence could affect 
the basic functioning of perception, Happe (1996) thought it worthwhile to conduct a 
systematic study into autistic susceptibility to visual illusions. She pointed out that in 
an illusion like the Ponzo, the context of the converging lines is responsible for 
provoking the perceptual distortion of the stimuli circles (see Figure 3: 1). If an 
individual were effectively able to ignore this context, then the illusion would not 
work. Since individuals with autism are reputed to fixate locally rather than globally, 
owing to weak central coherence, they may not be influenced by the wider context 
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and thus would not be susceptible to visual illusions. In Happe's study, individuals 
were presented with 6 common visual illusions and asked questions about their 
appearance. For example, they were asked whether two circles appeared the same or 
different or if two lines were straight or curvy. The results showed that individuals 
with autism were less susceptible to some of the illusions than control groups. 
It is important to replicate Happe's (1996) study to establish whether the same results 
could be obtained with a different kind of measure. Perhaps her participants with 
autism had already been acquainted with visual illusions and judged according to what 
they knew rather than what they saw. Moreover, it is possible that the difference 
between individuals with and without autism is confined to a task that requires a 
verbal response. In Happe's study, participants would be scored correct (i. e. not 
susceptible to illusions) if they responded "same". Differences between groups might 
thus have reflected variations in a verbal response bias for judging "same". Apart 
from this, it remains an open question whether variations between samples would 
appear at the level of manual response. Aglioti, DeSouza, and Goodale (1995) report 
differences in susceptibility to visual illusions according to whether the participant is 
asked to make an explicit judgment of size or to reach out in order to pick up the 
illusory stimulus. I return to this point when introducing Experiment 3: 2. 
The purpose of the current study was to replicate Happe's (1996) findings using a 
more quantifiable measure of illusion susceptibility at the level of manual response. 
A computer program was developed to graphically illustrate 4 different illusions (see 
Figure 3: 1). All were illusions of extent in that they operated on the basic principle of 
size constancy (Day, 1972; Robinson, 1972). By asking the subjects to adjust the 
length of lines, or size of circles, the strength of the illusion could be quantified. 
Furthermore, presenting the illusions graphically and asking for manual judgments 
would help avoid some of the biases that can occur with verbal responses. A group 
with Asperger's syndrome were also included to see whether individuals with autistic 
features but with less severe learning difficulties are susceptible to illusions. 
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3: 3 Method 
Subjects. Twenty-three males with autism and 13 males with Asperger's syndrome 
took part in the study. All had been diagnosed by experienced clinicians according to 
standard criteria (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and attended 
schools for children with special needs. Their verbal mental ages were assessed using 
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintilie, 1982). Due to 
constraints at the school, 3 of those with autism were not tested on the Titchener and 
Hat illusions (and their controls). A further 2 were not tested on the Hat illusion only 
(and its control). One child was not tested on the Muller-Lyer illusion only (and its 
control). In consequence, the n values and df vary in the results section, depending on 
which illusion is being considered for analysis. 
A group of 17 individuals with moderate learning difficulties (MLD) were 
approximately matched to the mean verbal mental age of the autistic group. This 
group was of mixed aetiology but without any autistic-related problems. Three 
groups of individuals with typical development were also included in this study. One 
group of 20 children had a mean age of 8 years and 3 months, which was fairly close 
to the mean verbal age of the autistic group. Twenty-one children between 10-11 
years and 15 adults were also tested. Table 3: 1 provides details. 
I 
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Table 3: 1 
Subject characteristics for Experiment 3: 1 
Group N CA (y; m) VMA(y; m) BPVS 
Standardized score 
(VIQ) 
Autism 
Mean 23 13; 0 7; 2 59.9 
SD 3; 8 2; 10 19.1 
Range (7; 10-18; 4) (4; 1-14; 3) (40-84) 
Asperger's 
Mean 13 14; 2 14; 7 97.5 
SD 2; 8 4; 7 9.9 
Range (9; 5-17; 8) (7; 9-19; 6) (68-126) 
MLD 
Mean 17 10; 7 6; 1 61.5 
SD 0; 4 1; 4 7.8 
Range (9; 11-11; 4) (3; 5-8; 7) (40-84) 
Year 3 
Mean 20 8; 3 
SD 0; 3 
Range (7; 8-8; 8) 
Year 6 
Mean 21 11; 3 
SD 0; 3 
Range (10; 9-11; 7) 
Adults 
Mean 15 17; 1 
SD ' 0; 5 
Range (16; 7-18; 6) 
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Materials. Four different illusions of extent and their controls were graphically 
displayed on a lap top computer with LCD screen. The stimuli were created using 
Turbo Pascal 7.0 programming language (see Appendix 3: 1 for printout of program). 
The illusions included the Muller-Lyer, Ponzo, Titchener Circles, and the Horizontal- 
vertical figures (Hat illusion). They were presented in white on a black background 
and varied in size from 3x3 cm to 6x11 cm. Examples of the illusions and their 
controls appear in Figure 3: 1. 
Figure 3: 1 
/o\ 
/o\ 
Ponzo 
0 
oOo 
00 
0 
Stimuli for Experiment 3: 1 
O 
0 
Control 
ööö 0 
Titchener 
i 
Lý 
Muller-Lyer 
0 
Control 
0 
Control 
Hat Control 
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Design. Each illusion task had two conditions of 5 trials. That is, 5 trials were in the 
illusion configuration and 5 were controls in which the illusory elements were 
eliminated. These two conditions were alternated and the condition presented first 
was counterbalanced. Because there were 4 illusions, each participant thus performed 
40 trials in total. The presentation order of illusions was fixed as: Ponzo, Muller- 
Lyer, Titchener Circles, and the Hat illusion. 
Procedure. Initially a practice trial was offered to familiarise subjects with the use of 
the computer keyboard. Instructions were given on which arrow would increase and 
which would decrease the size of the target object on the screen. A single line and 
circle were used as examples for the practice trial. Once subjects felt comfortable 
using the arrows the main part of the experiment began. Each participant was 
instructed to adjust certain parts of the figure by using the arrow buttons on the 
keyboard. Each press increased or decreased the size by two pixels. The adjustable 
parts of the stimuli appeared at random starting points within defined limits. On each 
trial the experimenter indicated which line or circle needed to be adjusted and which 
part it needed to match in size. Subjects were instructed to press the "N" button on 
the keyboard to complete the trial and to begin the next. Subjects were given as 
much time as necessary to complete all 40 trials. Following each trial the computer 
automatically recorded the participant's length of line or diameter of circle in number 
of pixels. 
3: 4 Results 
, 
Raw data fed automatically from the laptop computer into SPSS and ANOVA's were 
carried out on each of the illusions separately. Condition (2) and trial (5) were 
included in the analysis as within subjects factors and participant group (5) was 
entered as a between factor. 
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Titchener Circles. Figure 3: 2 displays the group means for the illusion and the 
control condition. The figure shows that all groups scored lower on the illusion than 
the control, which suggests that the effect of the illusion led to a systematic distortion 
in perception. The horizontal line indicates the actual number of pixels in size of the 
circle being estimated. This was apparent as a main effect associated with condition: 
F(1,99)=172.87, p< 
. 
001. No other effects were significant. It is possible that the 
distorting effect might become stronger with more exposure to the illusion. This 
possibility was suggested by Happe through personal communication. Therefore, the 
first trial on the illusion condition was compared with the first trial on the control 
condition. The results of the t-tests comparing first trials only for each group are 
displayed in Table 3: 2. All groups significantly underestimated size on the illusion 
condition suggesting they were susceptible to the illusory effect even on the first 
trials. 
Table 3: 2 
t-tests based on first trial only for the Titchener illusion 
Group Significance 
Autistic t= 
-4.31 (18), p<. 001 
Asperger t= 
-4.38 (12), V<. 005 
MLD t= 
-2.63 (16), p. <. 05 
Year3 t= 
-511(19), p<. 001 
Year6 t= 
-6.83 (20), p<. 001 
Adults t= 
-4.53 (14), p<. 001 
i 
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Figure 3: 2 
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Ponzo. Figure 3.3 displays the group means for the illusion and the control condition. 
Again, the figure shows that scores were lower in the illusion than the control. The 
horizontal line indicates the actual size in pixels of the circle being judged. 
Accordingly, there was a main effect associated with the factor condition 
[F(1,103)=77.18, p<. 001]. There was also a main effect associated with participant 
group [F(5,103)=3.24, p< 
. 
01], and a post hoc Tukey analysis revealed that 
participants in the N LD group generally attained significantly higher scores 
(combined over trial and condition) than those with autism and the 7-8 year olds. One 
final weak effect was associated with trial number, and it seems participants tended to 
generate a larger circle in both conditions with increasing trials: F(4,412)=2.55, p< 
. 
05. No other effects were significant. Again the first trials of each condition were 
compared using t-tests. The results (see Table 3: 3) revealed that neither the autistic 
or MLD group showed susceptibility to illusions based on first trials only. 
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Figure 3: 3 
t-tests based on first trials only for the Ponzo illusion 
Group Significance 
Autistic t = 
-2.05 (22), p=. 052 
Asperger t = 
-3.74 (12), p<. 005 
MLD t =-. 85(16), p= 
. 
408 
Year3 t = 
-2.77 (19), p<. 05 
Year6 t = 
-2.94 (20), p<. 01 
Adults t = 
-2.55 (14), p<. 05 
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Muller-Lyer. Figure 3: 4 suggests that all the participant groups underestimated size 
in the illusion condition compared with the control: F(1,102)=262.49, p< 
. 
001. The 
horizontal line on the graph indicates the actual size of the line participants had to 
judge. As with the Ponzo, there was a weak effect of trial [F(4,408)= 2.95, p< 
. 
05] 
showing that mean scores increased for all groups as the number of trials progressed. 
There was no effect associated with group, but group did interact with condition: 
F(5,102)=5.95, p< 
. 
001. To help decompose the interaction, a between groups 
analysis for the illusion trials and the control trials was computed independently. 
There was an effect associated with group for the illusion trials [E(5,102)=4.17, P< 
. 
01] but not for the control trials. A post hoc Tukey test located the effect as 
pronounced susceptibility to the illusion in the autistic group. They had lower scores 
than adults, participants with Asperger's syndrome and typically developing children 
aged around 10 and 11 years. A series of ANOVA's were computed for each group 
independently, with condition and trial as within factors, which demonstrated that all 
participant groups underestimated size in the illusion condition compared with the 
control. T-tests were carried out comparing the scores on the first trials of each 
condition. As can be seen in Table 3: 4 all groups significantly underestimated size on 
the illusion condition in comparison with the control trial. 
/ 
Table 3: 4 
Figure 3: 4 
t-tests based on first trials only for the Muller-Leer illusion 
Group Significance 
Autistic t= 
-12.62 (21), p<. 001 
Asperger t= 
-3.94 (12), p<. 005 
MILD t= 
-2.12 (16), p=. 050 
Year3 t= 
-4.39(19), p<. 001 
Year6 t= 
-7.45 (20), p<. 001 
Adults t= 
-4.72 (14), p<. 001 
Mean scores on illusion and control trials for 
Muller-Lyer illusion 
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Q illusion 
  control 
Perhaps the difference between groups in susceptibility to the illusion reflects a 
maturity effect. Although the correlation between illusion score and chronological age 
was non-significant (x106)=. 11), there was a significant correlation with verbal 
mental age for the clinical groups: r(50)= 
. 
36,1_ 
. 
009. This indicates a decrease with 
illusion strength as verbal mental age increased. 
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Hat. As with the other illusions, estimates of the target stimulus were lower in the 
illusion condition than in the control (Figure 3: 5). The actual size of the line being 
judged is shown by the horizontal line on the graph. This was confirmed by a main 
effect associated with condition [F(1,98)=83.48, p<. 001]. Once again, participants 
generally gave larger estimates under both conditions with increasing trials: 
F(4,392)=9.55, p< 
. 
001. There was a main effect associated with participant group 
[F(5,98)=2.43, j< 
. 
05] and this factor interacted with condition [F(5,98)=3.35, 
p<. 01]. To help interpret the interaction, ANOVA's were carried out independently 
on the control and illusion condition. There was a significant between-groups effect 
only for the illusion condition: F(5,98)=3.77, p<. Ol. A Tukey test revealed that 
adults gained higher and therefore more accurate scores compared with the MLD 
group and the typically developing 7 and 8-year-olds. A series of ANOVA's were 
computed for each group independently, with condition and trial number as repeated 
measures (2 x 5). There was a significant effect associated with condition for all 
groups, except participants with autism. However, when performance on the first 
trial scores were compared, individuals with autism did judge significantly differently 
on the two conditions. However, those with Asperger's syndrome did not. 
Tah1P 3.5 
t-tests based on first trials only for the Hat illusion 
Group Significance 
Autistic t= 
-2.54 (17), p<. 05 
Asperger t= 
-1.10 (12), p=. 294 
MLD t= 
-2.28(16),. p<. 05 
Year3 t= 
-3.94(19), p<. 005 
Year6 t= 
-4.63 (20), p<. 001 
Adults t= 
-2.39 (14), p<. 05 
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Figure 3: 5 
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Compound scores. Table 3: 6 shows the number and percentage of participants who 
were susceptible to illusions within each group. Each illusion score was subtracted 
from its corresponding control score in all 4 illusion tasks. Hence, each participant 
had a total of 20 difference scores, which were entered into a t-test to compare 
against a hypothetical mean of zero. In the majority of participants, the difference 
score was significantly above zero at the 5% probability level. The number of 
participants thus deemed to be susceptible does not appear to vary greatly between 
the five groups. 
i 
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Table 3: 6 
Number and percentage of participants who showed overall susceptibility to illusions 
in Experiment 3: 1 
Group n 
Number susceptible 
to illusions 
Percentage 
susceptible 
Asperger 13 10 77% 
autistic 23 17 74% 
Year 3 (age 7) 20 18 90% 
Year 6 (age 11) 21 20 95% 
adults 15 12 80% 
N LD 17 11 65% 
Note. The text explains the basis for deciding who was and was not susceptible to 
illusions. Six participants with autism had an incomplete data set owing to the fact 
that they were presented only two or three of the illusions. All 6 showed susceptibility 
despite the fact that the analysis was particularly conservative in their case. 
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3: 5 Discussion 
The overall findings do not support the claim that individuals with autism or 
Asperger's syndrome are less susceptible to visual illusions than other groups. With 
the exception of the Hat illusion, there is little suggestion in our data of a deficit in 
perceptual coherence at a low level. 
In the current study, susceptibility to illusions was measured by asking participants to 
adjust the length of comparison lines or the diameter of comparison circles. In 
Happe's (1996) study, participants were asked verbally whether comparison stimuli 
look the same or different. Although there is no difference between population groups 
in susceptibility to illusions at the level of manual adjustment, perhaps a difference 
does exist at the level of verbal response. Aglioti et al. (1995) report a surprising 
difference in susceptibility to the Titchener Circles in normal participants depending 
on the kind of response they had to make. When asked to reach to the circle that was 
larger, their judgment was based on apparent rather than physical size. Paradoxically, 
however, the adjustment of the participant's grip in anticipation of picking up the 
circle was consistent with the physical rather than apparent properties of the circle. 
In Aglioti et al. 's (1995) study, differences in susceptibility occurred between two 
kinds of manual response. Although there is no evidence to date to suggest that there 
are differences in susceptibility between a verbal and manual response, Aglioti et al. 's 
findings do raise this as a possibility. In particular, it might be that while individuals 
with autism are susceptible at the manual level, they are not at the verbal level. 
Previous research suggests that participants without autism would show susceptibility 
in both kinds of measure. A second experiment was conducted that involved a 
procedure more similar to Happe's (1996) to assess autistic susceptibility to illusions 
in a task requiring a verbal response. 
A final aspect of the results that deserves comment concerns performance in the 
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control condition. Participants sometimes seemed to deviate systematically from the 
actual size in these, which was most noticeable in the control for the Titchener 
illusion. Exactly why participants should exaggerate the size of the stimulus remains 
unclear. On approximately half the trials, the figure that was to be adjusted began 
smaller than the comparison stimulus, while on the rest it began larger. Hence, the 
possibility of a response bias associated with initial size can be eliminated. The 
exaggeration of size was not confined to judgments of circles, since participants 
showed no such tendency in the control for the Ponzo. It was not confined to 
judgments based on stimuli that were arranged horizontally, since the effect was not 
so apparent in the control for the Muller-Lyer. The phenomenon remains a mystery, 
but it need not detract from the important finding that participants judged differently 
between illusion and control conditions. 
Experiment 3: 2 
3: 6 Method 
Subjects. Twenty nine individuals with autism and 18 with Asperger's syndrome 
participated in the study. The autistic group consisted of 17 males and 3 females 
while the Asperger's group included males only. All subjects were diagnosed by 
experienced clinicians according to standard criteria. Once again their verbal mental 
ages were assessed using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale. The control groups 
included 17 individuals with moderate learning difficulties (MILD) who were 
approximately matched to the mean verbal mental age of the autistic group, and 35 
children with typical development whose chronological age approximately matched 
the mean verbal age of the autistic group. Subject characteristics are shown in Table 
3 : 7. Nine of those in the Asperger's group and 6 in the autistic group had previously 
participated in the first experiment. None of the controls had participated in 
Experiment 3: 1. There was no sign that the inclusion or exclusion of their data 
affected the overall pattern of results. 
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Tahlo 1"'7 
Subject characteristics for Experiment 3: 2. 
BPVS 
Standardized 
Group n CA(y; m) VMA(y; m) score 
(VIQ) 
Autism 
Mean 29 12; 7 6; 7 59.1 
SD 3; 5 2; 9 7.7 
Range (7; 10-18; 10) (2; 7-14; 3) (40-101) 
MLD 
Mean 17 14; 5 
SD 1; 1 
Range (12; 3-15; 10) 
Asperger's 
Mean 18 15; 5 
SD 5; 4 
Range (9; 5-29; 6) 
8; 4 62.4 
1; 3 7.9 
(6; 7-10; 10) (42-77) 
12; 1 87.1 
4; 0 9.3 
(6; 8-19; 6) (40-126) 
Normal 
Mean 357; 9 
SD 0; 3 
Range (7; 1-8; 2) 
Materials. The stimuli were 16 (21xl5cm) laminated cards of visual illusions and 
their controls. There were four variations of each of the illusions used in Experiment 
3 : 1. Four of the cards had the illusions printed on them as they are normally 
presented, in which the target stimuli appeared different but were physically the same. 
The 12 controls were as follows: Four cards showed the illusory context with 
comparison stimuli that appeared different and were physically different; four showed 
physically identical comparison stimuli not in illusory context; the final four showed 
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physically different comparison stimuli not in illusory context. The stimuli were 
printed in black ink on a white background and varied in size from 3x3 cm to 6x11 
cm (see Figure 3: 6). 
Figure 3: 6 
Stimuli for Experiment 3: 2 
O 
O 
o /o\ 
0 /0\ 
0 
0 
Illusion same Control same Illusion different Control different 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually at their school in a quiet area. Each 
was told they would be shown lines and circles which may be the same size or 
different sizes. The 16 cards were shuffled and presented in random order. The 
experimenter pointed to the comparison lines or circles on each card and asked "Are 
these two lines/circles the same size or different sizes? The order of alternatives in 
the test question was counterbalanced between participants. 
3: 7 Results and Discussion 
Responses for the "control same" and "control different" conditions were compared 
using McNemat analyses to see if participants were sensitive to physical differences in 
a non-illusory context. These results indicated an extremely strong contrast between 
conditions for all groups, in that participants usually judged "different" only when 
appropriate. Despite that, several participants made one or more errors on the 12 
control trials: 4 with MLD, 3 with Asperger's syndrome, 10 with autism, and 12 with 
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typical development. Either these participants did not have a clear concept of same- 
different or they did not always inspect the stimuli adequately. 
The percentage of subjects who fell for each illusion appears in Table 3: 8. The table 
includes participants with and without errors on any of the controls. In order to 
assess whether groups of individuals were susceptible to the illusions, responses 
between the "illusion same" and "control same" conditions were compared. The 
results appear in Table 3: 9 which shows that participants in all groups were 
significantly more likely to say "different" on the "illusion same" than "control same" 
conditions for all illusions except the Hat. 
Table 3: 8 
Percentage of subjects who succumbed to each illusion in Experiment 3: 2 
Group Muller-Lyer Titchener Ponzo Hat 
Errors none included none included none included none included 
Autism 95.0 89.7 75.0 82.8 25.0 37.9 15.0 24.1 
MLD 100.0 100.0 84.6 76.5 30.8 41.2 23.1 17.6 
Asperger 80.0 77.8 60.0 66.7 46.7 38.9 20.0 16.7 
Normal 100.0 97.1 56.5 62.9 34.8 45.7 26.1 22.9 
Note. The term "none" refers to participants who did not make errors in control 
conditions and the term "included" refers to all participants, including those who 
made control errors. 
Another series of McNemar comparisons was carried out between the "illusion same" 
and the "illusion different" conditions, to address the question: Are participants more 
sensitive to a physical than illusory difference between stimuli? In all four groups, 
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participants were more likely to judge a difference between stimuli when that was 
physical rather than illusory for the Ponzo and Hat illusions. The same was also 
apparent in the Titchener illusion for those with Asperger's syndrome and those with 
typical development. Although this set of results suggests that participants were 
sometimes more sensitive to differences between stimuli when they were physical, 
once again there is no suggestion that the individuals with autism were peculiarly 
resistant to illusory effects. Indeed, a series of x2 tests failed to detect any differences 
between groups in terms of susceptibility to any of the illusions irrespective of 
whether those who failed controls were included or excluded. To generate an even 
more sensitive between-groups test, the number of illusions that each participant fell 
for was calculated, minus the number of errors in the "control same" condition. A 
one-way ANOVA between groups was carried out but once again the comparison 
was nonsignificant: F(3,95)=1.01, n. s. 
Tahlp i-9 
Results from the Mc Nemar analysis showing responses for illusion same and 
control same conditions all at 1 degree of freedom (Experiment 3: 2) 
Group Muller-Lyer Titchener Ponzo Hat 
Autism *23-1, p<. 001 20-1, p<. 001 8-0, p<. 02 5-5, n. s. 
MLD 17-0, p<. 001 12-0, p<. 01 6-0, p<. 05 3-1, n. s. 
Asperger 13-0, V<. 001 11-0, p<. 01 7-0, p<. 05 3-1, n. s. 
Normal 30-1, p<. 001 22-1, p<. 001 13-3, p<. 05 6-2, n. s. 
i 
* Twenty three participants judged "different" in the illusion trial and "same" in the 
control trial. Only 1 participant judged "same" in the illusion trial and "different" in 
the control trial. 
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3: 8 General Discussion of Experiments 3: 1 and 3: 2 
In experiment 3: 1, participants adjusted lines or circles to match a target in a context 
that was expected to provoke an illusory distortion. In general, participants with 
autism and Asperger's syndrome were demonstrably susceptible to the illusions by 
virtue of their systematic underestimation of the target stimulus specifically in the 
illusion condition. This underestimation is explained by the illusory context. 
Moreover, the effect of the illusion usually appeared to be as strong in those with 
autism as those without. Participants also showed susceptibility when making verbal 
judgments about the properties of lines and circles in illusory contexts. There is one 
exception, which is that participants with autism did not show susceptibility on the 
Hat illusion relative to the control condition. 
Generally, these results are not consistent with Happe's (1996) finding that 
individuals with autism are somewhat immune to visual illusions. It might have been 
that the difference between those with and without autism was detectable only at the 
level of verbal response, but the results of Experiment 3: 2 do not support such a 
possibility. Perhaps the verbally-based response required in Happe's study somehow 
led participants with autism to answer "same" in the illusion condition. Although 
participants were required to respond verbally in Experiment 3: 2, the procedure 
differed from Happe's in some aspects of detail such that participants were not led to 
answer "same". An alternative though perhaps less likely possibility is that Happe's 
autistic participants had already been acquainted with visual illusions and responded 
in accordance with what they knew rather than what they could see. 
If individuals with autism are susceptible to visual illusions, as our results suggest, 
then there are no grounds for supposing that coherence is weak at low levels of 
perception. When an individual with autism looks at a stimulus, like Titchener Circles, 
it seems their assessment of the inner target circle will inevitably be affected by the 
presence of the outer circles. Apparently, our perceptual systems are wired to analyse 
the target in its visual context, and that applies to people with or without autism. It 
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does not necessarily mean, however, that individuals with autism would be influenced 
by visual context at all levels of processing. For example, they might be effective in 
ignoring the identity of an object as suggested by its global shape when searching for 
constituent objects hidden therein, which is required in an embedded figures test. 
Also, Jarrold and Russell (1997) report that individuals with autism gain less 
advantage in terms of speed of counting when dots are presented in canonical form 
(as in the face of a dice), than when presented in ad hoc form. In canonical form, it 
seems participants without autism subitized, while those with autism attended to dots 
individually. Hence, they showed local over global preference on this level of visual 
attention. A somewhat different line of evidence also indicates impairment in global 
processing in autism. Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1988) report that individuals with 
autism show an advantage over control participants in matching faces when presented 
upside-down. Perhaps participants without autism are particularly hampered when 
processing inverted faces if their global approach to processing is based specifically 
on the canonical orientation of the face. Inverting a face would not be an impediment 
to those with autism if their processing was directed more at the local detail of the 
stimulus. 
In these various tasks, suppression of the global Gestalt might require a deliberate act 
of will. We do not know whether they have a preference and indeed an aptitude for 
focusing on detail whilst ignoring the whole or whether the whole does not impress 
itself upon them so strongly. An illusion is quite different. Importantly, it is not 
apparent to a naive individual that an act of will is needed to give a correct judgment. 
Rather, participants succumb to the illusion without realising they have done so. A 
capacity for single mindedness in deliberate acts of attentional focus would be no use 
in a task where one succumbs to perceptual distortion unwittingly. 
The preceding discussion highlights the kind of difficulty that is likely to be 
encountered when contemplating a rather vague concept like "weak central 
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coherence". Although the concept has intuitive appeal, it is hard to define the terms 
"central" and "coherence". The autistic intellectual profile is characterised by more 
severe deficits in verbal than non-verbal intelligence. Presumably, however, the term 
"weak central coherence" should mean something more specific than this. Perhaps it 
would be fair to say that a typical cognitive style of individuals with autism leads them 
to process information locally. Even so, we would still need to ask when this style of 
processing is evident. Apparently, it does not occur at the level at which visual 
illusions work. In consequence, it is difficult to make predictions of autistic 
performance on novel tasks. Perhaps weak central coherence can only be postulated 
once we have established a peculiarity in autistic performance in a given domain. 
Previous findings have not always given support to the possibility of weak central 
coherence in autism. Brian and Bryson (1996) devised a particularly elegant 
embedded figures procedure in which the level of abstractness of the global shape 
varied between stimuli. If participants with autism were not distracted by the global 
shape, then not only would they find the embedded figure faster than controls, but the 
level of abstractness of the global shape would make no difference to their 
performance. Unexpectedly, participants with autism were no faster than controls and 
their disembedding was slower when the global shape was meaningful rather than 
abstract. However, Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997) noted several factors that could 
have accounted for Brian and Bryson's failure to find a superiority effect, such as the 
inclusion of participants with pervasive developmental disorder within the autistic 
sample and the use of conservative statistical tests. 
A recent study by Mottron, Burack, Stauder and Robaey (1999) also fails to support 
the weak central coherence hypothesis in a sample of high-functioning adults with 
autism. Participants performed a mental synthesis task, in which they were required to 
judge whether part-figures shared similarity with a larger figure. Some figures were 
deemed to be "good", by virtue of the fact that they formed an enclosure without 
redundant appendage lines (e. g. a triangle), while others were deemed "bad" if they 
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did not possess such properties. From the hypothesis of weak central coherence, the 
authors predicted that individuals with autism would generally have faster response 
times than controls. Also, unlike controls, they should have no advantage with 
"good" over "bad" figures. Neither hypothesis was supported by the data. 
Even so, it remains a possibility that symptoms of weak central coherence can be 
found, but only in a subset of individuals with autism. In that case, the utility of the 
concept would be undermined because these symptoms would not count as a defining 
feature. At best, it would appear that autism presents a risk of measurable weak 
central coherence. The concept would be more useful if we had a range of converging 
measures that identified specific individuals. It might be that the individuals with 
autism who show especially good performance on embedded figures are the same 
who speedily solve block design problems and who are prone to ignore context in 
their pronunciation of homographs. It might even be that these individuals in 
particular are less susceptible to visual illusions than others with autism and those 
with typical development. 
The rather sparse extant data are not promising with respect to the prospect of 
finding resistance to visual illusions in those who show signs of weak central 
coherence across a range of tasks. Mottron and Belleville (1993) report that E. C. was 
distinguished by his preference for local rather than global processing in Navon's 
(1977) task. He was asked to state the letter element in a larger shape that actually 
formed a discrepant letter. For example, small S's combined to form a large H. Unlike 
control participants, E. C. was not hampered by the discrepant letter that was formed 
by the global shape. Hence, E. C. apparently preferred to process locally rather than 
globally, and by virtue of that he was a prime candidate for showing symptoms of 
weak central coherence. As already mentioned, though, he was just as susceptible to 
visual illusions as control participants. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Measures of WCC: Is susceptibility to illusions related to 
performance on visuo-spatial tasks? 
4: 1 Variation in coherence ability 
Happe (1999) has suggested three levels at which we might find deficits of 
coherence in autism perceptual, visuo-spatial-constructional, verbal-semantic. 
She suggests that visual illusions require coherence at a perceptual level. An 
individual would simply need to integrate the lines and shapes together in order to 
succumb to the illusion. In everyday life we need to integrate basic elements in 
order to perceive objects, pictures, and people. For this reason we might not 
expect individuals to have a problem with coherence at this level. However, 
clinical reports have mentioned occasions where fragmented perception has been 
noted by autistic individuals. Happe argues that tasks such as the embedded 
figures and block design may involve visuo-spatial-constructional coherence. 
With these tests there are many more aspects to integrate which place demands on 
information processing. The information an individual is required to visually 
segment or integrate on visual spatial tasks may be meaningful (e. g. embedded 
figures) or non-meaningful (e. g. block design). Finally, she suggests that tasks 
involving lanuage comprehension would tap coherence at higher levels. This 
involves extracting information from individual components (e. g. words) in order 
to create a meaningful whole (e. g. sentence or story). While problems with 
language are quite pervasive in autism, the extent to which perceptual deficits 
persist is still in need of further investigation. Therefore, I have decided to restrict 
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the current investigation to WCC tests at the first and second levels which are of a 
more perceptual nature. 
In the previous study I investigated whether WCC may be evident in autism at low 
levels such as in the perception of visual illusions. I found that individuals with 
autism were just as susceptible as those without autism indicating on a group basis 
that coherence was not weak at this level. These findings are inconsistent with 
those reported by Happe (1996). There are several ways these conflicting results 
might be interpreted. It could simply be that individuals with autism do not have 
coherence deficits at very low levels. Happe herself commented that her findings 
were surprising in suggesting otherwise. It could also be that illusions do not 
measure WCC, and Happe's results were due to an artefact. 
There may be an alternative explanation that does not counter Happe's theory. It 
could be that illusions do measure WCC, but there may be subgroups within the 
autistic population that differ by degree of coherence ability. Most research has 
primarily considered "weak central coherence" as something a person either has 
or does not have. For instance, tests such as the embedded figures or block design 
have usually equated good performance with "weak coherence". This assumption 
neglects an important point made by Happe (1994a, page 125) who argues that 
central coherence is a cognitive style that varies in the normal as well as the 
autistic population. Therefore, it makes more sense for us to consider the extent to 
which an individual displays weak central coherence, rather than whether they 
have it or do not have it. Coherence ability then varies within populations as well 
as between populations. Thinking of coherence in these terms carries several 
implications. If both populations with and without autism vary in degree of 
coherence ability then we might expect them to overlap. Figure 4.1 may help to 
illustrate this point. 
74 
Figure 4: 1 
Variation in coherence ability 
Not susceptible 
Autistic 
>>> Suceptible to illusions 
Non-autistic 
WCC >scc 
The `x' axis indicates the level of coherence ability in the general population 
which ranges from very weak to very strong. Those with autism might be 
expected to lie more towards the left end of the continuum since WCC is 
characteristic in this population. Those without autism who are less likely to show 
WCC would be more towards the right of the scale. However, within each of 
these populations there will be variation in coherence ability. This is represented 
by a normal distribution for each population. 
In those without autism it is likely there may be a few who have relatively weak or 
strong coherence. An individual with average coherence would be someone who 
may be inclined to process information globally, however they would also be 
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capable of processing local information when needed to. Thus, although global 
information may take priority, they would be able to alternate between using both 
strategies. Since they are able to use both global and local processing styles, they 
are likely to experience some interference problems. For instance, on the 
embedded figures task an individual's search for the hidden figure is slowed as a 
result of resisting the global larger figure. It is important to note that their 
performance is slowed; it is not impossible for them to break the design down into 
its component parts. However, it is likely that some individuals would find the 
embedded figures task extremely difficult or even impossible. These people may 
have very strong coherence and would lie at the far right side of the distribution 
representing those without autism On the other hand there would also be some 
people within this population that have weak coherence and do exceptionally well 
on the task who would be at the far left of the curve. 
The autistic population is at the lower end of the continuum since we would 
expect the majority of individuals to show weak central coherence. There would 
be some to the far left of the distribution having extremely weak central 
coherence. Savant abilities might be typical of individuals falling within this area. 
On the far right of the curve would some individuals with autism having stronger 
coherence. They might perform less well on tests of WCC in comparison with the 
average of the autistic population. 
It is possible that individuals at the lower end of the distribution representing 
those without autism may perform similarly to those at the higher end of the 
autistic population. These individuals may fall in the shaded grey and green areas 
of the figure which shows how the two groups would overlap. The vertical line on 
the graph could indicate the point at which individuals either are susceptible or are 
not susceptible to illusions. Thus, everyone falling to the left of the line would not 
succumb to illusions, and everyone to the right of the line would. It could be that 
the individuals with autism from our study that were susceptible to illusions 
primarily fell to the right side of this shaded area (grey area). The shaded green 
area to the left side of the vertical line would then represent those with autism and 
typical development who were not susceptible to illusions. 
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Evidence to support this explanation can be found in a study by Pring, Hermelin 
and Heavey (1995). The aim of their study was to see whether WCC may be a 
characteristic of those with artistic ability as well as those with autism. They 
tested both artistically talented as well as non-talented individuals with normal 
development and autism. They compared all four groups to look at how autism 
(diagnosis) and artistic ability were related with performance. Participants were 
presented with a picture puzzle task and the block design test. Both tasks can be 
argued to test WCC as it requires an individual to visually segment a design or 
picture in order to recreate it using individual blocks. Therefore, a global 
processing style would actually hinder one's ability to perform well. The picture 
puzzle task depicts a meaningful scene rather than an abstract design like the 
block design test. 
In the block design task the two artistic groups performed at the same superior 
level while the non-gifted autistic group did significantly better than the non- 
talented individuals with typical development. On the picture puzzle task 
however the pattern of results was in the opposite direction. The two non- 
talented groups performed at the same level, while the talented control subjects 
did better than savants. They concluded that artistic ability as well as autism 
enhanced performance independently of each other. 
The importance of this study is that it provides an example of how coherence 
ability varies in both autistic and non-autistic populations. It also shows how 
individuals without autism may perform similarly to those with autism on a test of 
coherence such as the block design task. Even though the non-autistic participants 
that performed particularly well on the block design were artistically talented, it 
cannot be assumed that having WCC would be sufficient for artistic ability to 
arise. Likewise, WCC may be characteristic of those with autism, but it does not 
mean all those with this cognitive style will be autistic. It could however be 
inferred from this study that having a cognitive style such as WCC may be more 
common in those with autism or artistic ability. 
Although exceptional performance on tasks associated with WCC is more 
common in the autistic population, it is not universal. For example, Brian and 
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Bryson (1996) did not find individuals with autism to be any better at the 
embedded figures task than comparison groups. This conflicts with findings from 
other studies where a superiority effect in the autistic group was demonstrated 
(Shah & Frith, 1983; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997). Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen 
(1997) offered several explanations for these conflicting findings. One suggestion 
was that there might be subgroups in the autistic population as revealed by the 
searching styles of individuals on the embedded figures test. In Brian and 
Bryson's (1996) study only one individual with autism showed an immediate 
search strategy. However, both Shah and Frith (1983) and Jolliffe and Baron- 
Cohen (1997) reported that a number of individuals with autism found the hidden 
shape immediately. Therefore, it might be that the autistic population in Brian 
and Bryson's study consisted of individuals in the shaded grey area of our 
diagram Figure 4: 1, having stronger coherence. 
Altogether, the studies above provide examples of how coherence ability can vary 
in autism and in those with typical development. Pring et al. 's (1995) study 
demonstrates how two groups in the autistic population (savant artists and non- 
savants) may differ in performance. Both were superior to non-artist controls, 
however the savant artists were still significantly better than non-savant autistic 
individuals. 
It seems reasonable then to ask whether subgroups in coherence ability might 
explain our failure to replicate Happe's results. Our study may have encapsulated 
a sample of individuals that would not do well on the block design test and the 
embedded figures test, while those individuals in Happe's study may have 
excelled at these tasks. The following section explains how I intend to investigate 
this matter. 
4: 2 Introduction 
The primary aim of this study is to explore individual differences in coherence 
ability in autism I predict that those individuals who score highest on measures 
of WCC within the autistic group would be least susceptible to illusions. The 
embedded figures and the block design have generally been accepted as measures 
of coherence ability and since some research has found correlations between these 
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two tests (Jarrold et al., 1999) it seems appropriate to use these as part of our 
investigation. In addition to these more traditional tests of WCC the Rey complex 
figure test was also administered (Rey, 1959). This test is used to investigate 
perceptual organisational and visual memory abilities. There are several reasons 
for including this as part of the battery of tasks. 
In Pring, Hermelin, and Heavey's study (1995) it was shown that individuals with 
artistic ability (autistic and non-autistic) did exceptionally well on the block 
design, suggesting they had weak central coherence. Therefore, it is expected that 
those who do well on the embedded figures, and block design, might also 
demonstrate good drawing ability on the Rey figure test. This test can give us an 
estimate of a person's drawing ability. It requires an individual to copy a figure 
once with the stimuli in view which is referred to as the copy trial. The person is 
then asked to draw the figure again 3 minutes later from memory in the recall trial. 
A person is awarded points for accuracy and placement for each part of the overall 
design. This test can also tell us about an individual's drawing style. 
When asked to copy the Rey figure an individual might begin by drawing the 
outline. This would indicate he or she was using a global strategy. Alternatively, 
a person might use a local strategy which would entail focusing more on the 
details of the figure when drawing. According to the theory of WCC we would 
expect those with autism to show a preference to use a local strategy, while those 
with typical development might use a global strategy. 
Previous studies that have presented the Rey figure test to individuals with autism 
have found that they cto indeed show a preference to use a local strategy. A case 
study carried out on a mathematical savant included the Rey figure as part of their 
battery of tests (Steel, Gorman, & Flexman, 1984). They reported that he focused 
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primarily on internal elements rather than the global outline. They also noted that 
he had considerable difficulty with recall from memory. Prior and Hoffman 
(1990) presented the same test to a group of 12 individuais with autism (non- 
savants). They observed that autistic children showed an odd and disorganised 
drawing style. Participants focused primarily on the details rather than the outline 
of the figure, unlike controls. Although the autistic group performed similarly to 
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controls on the copy trial, performance on the recall trial was poor in comparison. 
The sample size of both these studies was quite small. Therefore, more research 
in this area is needed to establish whether or not this finding can be replicated. 
Furthermore, a recent study by Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997) did not find a 
preference to draw details first in individuals with autism. However, they argued 
their failure to replicate past findings may be due to their using an adapted version 
of the Rey figure test (see Figure 4: 2). This simplified version was used in order 
to make it easier to determine whether an individual was drawing the global 
outline or details of the figure. However, they found that the autistic group was 
just as likely as the non-autistic groups to begin drawing with the global outline. 
They suggest that the figure may have been oversimplified to the extent that a bias 
to draw details first could not be detected. 
Figure 4: 2 
Simplified Rey figure 
Although the original Rey figure may make, coding for local or global drawing 
strategies complicated, it seems more likely to reveal differences in drawing style. 
Therefore, the original Rey figure stimulus was used in the current study (see 
Figure 4: 3). One would expect that those who perform well on the Rey copy trial 
and who show a local drawing strategy would be the same who perform well on 
the embedded figures test and the block design task. These measures should 
correlate with one another if they are all related to coherence ability. 
Furthermore, it would be expected that individuals with autism would be more 
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likely than controls to perform well on this battery of coherence tasks. However, 
based on previous findings, poor performance on the recall trial in the autistic 
group would anticipate would be expected. 
Figure 4: 3 
Rey complex figure 
There is also a newer part of the Rey figure test called the recognition trial which 
to my knowledge has not been administered to individuals with autism before. 
The recognition trial awards points for correctly recalling or rejecting component 
parts of the Rey figure. Twenty-two of these items are smaller components of the 
Rey figure, while only 2 of the designs are similar to the global shape of the 
figure. The participant needs to identify only the correct items and reject the 
distracters. 
The Rey figure test then provides several ways to investigate coherence ability. 
One would expect that those who attend more to the global outline when drawing 
the Rey figure, might be worse in recalling the local designs. Those who use a 
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local drawing strategy may spend more time processing the details. Therefore, 
they might be better at recognising the local designs. 
Altogether the embedded figure test, block design, and Rey figure task (copy, 
recall, and recognition trials) make up a battery of tasks which can give us a good 
indication of a person's coherence level- If they do test the same ability 
(i. e. coherence), all these measures should correlate with one another. 
Administering these tasks will provide a profile of each individual's abilities, and 
also allows us to look at group patterns of performance. Performance on these 
tasks can then be examined to see if it can predict susceptibility to illusions. In 
order to measure susceptibility to illusions we employed the same computer task 
as in our prior study. This would allow a very specific measure of illusion 
susceptibility to determine whether those who were most strongly susceptible 
excelled on the battery of tests (embedded figures, block design, Rey figure). 
Thus, our general hypotheses for this study are: (1) Performance on all four kinds 
of task should correlate if they are all indeed tapping coherence ability. (2) 
Specifically, performance on tasks associated with WCC should be associated 
with susceptibility to illusions. (3) Those on the autistic continuum would be 
expected to perform better than controls on the battery of WCC tasks. 
Method 
4: 3 Subiects 
Nineteen individuals with autism participated in this study. They had all been 
diagnosed by experienced clinicians. Only 2 failed to complete all the tests. They 
were unable to finish the embedded figures test due to frustration with the task or 
being distracted by the stylus. The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; 
Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintilie, 1982) was carried out on both clinical and 
control participants to establish verbal mental ability (VMA). The autistic group 
had a mean chronological age (CA of 14; 2 and mean verbal mental age (VMA) 
of 11; 6. Further details are provided in Table 4: 1. A group of 11 individuals with 
Asperger's syndrome were also included in the study (with an average CA of 
11; 10 arnd VMA of 9; 11). This allowed us to investigate whether there were any 
differences between the two autistic subgroups in their perceptual ability. There 
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were three groups of control subjects including children with normal development 
in year 3, year 6, and individuals with moderate learning difficulties (MLD). The 
autistic group was exactly matched with the MLD group for VMA. The autistic 
and MLD groups were also closely matched according to sex in case of any sex 
differences. Details on sex are given for this particular study because previous 
literature suggests that males have better visuo-spatial ability than females (Baron- 
Cohen & Hammer, 1997b). 
Table 4: 1 
Subject characteristics for Experiment 4: 1 
Group CA (y; m) VMA(y; m) Sex 
(males; females) 
Autistic (N =19) 
Mean 14; 2 6; 11 17; 2 
SD 2; 5 2; 1 
Range 9; 3-18; 3 3; 8-13; 4 
Asperger's (N=11) 
Mean 11; 10 9; 11 9; 2 
SD 2; 0 4; 0 
Range (8; 4 
-15; 4) (5; 1-17; 6) 
MLD (N= 20) 
Mean 12; 11 6; 11 17; 3 
SD 1; 5 1; 9 
Range 9; 2-14; 8 3; 3-10; 10 
Year 3 (N =19) 
Mean 8; 6 8; 0 9; 10 
SD 0; 4 1; 7 
Range (7; 7-8; 6) (5; 3-10; 6) 
Year 6 (N= 18) 
Mean 11; 3 11; 6 10; 8 
SD 0; 4 2; 0 
Range 10; 9-11; 7 9; 5-15; 7 
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4: 4 Visual illusion computer task 
Materials. The same four illusions used in Experiment 3.1 were graphically 
displayed on a lap top computer with LCD screen. The Muller-Lyer, Ponzo, 
Titchener, and Hat stimuli were created using Turbo Pascal 7.0 programming 
language. They were presented in white on a black background and varied in size 
from 3x3 cm to 6x11 cm. 
Desi n. A few modifications were made to the original computer program. 
Firstly, the number of trials was changed to 6 per illusion reducing the total 
number of trials from 40 to 24. This allowed for a shorter testing time which 
would hopefully decrease the chance of individuals becoming bored and not 
finishing the task. Once again, half of the trials were in the illusion condition and 
the remaining were controls in which the illusory elements were eliminated. These 
two conditions were alternated and the condition presented first was 
counterbalanced. The presentation order of illusions was always the same: Ponzo, 
Muller-Lyer, Titchener Circles, and the Hat illusion. Another difference was that 
the Ponzo illusion was reversed. Therefore, susceptibility would result in 
overestimation rather than underestimation on the illusion condition. This was 
due to an oversight, but there was no reason to expect it would affect the results. 
Procedure. Initially a practice trial was offered to familiarise subjects with the 
use of the computer keyboard. Instructions were given on which arrow would 
increase and which would decrease the size of the target object on the screen. A 
single line and circle were used as examples for the practice trial. Once subjects 
felt comfortable using the arrows the main part of the experiment began. Each 
participant was instructed to adjust certain parts of the figure by using the arrow 
buttons on the keyboard. Each press increased or decreased the size by two 
pixels. The adjustable parts of the stimuli appeared at random starting points 
within defined limits. On each trial the experimenter indicated which line or circle 
needed to be adjusted and the part it needed to match in size. Subjects were 
instructed to press the "N" button on the keyboard to complete the - 'il and to 
begin the next. 
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Subjects were given as much time as necessary to complete all 24 trials. 
Following each trial the computer automatically recorded the participant's length 
of line or diameter of circle in number of pixels 
4: 5 Block design task 
Materials. Twelve patterned designs were placed on individual cards that were 
10.5 x 10.5 centimetres in length (Wechsler, 1974). The patterns were 
approximately 28x55mm to 85x85mm in size, depending on the number of blocks 
needed to create the pattern. There were nine wooden blocks (32 x 32mm) which 
were all painted identically. Each had 2 red sides, 2 white sides, and 2 sides that 
were both red and white (see Figure 4: 4 for illustration). Each stimulus was 
placed on its own page in a small photo album. A stop watch was also needed to 
record the time to solve each design. 
Figure 4: 4 
Block design test 
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Procedure. The standard instructions for the Block design test were followed to 
familiarise the subjects with the blocks and task. 
"See these blocks? They are all alike. On some sides they are all red; on some 
sides, all white; and on some sides, half red and half white. They can be put 
together to make a design like the one you see on the card. Watch me. " [The 
experimenter demonstrates trial one. The blocks are then scrambled up and given 
to the child. ] 
Now you make one like the one on the card. Go ahead. " In cases where 
participants failed on trial one of a practice item the following was said. "Watch 
me again. " [Experimenter demonstrates how to construct the design. ] "Go 
ahead. See if you can do it this time. " 
Each individual started with the appropriate practice trial for their age. Children 
younger than 8 began with stimulus card one, and those aged 8 and over began 
with stimulus card three. Any errors on practice trials (items 1-3) were dealt with 
in accordance with the block design test manual. When 2 consecutive failures 
were made the test was discontinued. A trial was recorded as incorrect if 
individuals could not replicate the correct design within the given time limit for 
each trial. The time allotted to solve the puzzle increased along with the difficulty 
of the design. A stopwatch was used to record time to complete design for all 
trials. 
Table 4: 2 
Time limits for each item on block design test 
item 1 30 seconds 
items 2-5 45 seconds 
items 6-9 75 seconds 
items 10-12 120 seconds 
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On practice items individuals were allowed 2 attempts to solve the design. These 
were only counted as a failure if both trials were unsuccessful. Therefore, those 
beginning with item 1 would keep on with the test so long as they did not meet the 
discontinue criterion. If an individual started with card three and correctly solved 
the design on their first attempt they proceeded to the next test item. They did not 
have to do trials 1 and 2 although they were awarded the full points for them (2 
points for each). If the person did not succeed on their first try on item 3 within 
the 45 second time limit they were given another chance to solve the design. 
Regardless of how an individual performed on the second trial of test item 3, 
items 1-2 were administered. 
Coding 
. 
Successful completion on any of the practice stimuli for trial one earned 
2 points. One point was given for correct construction on the second trial. Failure 
to make the design on both trials within the required time limit gave a score of 0. 
On the actual test items (4-12), points were awarded according to the time taken 
for completion (see Table 4: 3). No credit was given for designs that were 
partially correct or incomplete. All points were totalled for items 1-12, allowing 
an individual to attain a maximum of 69 points. 
Table 4: 3 
Awarding of points for performance on the block design test 
Item number Completion time in seconds 
4 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-45 
5 1-10 11-15 16-20 21-45 
6-8 1-10 11-15 16-20 21-75 
9 1-10 11-15 16-25 26-75 
10 1-25 26-30 31-40 41-120 
11-12 1-30 31-35 36-55 56-120 
Score 7 6 5 4 
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4: 6 Embedded fieures test 
Materials. Since the children's embedded figures test (CEFT) was discontinued 
and could no longer be purchased, the standard adult embedded figures test was 
used (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971). The embedded figures test manual 
states that the test can be administered to younger children. Form A of the test was 
administered. There were 12 different complex cards. Each of these depicted a 
complex design that had a simple shape hidden within it. There were only 8 
different simple shapes because some were common to a few of the complex 
designs. Each complex card was situated next to its appropriate simple shape on 
its own page in a small photo album. An example of one of the test items is 
shown in Figure 4: 5. 
Figure 4: 5 
Embedded figures test 
ýý 
Procedure. The standard procedure was adapted in a few ways to make it more 
appropriate for children and individuals with learning disabilities. Two additional 
practice trials were given initially to ensure that the individual understood the aim 
of the task (tent within pram, house within rocking horse). Performance on these 
trials was recorded but was not entered into the analyses. The following 
instructions were given to the participant. 
88 
I am going to show you some pictures. Each time I show you one, I want you to 
describe it in anyway you like. Here is one (experimenter shows practice complex 
figure 1). Tell me what it looks like? OK. Then I will show you a smaller shape 
that is hidden inside this one (simple shape is revealed). Your job will be to try 
and find this hidden shape in the larger picture. I want you to tell me as soon as 
you see the hidden shape, and then use this pen (stylus) to show me where it is. 
Let's try this one. Can you see where the hidden shape is? " 
If they were unable to find it the experimenter showed them and traced the shape 
with the pen. It was decided that the additional processing load required to search 
for the target object from memory (as in the standard adult task) would be too 
difficult for our chosen populations. Therefore, the target shape was not covered 
up when the participant was searching for it in the complex figure. This allowed 
the participant to refer to the target object whenever they needed to. This 
convention is part of the children's embedded figures test used by Brian and 
Bryson (1996), and Shah and Frith (1983). 
Two more practice items were given to make sure the task requirements were 
understood. Further clarification was provided when individuals needed it. A few 
subjects did not proceed with the task either because they failed to comprehend 
the instructions or were distracted by the stylus pen. On the final practice item the 
stopwatch was introduced. They were told now they would be timed to see how 
quickly they could find the object. Participants were given up to 3 minutes to 
search for the target on the final practice card and the 12 test cards. After 3 
incorrect guesses the person was presented with the next test item This was to 
prevent frustration or random guessing. 
The 12 test items were given in a fixed order for every subject. Complex figure 7- 
F was presented first after the practice items, and then the other cards were shown 
in sequence (1-A, 2-B, 3-C... ). This presentation order was suggested in the 
embedded figures test manual to be more appropriate for younger children. If the 
individual was having considerable difficulty finding hidden objects on the first 
five items, the remainder of the test was administered on a separate day. This was 
to avoid frustration or reduced motivation which might result from several 
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consecutive failures. Verbal encouragement was provided throughout the test to 
also prevent this. 
Coding. If an individual failed to find the target item after three attempts or 
within the allotted 3 minutes their solution time was recorded as 180 seconds. An 
average completion time was calculated from the 12 test items (not practice 
items). 
4: 7 Rev figure test 
Materials. The materials for the Rey complex figure test include the stimulus 
card (see Figure 4.3), recognition test stimuli, blank sheets of paper, pencil, 
rubber, and a stopwatch (Meyers & Meyers, 1995). The stimulus figure is printed 
black on a white card (A4) which is laminated. The figure is presented in portrait 
orientation and is approximately 15cm x 12cm in size. The recognition stimuli 
come from pages 7-10 of the Rey test booklet. These pages display 24 items, 12 
of which were actually part of the Rey stimulus card and 12 which were not (see 
Appendix 4: 1). These stimuli were also black ink printed on white A4 sheets. 
Each of the 24 items had a corresponding number to identify it. 
Procedure. There were actually four parts to the standard Rey figure test: the 
copy trial, immediate recall trial, delayed recall trial, recognition trial. The 
delayed recall trial was not administered since it required a delay of 30 minutes 
and would have prolonged the testing period considerably. This did not seem 
appropriate for our selected populations that included many individuals whom 
were young and had learning difficulties. The other three parts of the test were 
presented in the same order. The experimenter told the participant that we were 
going to do some drawing. It was important that they were not informed initially 
about the recall or recognition trials. 
Copy trial. Participants were given a blank sheet of paper, pencil, and rubber. 
They were then shown the stimulus card and told to "copy the figure on to the 
piece of paper". The experimenter reminded them to try to do their best to draw 
the figure just as it was on the card. The stopwatch was then started and the 
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participant was told to begin. As they drew the figure, the experimenter copied 
everything the person was drawing in the exact same way. The order in which 
each line was made was noted by increasing numbers (1,2,3... ). Arrows were used 
by the experimenter to indicate the direction of the drawing strokes. When the 
participant said they had finished the timer was stopped and recorded. 
Immediate recall trial. After the copy trial the timer was set for 3 minutes. The 
individual was told we were going to take a short break before doing the next part. 
During this time the experimenter spoke with the participant about daily activities 
at school. After the delay the individual was given another blank sheet of paper. 
The experimenter then said: 
"Remember the picture I had you draw just a short time ago? Well, I want you to 
try and draw it again for me, but this time from memory. So try your best to draw 
as much as you can remember from the picture on this paper. Let me know when 
you have finished. " 
The timer was then started and the individual was instructed to begin. The 
experimenter copied everything the participant was drawing as on the copy trial. 
Once again numbers and arrows were used to indicate how the figure was being 
drawn by the person. When they had finished, their time was recorded. 
Recognition trial. Immediately after the recall trial, the recognition stimuli were 
presented. Participants were told the following. "Some of these designs that are 
printed on these pages were part of the picture I asked you to copy earlier. They 
will be the same size and facing the same way as they were on that picture. I want 
you to point to only those designs you remember seeing. " The number of each 
design the participant chose was recorded. Twenty-two of the 24 designs related 
to components of Rey complex figure. These could be considered to be local 
details (see Appendix 4: 1). The remaining 2 designs reflect the outline of the 
entire figure and therefore are global shapes. Figure 4: 6 shows examples of 
correct and incorrect local and global designs. Both types of designs will be 
considered together as well as individually in the results section. 
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Figure 4: 6 
Examples of correct and incorrect designs for the Rey recognition test 
11. 12. 
Incorrect local design 
15. 
Incorrect global design 
Correct local design 
Correct global design 
Codin 
. 
The standard coding procedure as specified by the manual was followed. 
The Rey figure was divided into 18 separate units which were assessed 
individually ajccording to accuracy and placement. If an item was drawn 
accurately and placed correctly then a total score of 2 was given for that item. 
However, if that item is unnecessarily duplicated in the drawing then it is only 
given a score of 1. One point was awarded if the design was drawn accurately, but 
placed incorrectly. If the unit was in the correct place but drawn incorrectly then 
it was also given 1 point. In cases where the design is recognisable but is neither 
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drawn or placed correctly then a score of 0.5 is assigned. When the individual has 
omitted the item altogether no points were earned. Therefore, each participant 
could obtain a score between 0-36 on the copy trial and on the immediate recall 
trial. On the recognition trial the number of correctly identified designs (out of 12) 
was added to the number of those that were correctly rejected (out of 12). This 
total score was entered into the analysis. 
There were other comparisons I was interested in making that were not part of the 
standard analyses suggested in the Rey figures test booklet. Firstly I wanted to 
know whether there were group differences in the drawing style individuals 
displayed. More specifically, were they using a global or local strategy? If an 
individual is using a global strategy they will tend to focus on drawing the outline 
of the entire figure first and then move on to filling in the internal details. A local 
strategy might then entail a person focusing on drawing the secondary details and 
paying little attention to the larger global shape of the figure. Two people were 
asked to judge which strategy they felt individuals were using on the copy trial. 
They were able to do this by looking at the experimenter's notes that indicated the 
order and direction in which the lines were drawn. 
I was also interested in knowing whether individuals imposed meaning on what 
they were drawing. This might be reflected by the person drawing something that 
does not actually appear in the Rey figure. For instance, the overall figure 
somewhat resembles a house. A person might then include windows or a door in 
their drawing which would indicate that they interpreted the figure to have 
meaning. It could be that groups differ in whether or not they incorporate 
meaning in their drawings. In particular, one might expect those with 
autism/Asperger's syndrome to use meaningful representations less in their 
drawings. Two people were asked to rate whether they thought an individual used 
meaningful representation in their drawings on both copy and recall trials. 
Recognition test. This tests the participant's memory for elements of the 
complex figure. It also helps to assess an individual's ability to use cues for 
retrieval (other recognition memory studies include Brian and Bryson, 1996; 
Ameli, et al., 1988). Both these studies found that meaningful information did aid 
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memory recall in autistic individuals. As with control participants, they were 
better at correctly recognising meaningful stimuli than non-meaningful stimuli. 
The elements in this particular recognition task however are devoid of meaning. 
Are individuals with autism better at recognising the smaller individual elements 
rather than the larger general shape in comparison to controls? This should partly 
be related to how they drew the complex figure. For instance if they drew the 
figure piece by piece using several lines to construct the figure, this would suggest 
they were breaking it into very small chunks. However, they may instead draw 
the general shape first and then fill in the detail. 
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4: 8 Results on illusion task 
Five autistic individuals did not complete all 4 illusions. A computer malfunction 
that resulted in the loss of data on a particular illusion accounted for 4 of these. The 
data for only one illusion was excluded in these individuals. Another individual was 
excluded because he was unwilling to continue with the testing. Data for this 
individual were collected for only 2 of the illusions. Raw data were transferred 
directly into SPSS from the computer program and mixed ANOVA's were carried out 
on each of the illusions separately. Condition (2) and trial (3) were included in the 
analysis as within subjects factors and participant group (5) was entered as a between 
factor. This would allow us to assess whether performance in general differed on the 
illusion and control trials. This analysis would also allow us to detect any group 
differences in performance on either condition. Individuals with autism might differ 
from other participants in their performance on illusion trials but not on control trials. 
This would occur if there were differences in judgments between conditions 
specifically in individuals with autism. Hence, a group by condition interaction was 
expected. 
Titchener Circles 
Figure 4: 7 displays the group means for the illusion and the control condition. The 
figure shows that all groups scored lower on the illusion than the control, which 
suggests that the effect of the illusion led to a systematic distortion in perception. The 
horizontal line drawn across the graph indicates the actual number of pixels the circle 
being judged was in size. This was apparent as a main effect of condition 
F(1,79)=30.653, p<. 001. There was also a significant difference between groups 
F(4,79)=5.587, p<. 005. A Tukey's HSD post-hoc test showed this was due to the 
autistic group having overall significantly higher scores (combined over trial and 
condition) than the MLD and year 3 groups. There were no other significant main 
effects. Although a significant group by condition interaction was not found I wanted 
to be certain that each group individually judged differently on the illusion and 
control trials. Therefore, t-tests were carried out on each group separately as in Study 
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3: 1 comparing performance on the first trials of both conditions. All groups judged 
significantly differently between the illusion and control trials (see Table 4: 4). 
Table 4: 4 
t-test results for first trial of Titchener illusion 
Group Si gmficance 
Autistic t= 
-2.19 (17), p<. 05 
As er er t= 
-2.86 (9), <. 05 
MLD t= 
, -3.01 
(19), p<. O1 
Year' t= 
-2.56 (17), p<. 05 
Year6 t= 
-3.26 (17), <. O1 
Figure 4: 7 
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Muller-Leer 
Figure 4: 8 displays group means for the illusion and control condition. The figure 
shows that all groups scored lower on the illusion condition than on the control, 
which suggests they were susceptible to the illusions. Again the horizontal line 
indicates the actual size in pixels of the line being judged. Our analyses supported 
this showing a significant main effect of condition F(1,81)=495.125, p<. 001. Trial 
was also significant F(2,162)=8.03, p<. 001. This was a result of the means for each 
successive trial being higher. There was a main effect of group E(4,8 1)=3.225, p<. 017 
and this factor interacted with condition F(4,81)=7.133, j< 
. 
001. Further analyses 
revealed that the interaction was due to groups performing significantly different on 
the illusion condition F(4,85)=6.174, p< 
. 
001. 
A post-hoc test (Tukey's HSD) revealed that both the Asperger's and year 6 groups 
had significantly higher means than the MILD and year 3 groups. It seems the 
Asperger's and Year 6 groups are not as susceptible to illusions as the others. Since 
both these groups have a higher mean CA and VMA this may reflect a maturity effect 
by which individuals become less susceptible to the illusion with age. In order to 
check whether condition was significant for each group independently individual t- 
tests were carried out to see if performance differed on the illusion and control trials. 
As in Study 3: 1, this was done on the first trials only for the illusion and control 
conditions. All groups judged differently between the two conditions (see Table 4: 5). 
Table 4: 5 
t-test results for first trial of Muller-Leer illusion 
Group Si gnificance 
Autistic t= 
-11.94 (17), p<. 001 
Asperger t= 
-5.57 (10), p<. 001 
MLD t= 
-10.47 (19), <. 001 
Year' t= 
-11.60 (18), p<. 001 
Year6 t= 
-7.90 (17), <. 001 
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Figure 4: 8 
Mean scores on illusion and control trials for Muller-Lyer illusion 
120 
100 
U) X 80 
60 
N 
. 
40 
N 
20 
0 
Ponzo 
autistic asperger mid year 3 year 6 
Q illusion 
control 
The Ponzo differed from the other illusions in that susceptibility to the illusion would 
result in overestimation rather than underestimation of size. This can be seen in 
Figure 4: 9 which displays the means for each group on both conditions. All groups 
systematically overestimated on the illusion condition. The horizontal line indicates 
the actual size the judged circle was in pixels. This was confirmed by a main effect 
of condition F(1,79)=15.976, p<. 001. T-tests were carried out on the first trials of 
both conditions to ensure the effect could be found for each group separately. The 
results showed that only year 6 and the autistic group performed significantly 
different on the two conditions (see Table 4: 6). No other effects were significant. 
i 
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Table 4: 6 
t-test results for first trial of Ponzo illusion 
Group Si gnificance 
Autistic t= 2.22 (17), p<. 05 
Asperger t= 1.31 (10), p=. 221 
MLD t= 
-. 
04 18 
, 
=. 968 
Year3 t= 
. 
11 (17), p=. 915 
Year6 t= 3.55 (17), p<. 005 
Figure 4: 9 
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The mean scores for each condition are displayed in Figure 4: 10. All groups 
underestimated size on the illusion condition. The actual size of the line being 
estimated is shown by the horizontal line. As with the other illusions, there was a 
significant effect of condition F(1,79)=37.966, p<. 001. There was also a significant 
difference between groups F(4,79)=5.483, p<. 005. Post-hoc comparisons showed 
that participants in the MLD group had overall lower scores (combined across trial 
and condition) than the other groups. There were no other significant main effects. 
Individual t-tests on the first trials were carried out to compare each group's 
performance on the illusion and control conditions. The results showed that the MLD 
group and year 6 all judged differently between conditions to a significant extent (see 
Table 4: 7). The remaining groups however did not perform differently on the two 
conditions. 
Table 4: 7 
t-test results for first trial of Hat illusion 
Group Significance 
Autistic t= 
. 
24 (16), =. 811 
Asperger t= 
-1.04(9), p=. 327 
MLD t= 
. 
-4.31 19 , <. 001 Year3 t= 
-1 
. 
36 (18), p=. 190 
Year6 t= - 
-3.35 (17), p<. 005 
Figure 4: 10 
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These results provide little support for Happe's claim that individuals with autism are 
not susceptible to illusions. In general, there was a significant main effect of 
condition on all illusions which suggests that individuals judged differently on the 
two conditions. This is consistent with the results obtained in Experiment 3: 1. 
However, not all groups judged differently between conditions to a significant extent 
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as revealed by further analyses. A discussion of the results from each illusion 
individually will help us determine to what extent they support Happe's argument. 
On the Ponzo illusion there was no evidence of group differences from the general 
ANOVA. However, the t-tests on the first trials of both conditions suggested some 
differences in susceptibility to illusions. There was no significant contrast between 
conditions in those with Asperger's syndrome, though they did succumb to it in 
Experiment 3: 1. The pattern was reversed for the autistic group in that they were 
susceptible in this study but not in the first. This may weakly offer some evidence for 
Happe's argument even if there is inconsistency between the two studies. However, 
this does not seem to be specific to autism since other non-autistic groups were also 
not susceptible to this illusion. The results from the Ponzo illusion seem to be less 
clear than those from the Muller-Lyer and Titchener illusion. 
The results of the Titchener illusion were also fairly strong and consistent with our 
first study. There was a significant difference in performance between conditions for 
all groups as indicated by the general ANOVA and the individual t-tests. The lack of 
a significant group by condition interaction indicated that all groups performed 
similarly. In comparison to Happe's study, these results contradict her claim that 
individuals with autism are less susceptible to illusions. 
The Muller-Lyer illusion seems to have produced the strongest illusory effect of all 
the stimuli. Although the results showed a significant difference between groups on 
the illusion condition, this was not due to the autistic/Asperger group being less 
susceptible to the illusion. Furthermore, as in Experiment 3: 1, all groups significantly 
judged differently on the 
_t-tests. 
These findings are consistent with Happe's, as the 
Muller-Lyer was the one illusion she found individuals with autism to be susceptible 
to. She argued this may not be ideal as it did not allow one to easily distinguish 
between "induced figure and inducing context ". 
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For example, in the Ponzo illusion the diagonal lines provide the inducing context 
that distorts the appearance of the circles that lie between them. The circles in this 
case would be the induced figure. Thus, the inducing context (diagonal lines) and the 
induced figure (circles) are separated by space in this illusion. This is also the same 
for the Titchener Circles. However, in the Muller-Lyer the arrows which create the 
inducing context in the illusion are connected to the induced figure and form part of 
the same object. Happe argues that it is difficult to separate the illusion into these 
two elements since coherence is inherent in the configuration of the illusion. She 
argues this would explain why the illusory effect was found in those with autism. 
The same could be argued however for the Hat illusion. There does not seem to be an 
obvious context that needs to be integrated for the illusion to work like there is in the 
Ponzo or Titchener illusions. Rather, the orientation of the lines is sufficient to 
induce perceptual distortion. On this basis Happe would have to predict that 
individuals with autism would be susceptible to the Hat illusion. It is ironic that there 
was some evidence of less susceptibility on this illusion in the current study. 
Although there was a main effect of condition on the Hat illusion which indicated that 
all groups performed significantly different on the two conditions, a look at the 
individual t-tests showed that those with autism and Asperger's syndrome were less 
susceptible on the illusion. However, since this was also true of those individuals in 
year 3, non-susceptibility is not confined to those with autism/Asperger's syndrome. 
In Experiment 3: 1 there was also some evidence that those with autism and 
Asperger's syndrome were less susceptible to this illusion. 
Overall, it seems that performance on the Titchener illusion provides the strongest 
support against Happe's argument. The results of the Ponzo and the Hat illusion are 
somewhat inconclusive. Susceptibility to the Muller-Lyer in the autistic group is 
consistent with Happe's findings. However, she dismisses this as evidence against 
her theory by arguing that the illusion is not ideal to test WCC, as the context is not 
easily separated or identified. 
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The reason for this study was not just to establish whether or not individuals with 
autism succumb to illusions, but to see whether performance on the illusions 
correlates with measures of central coherence. I will address this question later. 
4: 10 Block design test 
Each individual's score on the block design test was entered into a oneway ANOVA 
with group (5) as a between subjects factor. The analysis revealed there was a 
significant difference between groups F(4,86)=11.114, p<. 001. Post-hoc 
comparisons (Tukey's HSD) revealed that the MLD and year 3 groups had 
significantly lower scores than the other groups. This difference is illustrated in 
Figure 4: 11 which shows each group's mean score. The graph shows how the autistic 
group scored significantly higher on the block design test than their verbally matched 
controls, suggesting this area of functioning in autism may be preserved. Year 6 also 
did significantly better than Year 3 showing an expected increase in visuo-spatial 
ability with age. The individuals with Asperger's syndrome performed similarly to 
the Year 6 group, but did not surpass them on the task. 
Since visuo-spatial ability tends to increase with verbal ability an ANCOVA was 
carried out to see if the results changed when VMA was entered as a covariate. For 
example, once VMA is controlled for, those with Asperger's Syndrome might gain 
higher scores in block design than those in year 6. However, the pattern of results 
remained the same as in the previous ANOVA. 
i 
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Figure 4: 11 
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4: 11 Embedded figures test 
Lo mean score 
Each individual's average time to complete the embedded figures test was entered 
into a oneway ANOVA, with group (5) as a between subject factor. The results 
showed there was a significant difference between groups F(4,84)=12.935, p<. 001. 
The difference in performance on this task is illustrated in Figure 4: 12 which shows 
the mean scores of both conditions for all groups. A Tukey's post-hoc test revealed 
that the year 3 and MILD groups had significantly higher mean completion times than 
the other groups. It seems they had considerably more difficulty with this task than 
the Asperger's, autistic, and year 6 groups whose means were much lower. Although 
the autistic group took a bit longer to complete the task compared to the Asperger's 
and year 6 group, they still did significantly better than the MLD group. This 
provides further evidence that individuals with autism might excel in visuo-spatial 
ability. An expected increase in ability with age is also reflected in the better 
performance of year 6 in relation to the year 3 group. Again, individuals with 
Asperger's syndrome were comparable with those in year 6. An ANCOVA was 
carried out with VMA as a covariate, and the results remained the same. 
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Figure 4: 12 
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4: 12 Rev comulex figures test 
Each individual's scores on both the copy and delayed recall trials were entered into a 
mixed ANOVA. There was a within subject factor of condition [(2) copy or recall] 
and a between factor of group (5). There was a significant main effect of group 
F(4,82)=8.237, p<. 001 and condition F(1,82)=281.073, p< 
. 
001. There was also a 
significant interaction between these two factors F(4,82)=2.894, P<. 05. The 
difference in performance on the two conditions is illustrated in Figure 4: 13 which 
shows each group's mean score. Oneway ANOVA's were carried out on each 
condition separately to clarify the interaction. A significant difference in 
performance was found on the copy condition F(4,86)=8.602, p<. 001. Post -hoc 
analysis (Tukey's HSD) showed this was due to the MLD group performing worse 
than all other groups. The analysis on the recall scores also yielded a significant 
difference between groups F(4,86)=4.775, p< 
. 
005. Post-hoc comparisons showed 
this was due to the MLD group doing significantly worse than year 6. Paired t-tests 
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were carried out to see how each group individually performed on the 2 trial types. 
All groups achieved a significantly higher score on the copy condition (P<. 001). As 
before an ANCOVA with VMA as a covariate on both the copy and recall trials was 
conducted. This did not change the pattern of results in anyway for either of these 
conditions. 
Figure 4: 13 
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Do individuals' with autism/Asperger's syndrome prefer to use a local or global 
strategy when drawing? 
Two raters were asked to judge whether individuals used a global or local strategy 
when copying the Rey figure. An inter-rater reliability of 78% was established. The 
percentage of those using a global strategy was calculated on only the individuals 
where both raters were in agreement. Table 4: 8 displays these percentages for each 
group. In order to see whether those on the autistic spectrum were less likely to use a 
global strategy. Surprisingly the autistic and Asperger's group used a global strategy 
at least as much as other groups. 
autistic asperger mid year 3 year 6 
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Table 4: 8 
Percentage of individuals in each group using a global strategy 
Group % using a global 
strategy 
Autistic 50% 
Asperger's 60% 
MLD 29% 
Year 3 50% 
Year 6 40% 
Do individuals' with autism/Asperger's syndrome incorporate meaningful 
representations in their drawings? 
Two raters were also asked to judge whether participants used meaningful 
representations in their drawing to see if those in the autistic/Asperger groups used 
representation less than comparison groups. There was an inter-rater reliability of 95 
percent. Again, the figures shown in Table 4: 9 are based only on those individuals 
the raters agreed upon. The use of representation was not particularly high in any of 
the groups, though the zero score in the Asperger group is notable. Individuals with 
autism however were just as likely to incorporate meaningful representations in their 
drawings as other groups. In general, there is no striking difference between groups 
in the use of representation. 
i 
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Table 4: 9 
Percentage of individuals in each group who incorporate meaningful 
representations into their drawings 
Group using 
representation 
Autistic 11% 
Asperger's 0% 
MLD 25% 
Year 3 6% 
Year 6 13% 
Rev recognition task 
Global analysis 
If individuals without autism are more inclined to attend to global shapes, then one 
might expect they would be accurate in their recall of the overall shape of the Rey 
figure. Table 4: 10 shows how groups performed in their ability to identify the correct 
global design and reject the distracter. The majority of individuals in each group fell 
in the `accept both' column. That is, they correctly identified the appropriate design 
but failed to reject the distracter. The first column shows that few individuals were 
able to both correctly identify the target and reject the distracter. There do not appear 
to be any notable differences between those with and without autism in their pattern 
of responses as displayed below. 
Table 4: 10 
Number of individuals in each group accepting and rejecting target 
and distracter global shapes 
Group Reject distracter 
& accept target 
(both correct) 
Accept distracter 
& reject target 
(both incorrect) 
Accept both 
(1 correct) 
Reject both 
(1 correct) 
Autistic 5 1 11 1 
Asperger 
MLD 
0 
4 
5 
6 
5 
8 
1 
2 
Year 3 2 5 12 0 
Year 6 0 1 15 2 
108 
Are there group differences in recall of the local shape? 
A oneway ANOVA was carried out to investigate whether there were any group 
differences in the ability to recall the components of the design that would be 
considered local. This meant the two global designs were removed leaving 22 items 
(11 target items and 11 distracters). An individual was awarded 1 point for each 
target item they correctly identified. One point was also given for each distracter they 
appropriately rejected. The total number of points (maximum of 22) was entered into 
SPSS. A between groups (5) ANOVA was performed which found no significant 
difference in performance. Group means are shown in Figure 4: 14. 
Figure 4: 14 
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4: 13 Discussion of central coherence measures 
According to previous literature on WCC I predicted that individuals with autism and 
Asperger's syndrome would perform significantly better than comparison groups on 
the block design task and embedded figures test. It was expected that individuals 
with autism and Asperger's syndrome might perform better than other groups on the 
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Rey copy but not the Rey recall trial. Evidence of a local strategy and less use of 
representation in the drawings of the autistic and Asperger's group would show 
evidence of WCC. If individuals did process details more than global shapes this 
would also be obvious in their recognition of the parts of the Rey figure. 
The results offer mixed support for the theory of WCC. On the block design test and 
embedded figures test the autistic group did perform significantly better than their 
VMA-matched controls. This is consistent with previous findings (Shah & Frith, 
1983; 1993). Since the male/female ratio for both these groups was similar, the better 
performance of the autistic group could not be explained by sex differences. 
However, individuals with Asperger's syndrome performed similarly to typically 
developing 11 year olds, but did not outperform them. This may be a result of their 
lower VNIA (9; 11) in comparison to the VMA (11; 6) in the typically developing 
group. However, the results from the ANCOVA's with VMA as a covariate ruled this 
explanation out. Therefore, the individuals with Asperger's Syndrome in this study 
did not show a superiority effect on these tasks in comparison to individuals with 
typical development. 
Individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome performed significantly better than 
the MLD group on the Rey copy but not the Rey recall trial. No evidence was found 
to suggest that individuals with autism or Asperger's syndrome used a local drawing 
strategy less often. They seemed to rely on a global drawing strategy to the same 
extent, if not more, than comparison groups. This is not consistent with previous 
literature suggesting that individuals with autism tend to draw the internal details first 
rather than the outline shape (Mottron & Belleville 1993,1995; Steel, et al. 1984; Prior 
& Hoffman, 1990). It is consistent with findings from Joliffe and Baron-Cohen 
(1997) which showed individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome were just as 
likely to begin drawing the global outline first. These findings seem to be detrimental 
to the theory of WCC as no local bias was found. However, the theory of 
Hierarchisation which predicts no preferences for either the local or global level 
might be able to account for these results. 
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Use of representation in drawings was also similar in the autistic and non-autistic 
groups. The fact that there was minimal use of representation in all groups however 
may indicate that the task was not ideal for evoking meaningful interpretation. Joliffe 
and Baron-Cohen (1997) did find that individuals without autism were likely to give 
meaning to abstract stimuli in the adult embedded figures test. However, they were 
directly asked to describe the figure for 15 seconds, unlike in the Rey figure test 
where I never explicitly asked the individual to reflect on the appearance of the shape. 
If this had been done, I might have found a greater number of those without autism 
using representations in their drawings. 
On the Rey recognition task those with autism and Asperger's syndrome performed 
similarly to comparison groups on their recall of global and local designs. Therefore, 
those in the autistic population were no better at recognising local and no worse in 
recognising the global designs of the Rey figure. This offers little support for the 
theory of weak central coherence. Again, this would not undermine the theory of 
Hierarchisation which predicts that global and local details are processed equally 
well. 
Developmental trends 
Individuals with typical development aged 11 did significantly better than those at 
age 7 on the embedded figures and block design test. This shows an increase in 
visuo-spatial ability with age. A similar developmental trend between these typically 
developing groups was also observed on the Rey copy and recall trials, but this did 
not reach significance. 
Results and discussion of correlations 
Only data from subjects who completed all the tests were included in the correlational 
analyses. There were three main questions I wanted to explore. Firstly, I wanted to 
know whether performance on the 4 illusions correlated. Secondly, I wanted to know 
whether the tasks associated with WCC correlated with one another. Finally, and 
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most importantly, I wanted to see if performance on the block design, embedded 
figures, and Rey figure test predicts susceptibility to illusions. The results are 
discussed in the following section in relation to these specific questions. 
1. ) Do the illusions correlate with one another? 
Each participant's mean score on the control trials was subtracted from their mean 
score on the illusion trials to yield a difference score. The data were combined across 
groups on all four illusions (Ponzo, Hat, Muller-Lyer, Titchener) and entered into a 
correlational matrix (see Table 4: 11 for results). A Bonferroni correction was 
applied. This was done by dividing 
. 
05 by the number of comparisons being made 
(6) which resulted in a significance level of 
. 
008. With the Bonferroni correction 
there were no significant correlations. Overall, the analyses did not show any 
relationships between performances on the four illusions. However, this does not 
exclude the possibility that one or more of the illusions may be related to performance 
on the embedded figures, block design, or Rey figure test. I will return to this 
question later on in this section. 
Table 4: 11 
Correlation coefficients and significance levels showing the relationship 
between the four illusions 
Degrees of freedom equals 77 for all below. 
Hat Ponzo Muller-Lyer Titchener 
XXXX r =. 23, .p<. 05 r=-. 25, <. 05 r =. 01, . =. 935 Hat 
X? CKXXX r=-. 13, =. 262 r=-. 11, =. 352 Ponzo 
x; X r =. 03, p =. 774 Muller-Lyer 
XXX X Titchener 
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2. ) Do the embedded figures, block design, and Rey figures test correlate with one 
another? 
All factors (embedded figures, block design, Rey copy, Rey recall, Rey recognition) 
correlated when all groups were combined. To be certain these correlations were 
reliable a Bonferroni correction of 
. 
005 was applied [. 05 divided by number of 
comparisons (10)]. These results are displayed in Table 4: 12. 
Table 4: 12 
Correlation coefficients and significance levels showing the relationship between the 
visuo-spatial tasks 
* Indicates significance when a Bonferroni correction of 
. 
005 was applied. 
Degrees of freedom equal 77 for all below. 
Embedded Block Rey copy Rey recall Rey 
figures design recognition 
*r 
= 
-. 
81, *r = 
-. 
68, *r 
= 
-. 
49, *r = 
-. 
46, Embedded 
ýxxx p<. 001 P<. 001 p <. 001 12 <. 001 figures 
*r 
= 
. 
72, *r =. 57, *r =. 39, Block 
xxxx p <. 001 P=<. 001 P- <. 001 design 
*r 
=. 71, *r =. 53, Rey copy 
XXx P<. 001 12 <. 001 
*r 
=. 37, Rey recall 
xxxx p<. 005 
Rey 
xxxx recognition 
Although I have established that these tasks are related, the association may be due to 
a factor such as VMA rather than WCC. For instance, all the tests place a demand on 
verbal comprehension skills in order to understand the instructions. Those who are 
poor at comprehending would be disadvantaged on all tasks. When VMA was 
partialled out all correlations remained between embedded figures, block design, Rey 
copy, and Rey recall (see Table 4: 13). This suggests that these tests are related 
independently of VMA. Two correlations did not remain significant at the p< 
. 
05 
113 
level when VMA was partialled out. These were between the Rey recognition test and 
both the block design task and Rey recall trial. 
Table 4: 13 
Correlation coefficients and significance levels showing the relationship between the 
visuo-spatial tasks with VMA partialled out 
EFT BDT Rey copy Rey recall Rey 
recognition 
XXXX *r 
= 
-. 
76, *r 
= 
-. 
57, *r 
= 
-. 
37, *r = 
-. 
26, EFT 
P<. 001 p<. 001 p< 
. 
005 p<. 05 
Xx *r=. 63, *r=. 48, r =. 20, BDT 
P<. 001 P<. 001 p=. 087 
xxxx *r =. 65, *r =. 34, Rey copy 
P<. 001 p< 
. 
005 
OX r =. 21, Rey recall 
p=. 069 
xx Rey 
recognition 
It can be concluded that the embedded figures, block design, Rey copy, and Rey 
recall trials are strongly associated. They are also related independently of VMA. 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to suppose that they all measure WCC. On the other 
hand, perhaps the recognition task does not involve coherence ability to the same 
extent as the other tasks. It does not require an individual to actively integrate or 
analyse visual information in the same way. That is they do not need to visually 
manipulate the stimuli, they merely need to recognise it. Therefore, from this point 
on I will not consider the Rey recognition test in the analyses since the tests 
associated with WCC (i. e. visuo-spatial tasks) are the primary focus of this study. 
Each group was examined independently to see if the significant correlations that 
emerged in the combined data remained significant. A Bonferroni correction was not 
applied here as these sub-analyses were begun with the assumption that it would be 
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inappropriate to use a conservative criterion of significance. Since the Rey 
recognition task was not strongly correlated with the other measures in our previous 
analysis it was not considered here. Overall, there seemed to be strong relationships 
between performances on many of the tasks as can be seen from Table 4: 14. Many of 
these significant correlations persist throughout all groups such as block design and 
embedded figures, block design and Rey copy, and Rey copy and Rey recall. Since 
these tasks inter-correlate fairly well, they will be accepted as a measure of central 
coherence. 
Table 4: 14 
Results of correlations on visuo-spatial tasks for each group separately 
Note: Table shows correlational coefficient and degrees of freedom. 
* Indicates significance at the 
. 
05 level. 
** Indicates significance at the 
. 
01 level. 
n. s. Indicates not significant 
Group Autistic Asperger's MLD Year 3 Year 6 
BDT & EFT 
-. 
72**(13) 
-. 
85**(8) 
-. 
79**(17) 
-. 
56*(15) 
-. 
71** (16) 
BDT & Rey 
. 
53*(13) 
. 
91**(8) 
. 
77**(17) 
. 
58*(15) 
. 
66**(16) 
copy 
BDT & Rey 
. 
26 n. s. (13) 
. 
91**(8) 
. 
51*(17) 
. 
52*(15) 
. 
64**(16) 
recall 
Rey copy & 
. 
53*(13) 
. 
76*(8) 
. 
83**(17) 
. 
51*(15) 
. 
75**(16) 
Rey recall 
* EFT & Rey 
-. 
74**(13) 
-. 
92**(8) 
-. 
63**(17) 
-. 
11 n. s. (15) (16) 
-. 
53 
copy 
EFT & Rey '-. 46 n. s. (13) 
. 
70*(8) 
-. 
45 n. s. (17) 
. 
14 n. s. (15) 
-. 
41 n. s. (16) 
recall 
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3. ) Is there a relationship between good performance on the embedded figures test, 
block design test, Rey complex figures test and non-susceptibility to illusions? 
Correlation results 
A difference score was calculated for each illusion by subtracting each participant's 
mean on the control trials from their mean illusion score. Data were combined from 
all groups and correlation analyses were carried out to see if there were relationships 
between any of the visuo-spatial tasks and the illusions. A Bonferroni Correction of 
. 
001 was applied to our analyses [. 05 divided by the number of comparisons (36)]. 
The results showed that the Muller-Lyer illusion correlates most strongly with 
performance on visuo-spatial tasks. The Muller-Lyer significantly correlated with the 
embedded figures test (i=. 48, df--77, p<. 001), block design test (r= 
-. 
46, df77, p 
<. 001), Rey copy test (r= 
-. 
45, df--77, p <. 001), Rey recall (r= 
-. 
41, df 77, p <. 001), 
and the Rey recognition test (r= 
-. 
37, df--77, p =. 001). The results also showed a 
significant correlation between the Hat illusion the Rey copy test (r= 
. 
40, df=77, p 
<. 001). These correlations will be the primary focus of our further analyses which 
look at each group independently. 
Individual group results 
Table 4: 15 shows the results of the correlational analyses for each group separately. 
It seems that in general the association between the Muller-Lyer and the other tests is 
more evident in year 6 than in any other groups. The relationship is positive between 
the embedded figures test and the Muller-Lyer illusion since those with a lower mean 
completion time (performed well) had a lower mean difference score on the Muller- 
Lyer illusion (indicating less susceptibility). This same relationship was also found 
to be significant for the MELD group. There was a negative relationship between the 
Muller-Lyer and the block design test, Rey copy, and Rey recall tests. Thus, those 
who achieved higher scores on these tasks had lower difference scores on the illusion. 
In other words, those who performed well on these tasks were less susceptible to the 
Muller-Lyer illusion. In the MLD group a similar relationship was found between the 
Muller-Lyer and the BDT, but not with the other tasks. In general there is some 
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evidence to suggest that good performance on these tests is associated with less 
susceptibility to the Muller-Lyer illusion. Another significant relationship was 
between the Hat illusion and Rey copy trial for the autistic group only. This finding 
shows something quite different than the results with the Muller-Lyer illusion. It 
seems those who obtained a higher score on the Rey copy test had a higher mean 
difference score on the Hat illusion. Therefore, those who were strongly susceptible 
to the Hat illusion achieved more points for copying the Rey figure. A partial 
correlation was also carried out to establish whether these relationships remained if 
VMA was accounted for. The results showed that the correlations remained 
significant (see Table 4: 16). 
Table 4: 15 
Results of correlations between visuo-spatial tasks and the Hat and Muller-Leer 
illusions for each group 
* Indicates significance at the 
. 
05 level. 
* Indicates significance at the 
. 
01 level 
Group EFT BDT Rey copy Rey recall Rey 
recognition 
Autistic 
- 
- 
Hat (. 66)** 
- 
- 
Asperger 
- 
- - 
- - 
MLD Muller-Lyer 
(. 55)* 
Muller-Lyer 
(-. 50)* 
- 
- - 
Year 3 
- 
- 
- 
- - 
Year 6 Muller-Lyer 
(. 74)** 
Muller-Lyer 
(-. 73)** 
Muller-Lyer 
(-. 54)* 
Muller-Lyer 
(-. 62)** 
- 
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Table 4: 16 
Results of correlations between visuo-spatial tasks and the Hat and Muller-Lyer 
illusions for each group with \TMA partialled out 
Group EFT BDT Rey copy Rey recall Rey 
recognition 
Autistic 
- - 
Hat (. 67)** 
- - 
Asperger 
- - - - 
MLD Muller-Lyer 
(. 59)** 
Muller-Lyer 
(-. 56)* 
- - - 
Year 3 
- - - - - 
Year 6 Muller-Lyer 
(. 77)** 
Muller-Lyer 
(-. 74)** 
Muller-Lyer 
(-. 56)* 
Muller-Lyer 
(-. 62)** 
- 
Multiple regressions 
I wanted to know if performance on tasks associated with WCC predicts 
susceptibility to illusions. Therefore, a multiple regression was carried out using the 
embedded figures test, block design, Rey copy, and Rey recall as predictors of 
performance on the illusions. This was done on the combined data of all the groups. 
The Rey recognition trial was not included as it did not correlate strongly with the 
other tasks. If non-susceptibility to illusions is related to WCC, like Happe argues, 
then one would expect a significant outcome. A regression was carried out for each 
of the illusions individually using the same four tasks as predictors. The results 
indicated that performance on the tasks significantly predicted performance on the 
Hat illusion F=3,87(4,78), p<. 01 and Muller-Lyer F=6.95 (4,78), p<. 001. Good 
performance on the visuo-spatial tasks predicted an individual would be more 
susceptible to the Hat illusion, but less susceptible to the Muller-Lyer 
illusion. 
Performance on the tasks did not significantly predict susceptibility to the Ponzo and 
Titchener illusions. 
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I wanted to know whether this pattern of results would be found in each group 
separately, or whether it was evident only in particular populations. The autistic and 
Asperger's group were combined since individually the group populations would 
have been too small. It was expected that both these groups would perform well on 
measures of WCC so this should not be a problem. The results indicated that 
performance on the embedded figures, block design, Rey copy and Rey recall tasks 
significantly predicted how the autistic/Asperger's group did on the Hat and 
Titchener illusion (see Table 4: 17). In general, those with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome who did well on visuo-spatial tasks were more susceptible to the Titchener 
illusion. This contradicts Happe's predictions that weak coherence results in less 
susceptibility to illusions. In regards to the Hat illusion, good performance on the 
visuo-spatial tasks predicted an individual would be more susceptible to the illusion. 
This again is not in line with Happe's argument. In fact the only evidence that weak 
coherence, as measured by the visuo-spatial tasks, predicted less susceptibility to 
illusions was in a non-autistic group. Those in year 6 who performed particularly 
well on visuo-spatial tasks were less susceptible to the Muller-Lyer illusion. This is 
somewhat ironic as Happe argued that the Muller-Lyer illusion was not the best for 
tapping coherence ability as the stimulus was a single unitary figure. Yet this illusion 
was not only the most strongly related to visuo-spatial tasks, but the relationship was 
in the appropriate direction. Generally, the results indicate that tasks associated with 
WCC do not strongly predict performance on the illusions. 
i 
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Table 4: 17 
Results of multiple regression analyses using the visuo-spatial batte as a 
predictor for performance on illusions 
Group Hat Ponzo Muller Titchener 
Autistic/ 
Asperger 
*F=3.36, p<. 05 F=1.01, p=. 424 F =. 33, p=. 852 *F=2.91, p<. 05 
MLD F=. 80, R--. 544 F=. 98, p=. 448 F= 2.25, p=. 116 F= 
. 
65, p=. 635 
Year 3 F=. 67, p=. 624 F= 1.63, p=. 231 F= 1.34, p=. 311 F=. 80, p=. 548 
Year 6 F=. 54, p=. 710 F= 
. 
39, p=. 816 * F= 7.40, p<. 005 F= 2.41, p=. 102 
General Discussion 
Overall these results question the strength of Happe's argument that individuals with 
autism do not succumb to illusions because of a weak drive for central coherence. As 
I already said in the interim discussion there was little evidence of any group 
differences in perception of visual illusions. Those with autism must be capable of a 
certain level of coherence if they do succumb to the illusions. However, it could be 
that illusions are not tapping coherence ability at all. Happe argues that illusions 
would involve low level coherence because one needs to perceptually integrate 
elements in order to perceive the illusory effects. If coherence were the underlying 
operating mechanism, one would expect some relationship between how an 
individual performs on one illusion and how they perform on another. The fact that 
no correlations were found between the illusions suggests that they may be working 
on other perceptual mechanisms rather than coherence alone (e. g. depth cues or 
framing effects)., Moreover, performance on visuo-spatial tasks did not predict 
susceptibility to all four illusions for every group. 
It could be that the mechanisms involved in coherence (drawing together pieces to 
perceive a whole) are less apparent in those illusions where performance was not 
significantly predicted by the visuo-spatial battery. Surprisingly however, this does 
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not seem to be the case. As discussed earlier, in the Ponzo and Titchener illusions the 
inducing context is very evident and separable from the induced elements. Thus, if a 
person could easily separate context from individual elements on tasks such as the 
embedded figures and block design test, then one might expect them to be less 
susceptible t6 the illusions. They should find it easy to ignore the context which 
surrounds the shapes they were required to match in size. Yet it was on these 
illusions where performance was not significantly predicted by the battery of tests. 
The illusion that most strongly correlated with performance on the battery of was the 
Muller-Lyer illusion (in the MLD and year 6 groups only). However, this illusion 
was argued by Happe (1996) to not be ideal for testing coherence as the parts were 
connected forming a whole. She said this illusion could not be easily separated into 
"inducing context" and "induced figure". Performance on the Hat illusion, which was 
also a unitary figure, significantly correlated with the Rey copy test. However, this 
was not in the direction that Happe would have predicted. Individuals who performed 
very well on the Rey copy test were more susceptible to the Hat illusion. Altogether, 
this evidence offers little support for Happe's argument. 
Performance on the embedded figures test, block design, and Rey copy test 
significantly correlated as would be expected given that all have been argued to test 
visuo-spatial ability. Previous research has argued that good performance on the 
embedded figures test and block design test suggest an individual may display "weak 
coherence"( Shah and Frith, 1993; Frith, 1989). The fact that individuals with autism 
performed better than their mental aged matched controls (MLD group) on all three 
of these tests suggest that those with autism may be superior on all visuo-spatial 
tasks. This idea has been suggested by Baron-Cohen and Joliffe (1997). It could be 
that having a cognitive style such as "weak coherence" is advantageous to an 
individual on all'visuo-spatial tasks. However, we could not say such a cognitive 
style causes an individual to be less susceptible to illusions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Cognitive styles: Do individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome 
rely on meaningful context or visual information? 
The experiments in this chapter form the basis of a paper by Ropar and Mitchell, "Do 
individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome utilise background knowledge in 
pairing visually presented stimuli? ", that is under submission with the Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders. 
5: 1 Background Knowledge 
In our previous chapters I established that coherence is intact at lower perceptual 
levels in autism. Individuals with autism are able to integrate lines and shapes as 
evidenced by their susceptibility to illusions. It appears that difficulties "drawing 
together pieces of information to create a meaningful whole" may be restricted to 
higher levels of processing. In chapter four I found that those with autism were better 
than verbal mental matched controls on the embedded figures, block design, and Rey 
copy trial. This shows evidence of weak coherence at a visuo-spatial constructional 
level as specified by Happe (1999). One might assume that individuals with autism 
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would also have difficulties with coherence at levels higher than the visuo-spatial 
constructional level. However, this assumption might be premature given the 
inconsistent findings from studies of comprehension and use of meaningful 
information in autism. 
By meaningful information I are referring to semantic as well as conceptual 
knowledge that has been acquired through experience. Bartlett (1932) argued that 
any new information we are presented with is always related to the pre-existing 
background knowledge he called schemata. Therefore, it follows that information is 
easier to retrieve if it is related to the knowledge schema being used at the time. 
Evidence for this comes from Palmer (1975) who found that individuals (without 
autism) were better at recalling objects when presented in a scene having an 
appropriate context as opposed to an inappropriate context. According to Frith's 
account of weak central coherence we would not expect individuals with autism to be 
affected by "context". Their failure to attend to contextual information would neither 
assist nor hinder performance on the task. 
Before I continue it may be useful to make a distinction between "context" and 
"background" or "meaningful" information. "Context" as Frith uses the term, can be 
either meaningful or non-meaningful. An example of "non-meaningful context" 
would be with visual illusions (e. g. circles). We can see an example of "meaningful 
context" on the embedded figures test (e. g. pram). This chapter is concerned with 
coherence at higher-levels involving only "meaningful context". Therefore, I will use 
the terms "background knowledge" or "meaningful information" to specify the type 
of context that is being investigated. 
5: 2 The Salience of Meaning 
Experimental studies suggest that individuals with autism do neglect meaningful 
information. I have already mentioned how individuals with autism give the incorrect 
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yet more common pronunciation of ambiguous homographs (Frith & Snowling, 
1983). Individuals with autism also fail to use the meaning of thematically related 
words to assist recall (Tager-Flusberg, 1991). However, in a second experiment 
where individuals with autism were presented with a cued-recall test they were able 
to utilise background knowledge to facilitate recall. This suggests that although those 
with autism are capable of processing meaningful information, they simply do not 
choose to use it when performing a task. It does not appear to "pop out" to them in 
the way that it does to individuals without autism. It could be that what is salient to 
an individual with typical development, is not salient to those with autism. Frith 
(1989) argues that peculiar patterns of attention in autism can be explained by a 
deficit in the central thought processes. We are inclined to focus on those aspects of a 
picture or story which are most meaningful to us. According to WCC those with 
autism may not share this same "drive for meaning", or rather other features of 
stimuli may be more meaningful to a person with autism. Boucart and Humphreys 
(1992) argue that global processing is closely related to higher level processes such as 
semantic knowledge. They found that on a similarity judgement task that individuals 
with typical development could not process global shape without accessing semantic 
information. Thus, if an individual prefers to process information at the global level, 
semantic information might be more salient to them than if an individual attended to 
the local level as we would expect to find in autism. 
Another line of argument which is somewhat related to WCC has been suggested by 
Snyder and Thomas (1997). They suggest that autistic savants do not impose visual 
or linguistic schema on what they are drawing. This follows from Snyder and 
Barlow's (1988) view that what we perceive in our visual field conforms to certain 
patterns. Our perception can be more efficient if we have certain expectations of 
what we are to see. They argue that typically developing individuals have mental 
representations that pick up on the salient or ecologically significant aspects in the 
environment. 
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Evidence of these internalised representations can be seen in young children's 
drawings in_ such that they draw what they conceptually know rather than what they 
actually see (Lee, 1989). Snyder and Thomas (1997) suggest that these fixed mental 
representations are absent in autistic children allowing them to draw more precisely. 
One example they provide is that of Nadia (Seife, 1977). As a young child with little 
linguistic ability she could create outstanding drawings which were very realistic. 
However, as she grew older her language skills improved and her artistic ability 
deteriorated. In conclusion, they argue that savant abilities arise from the inability to 
apply linguistic or mental schema. 
5: 3 Savant abilities 
As described in Chapter 4, a study by Pring, Hermelin, and Heavey (1995) supported 
the claim that individuals with autism fail to use meaningful information in visual 
processing. An aim of their study was to investigate whether a cognitive style such as 
weak central coherence, as found in those with autism (Shah & Frith 1983; 1993), 
might also exist in typically developing individuals who were artistically talented. 
They argued that artistic production requires an individual to decompose a picture 
into its basic elements (shape, colour, light) in order to recreate the pattern 
veridically. A preference to attend to the individual visual components of a picture 
rather than the meaningful whole might thus be found in artistically talented 
individuals as well as those with autism. Pring et al. (1995) tested artistically gifted 
as well as non-gifted individuals with normal development and with autism, yielding 
four participant groups. Participants were presented with a picture puzzle task and 
the block design test. Both require participants to recreate a pattern using individual 
blocks. The picture puzzle task depicted a meaningful scene (Winnie the Pooh) rather 
than an abstract pattern. While a global processing style could actually hinder one's 
ability to perform well in block design (Shah & Frith, 1993), performance could be 
enhanced by utilizing the meaningful information in the picture puzzle task. 
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On the block design task in the non-gifted groups, those with autism were 
significantly better than individuals with typical development. On the picture puzzle 
task, the two groups performed at the same level. Pring, et al. (1995) argued that the 
improved performance in those with typical development on the picture puzzle task, 
was due to their ability to make use of the meaningful information presented on the 
stimuli. In comparison, those with autism performed equally well whether or not it 
was possible to make use of the background information. There was also evidence 
that the autistic savant artists failed to benefit from meaning in the picture puzzle 
task, unlike the artistically talented comparison group. Pring et al. (1995) suggested 
that the performance of the clinical and comparison groups on the picture puzzle task 
was probably achieved via different routes. Those without autism seemed to use a 
semantic strategy, while those with autism may have employed a segmentation-based 
strategy as evidenced by their superior performance on the block design test. 
Surprisingly, an earlier study by Pring and Hermelin (1993) failed to demonstrate a 
difference between those with and without autism in their use of meaningful 
information. They hypothesized that individuals without autism might pair a 
wineglass with a wine bottle due to the common semantic property that both are 
receptacles for wine (see Figure 5: 1). In contrast, perhaps individuals with autism 
would pair a wineglass with a tulip due to the common structural property of 
gobletoid shape; no background knowledge would be required in order to note that 
the objects were structurally similar. However, Pring and Hermelin were surprised to 
find that their sample of savant artists, some of whom had autism, were just as likely 
as comparison participants to sort according to semantic properties. They concluded 
that savant artists are influenced by background knowledge to the same extent as 
artistically talented normal individuals. This evidence appears to contradict the claim 
that autistic individuals experience `less capture by meaning' (pace Shah & Frith, 
1983). 
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Figure 5: 1 
Example of stimuli used in Pring and Hermelin's study (1993) 
b 
a 
C 
5: 4 Introduction 
Pring and Hermelin's (1993) findings generate several questions. First, their study 
was confined to testing savant artists. This was entirely appropriate given that their 
hypothesis explicitly concerned the link between artistic skills and categorisation. It 
remains uncertain, however, whether a more typical population of individuals 
diagnosed with autism or even Asperger's syndrome would also choose to categorise 
semantically. It can be predicted from the hypothesis of `less capture by meaning' 
that they would not be influenced by background knowledge and instead would prefer 
to categorise according to surface properties of the presented stimuli. 
A further consideration concerns how structural similarity is defined. Whilst a 
wineglass and tulip appear structurally similar to those of us without autism, perhaps 
those with autism would attend to subtle differences. There are many clinical reports 
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of autistic individuals having heightened sensitivity to fine detail in their 
environment. For example, one child found small objects on a patterned carpet more 
rapidly than an individual with typical development (Frith & Baron-Cohen, 1987). 
This has been attributed to keen attention and memory for detail. Further evidence 
comes from a perceptual discrimination study which suggests that individuals with 
autism have difficulty processing common features but are relatively good at 
processing unique features (Plaisted, O'Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998a). This 
attention to a small detail of the picture in Pring and Hermelin's study would prevent 
an individual matching visually. Some studies (Mottron & Belleville 1993; 1995) 
have reported that individuals with autism, unlike those without autism, begin 
drawing a picture by details rather than the global outline. Authors of these studies 
argue that the global shape has less impact on those with autism. In order to perceive 
structural similarity between two stimuli in Pring and Heremlin's study one would 
need to attend to the global outline. 
In order to investigate the role of background knowledge in visual processing, I 
devised a test that effectively gave participants the choice to pair objects according to 
surface detail or deeper semantic properties. Participants were shown a sequence of 
pictures of coloured objects. Some had an associated colour (e. g. a banana), but were 
coloured atypically (blue). Others did not have a specific associated colour (e. g. a car) 
and were coloured ad hoc (red). Two patches of colour were presented alongside, 
such as yellow and blue for the banana and red and green for the car. Using the 
wording formulated by Pring and Hermelin (1993), participants in our study were 
invited to select which colour goes best with the target picture. In the case of a 
banana, would participants be influenced by background knowledge, as indicated by 
choosing the semantically appropriate yellow? Alternatively, would they base their 
choice on the surface property by selecting blue? Any fixation on minute detail would 
not stand in the way of a surface-based approach in this task, because the blue of the 
object picture and the blue of the colour patch were identical. Furthermore, since the 
whole object on each card was coloured, a person focusing only on one part of the 
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picture could still choose the visually matching colour patch. Hence, this ought to be 
a more sensitive test, than Pring and Hermelin's, for identifying population 
differences in the preference to pair according to surface property. 
Obviously, the wording of the question in a task like this is critical in influencing 
participants either to pair according to background knowledge or according to surface 
properties (cf. Carlson, 1977; Lichte & Borresen, 1967). As with Pring and Hermelin 
(1993), our aim was to ask a suitably ambiguous question to allow participants either 
to select colour according to background associations or according to surface 
properties. Importantly, if participants with autism were not inclined to pair according 
to background knowledge, there would be no pragmatic impediment to their pairing 
according to surface properties. 
A further virtue of the design is that it would be able to establish whether participants 
were likely to use a surface-based strategy when the object in question lacks an 
associated colour (e. g. a car). If participants chose the surface colour for a picture of a 
car, but chose the associated colour for a banana, this would suggest that they are 
sensitive to which objects do and do not have an associated colour. Background 
knowledge would only influence their judgments when appropriate. Perhaps 
individuals with autism, unlike those with typical development, might make a 
surface-based selection whether or not the presented object has an associated colour. 
This would raise the possibility that they do not optimally utilise background 
knowledge. Alternatively, we might find that participants with autism judge 
differently between items that do and do not have an associated colour, but the size of 
the contrast between conditions might be less than in comparison groups. In other 
words, those with autism might be influenced by background knowledge, but only 
weakly. 
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Experiment 5: 1 
5: 4 Method 
Subjects. Table 5: 1 summarises details of the participants. Eight individuals with 
autism and 10 with Asperger's syndrome participated in the study. All were 
diagnosed by experienced clinicians according to standard criteria (DSM-IIIR, 1987 
or DSM IV, 1994). Verbal mental age was assessed using the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS: Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintilie, 1982). They were 
compared with individuals with moderate learning difficulties and participants with 
typical development. Due to constraints on sample, the mean VMA of participants 
with moderate learning difficulties was slightly lower than that of participants with 
autism. If participants with autism performed the tasks differently from others, 
including those with moderate learning difficulties, it would seem appropriate to 
explain this specifically with reference to autism rather than more generally with 
reference to the associated learning difficulties. 
/ 
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Table 5: 1 
Subject characteristics for Experiment 5A 
Group CA m) (3', VIVI AiY, m) Autistic (N=8) 
Mean 19; 2 7; 11 
SD 9; 3 2; 6 
Range (12; 9-39; 10) (4; 9-12; 0) 
Asperger (N=10) 
Mean 19; 8 13; 1 
SD 5; 10 4; 11 
Range (11; 0-29; 6) (6; 8-19; 6) 
MLD (N=22) 
Mean 10; 8 5; 11 
SD 0; 4 1; 4 
Range (9; 11-11; 4) (3; 5-8; 7) 
Reception (N=20) 
Mean 5; 3 
SD 0; 3 
Range (4; 10-5; 8) 
Year 3 (N=25) 
Mean 8; 0 
SD 0; 3 
Range (7; 7-8; 6) 
Year 6 (N=20) 
Mean 11; 0 
SD 0; 5 
Range (10; 7-11; 7) 
Stimuli. The materials included six 1x2 inch colour cards (blue, red, green, yellow, 
brown, orange). These were used in order to screen participants for the ability to 
name colours. The stimuli for the main part of the procedure included 24 white cards 
that were 4x5 inches in size. Each bore a centrally positioned picture that was 
approximately 1.5 to 2.5 inches in size. Twenty of the pictures were taken from 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). Two square patches of colour (1x1 in. ) were 
situated on the right hand boarder of the card. One was aligned directly above the 
131 
other in the right side corners. Twelve of the pictures showed objects that had a 
specific colour associated with them, but were coloured inappropriately (e. g. blue 
banana). Thus, the participant could match the object with the associated colour 
(yellow) or the presented surface colour (blue). The other 12 pictures did not have 
colour as a characteristic feature (neutral cards), and could be almost any colour, such 
as a red car. The colour choices for these included the same colour as the picture on 
the card (red) and an alternative colour (blue). The 6 colours used in the experiment 
were represented equally throughout the cards. Also, the positioning of the coloured 
patches was counterbalanced so that the visually matching patch appeared the same 
number of times on the top as on the bottom. Figure 5: 2 illustrates an example card 
for each condition. For a complete list of the stimuli refer to Appendix 5: 1. 
Figure 5: 2 
Example of stimuli for Experiment 5: 1 
441dio, 
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Procedure. To assess verbal mental ability the BPVS was administered to each of the 
clinical participants. Then subjects were shown 6 colour cards and asked to identify 
each of them. Those who correctly identified all 6 proceeded with the testing. 
Subsequently, each participant was presented with the 24 cards showing a picture and 
2 colour choices. The experimenter pointed to the picture on each card and asked 
`What's this? ' If the participant could not correctly identify the picture they were told 
the correct answer. Participants proceeded to the next question whether they 
identified the picture correctly or were helped by the experimenter. Based on Pring 
and Hermelin (1993), each individual was then asked, "Which colour does the picture 
go best with? " They were asked to respond by pointing to one of the colour patches 
adjacent to the picture. The question was repeated for each of the 24 cards. 
Afterwards, individuals were asked to report the appropriate colour of the 12 items 
that had an associated colour. For example, they were asked `What colour is a 
banana? ' All 24 cards were randomly mixed together and then presented in the same 
order. The type of card presented first (semantic or neutral) alternated between 
participants. 
5: 5 Results and Discussion 
The distributions of responses appear in Figure 5: 3. A break down of visual pairings 
made for each group on the neutral condition can be seen in Histogram 1. It appears 
that most individuals made a relatively high number of visual pairings for this 
condition. Histogram 2, which displays the distribution of responses for the 
associated condition, shows a rather different pattern. With few exceptions, it seems 
each individual either made a fairly high or low number of visual matches, resulting 
in a bimodal distribution. This suggests that on the associated cards, some 
individuals were influenced by background knowledge while some were not. Given 
there were relatively few participants with autism and Asperger's syndrome, we 
combined the data from both populations to form a single group for the purpose of 
analysis, unless stated otherwise. 
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Figure 5: 3 
Histograms showing distribution of responses on both conditions for 
Experiment 5: 1 
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Histogram 2: Visual pairings on associated cards 
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Is the effect of background knowledge less potent in those with than without 
autism? An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed, given that nonparametric 
analyses are unsuitable for identifying an interaction effect. The ANOVA would 
remain stable even in the extreme case of a dichotomous dependent variable, so long 
as the data set is not too small (Lunney, 1970). Hence, it was assumed that the 
bimodal character of the distribution would not pose a serious problem for the 
ANOVA. 
The analysis was mixed, with condition (2) as a within subject factor and group (5) 
and order (2) as between subject factors. Within subject comparisons revealed a 
significant main effect of condition [F(1,95) = 125.81, p<. 001], and a significant 
group by 
-condition interaction [F(4,95) = 11.53,. p <. 001]. To clarify the interaction, 
simple ANOVA's were carried out including all groups for each condition separately. 
There was a significant difference between groups on the associated [F(4,104) =9.21, 
p< 
. 
001] as well as on the neutral condition [F(4,104) =2.71, p <. 05]. Post-hoc 
comparisons (Tukey's HSD) revealed that the reception group made significantly 
more visual matches than all other groups on the associated condition (p< 
. 
05 in all 
cases). Also, the reception group made significantly more visual matches than the 
moderate learning difficulties on the neutral pictures (g< 
. 
05). These differences are 
illustrated in Figure 5: 4, which shows participants who made more than 6 visual 
pairings (out of 12) in each condition. 
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Figure 5: 4 
Percentage of participants preferring to pair visually on the 
associated and neutral conditions 
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A series of Wilcoxon signed ranks analyses were carried out to determine whether the 
difference between conditions was significant for each group independently. The 
results revealed that all groups, except reception, judged differently in the two 
conditions 
(p< 
. 
05). 
Although participants with autism and Asperger's syndrome judged differently 
between conditions, perhaps in general they showed a visual preference. Seeing 
stimuli with an associated colour merely could have weakened a predominately visual 
preference. The number of individuals making more than 6 and fewer than 6 visual 
pairings was calculated for each group separately. If there was no preference within a 
particular group, then there should have been as many participants with a score above 
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as below 6. The relevant frequency counts appear in Table 5: 2. A significant majority 
of individuals in reception made more then 6 visual pairings on both the associated 
and neutral conditions. Year 6 was the only other group that showed a preference to 
pair visually, but this was specifically in the neutral condition. Year 3 and Year 6 
both had significant majorities pairing non-visually in the associated condition. 
Table 5: 2 
Frequency of individual responses for Experiment 5: 1 
Group condition exactly 6 below 6 above 6 x2 p value 
autistic/ associated 0 10 8 0.11 ns 
Asperger's 
neutral 2 5 11 1.56 ns 
MLD associated 0 13 9 0.41 ns 
neutral 0 9 13 0.41 ns 
reception associated 0 3 17 8.46 p<. 005 
neutral 1 2 17 10.32 p<. 005 
year 3 associated 0 21 4 10.24 p<. 005 
neutral 1 7 17 3.38 ns 
Year 6 associated 0 17 3 8.46 p<. 005 
neutral 6 1 13 8.64 p<. 005 
Note: "Above 6" and "below 6" refer to the number of visual pairings made. All the 
analyses in the above table have 1 degree of freedom and have been adjusted using 
Yate's correction for continuity. 
Perhaps participants in reception classes did not judge differently between conditions 
because they were ignorant of the associated colour of the objects. In order to address 
this a2 (condition) by 2 (group) mixed ANOVA was carried out excluding trials 
where errors on the post-test had been made. In the post-test, children were asked to 
name the colour of the objects appearing in the associated list. Since only the 
autistic/Asperger's and reception groups made errors on this part of the test, the 
following was conducted specifically with their data. The percentage of visual 
pairings made on all objects whose colour the child had identified correctly was 
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calculated. There was a significant effect of condition [F(1,36)=17.04, p<. 001], and a 
significant group by condition interaction [F(1,36)=9.86, P<. 01]. The form of the 
interaction was the same as in the main analysis. There was also a main effect 
between groups [F(1,36)=4.97, p<. 05], with reception children showing a stronger 
preference for visual pairing than those with autism/ Asperger's syndrome. 
It is possible that individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome performed 
differently from each other. In particular, perhaps only one subgroup judged 
differently between conditions. However, a Wilcoxon test confirmed a significant 
contrast in each subgroup independently: Autistic, Z=2.07, P=. 038; Asperger's, 
Z=2.38, j=. 017. Evidently, autism does not lead individuals to neglect background 
information when pairing a colour patch with the picture of an atypically coloured 
object. However, some individuals with autism/Apserger's syndrome did have a 
preference to match visually even in the associated condition, which is apparent in the 
bi-modal distribution in Figure 5: 3. Since visual pairing was most common in the 
reception group, it raises the possibility that the tendency is linked with intellectual 
immaturity. Perhaps those with autism who did not judge differently between 
associated and neutral conditions were the less mature members of the group. If so, 
then VMA would predict the tendency to judge differently. 
A stepwise multiple regression analysis was conducted using a forward inclusion 
procedure. The data were the score on the neutral condition, minus the score on the 
associated condition. This served as an index of the extent to which individuals 
judged differently between conditions. Considering participants with 
autism/Asperger's syndrome, CA was entered in the first step: R2 =. 06. Diagnosis was 
entered on the second step (autistic/Asperger's): R2 = 
.39, 
F(1,15)=8.08, p< 
. 
05. 
When VMA was entered in the third step, R2 increased to 
. 
55, which reflected a 
significant change: F(1,14)=4.80, p< 
. 
05. In other words, VMA predicted the 
tendency to judge differently between associated and neutral conditions 
independently of CA and clinical diagnosis (autistic/Asperger's). A further 
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regression was carried out entering these same predictors in a different order. As 
before CA was entered first as a predictor variable. When VMA was entered in the 
second step R2 increased to 
. 
50, indicating a significant change: F(1,15)=12.94, p< 
. 
01. Finally, diagnosis was entered, which increased R2 to 
. 
55. This increase was not 
significant which suggests that a difference in strategy choice between participants 
with autism and Asperger's syndrome is accounted for by the difference in VMA. 
Would VMA also predict performance in the participants with MLD? Chronological 
age was entered in the first step (R2=. 04). In the second step with VMA included, R2 
increased to 
. 
33, which reflected a significant increase in the portion of `explained' 
variance: F(1,19)=7.99, p<. 05. Therefore, VMA significantly predicted selection 
strategy in all clinical groups. 
The results show that most individuals, including those with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome, were influenced by background knowledge when pairing a colour patch 
with an atypically coloured object. The findings are consistent with Pring and 
Hermelin's (1993), showing semantically driven categorisation in the autistic 
population. Contrary to the suggestion of `less capture by meaning', it seems 
individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome are not distinguished by a tendency 
to focus on surface detail in this case. 
Perhaps our procedure unwittingly primed individuals with autism to attend to their 
background knowledge of the associated colour of objects. Indeed, the fact that items 
were atypically coloured could have made them look peculiar, which may have 
led 
participants to reflect on the normal colour. Campbell and Olson (1990) suggest that 
the incongruity inherent in an atypically coloured object can act as a powerful cue to 
attend to the typical colour, and this seems to occur even 
in children as young as 3 or 
4 years (Mitchell, Davidoff & Brown, 1996). In that case, it was expected that 
members of the reception sample in the present study, aged around 
5 years, to judge 
differently between associated and neutral pictures. Because these children did not 
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judge differently, it seems the typical colour did not inevitably impose itself on 
participants. In the context of failure to judge differently between conditions in the 
reception children, the success of participants with autism appears especially 
noteworthy. 
Perhaps some factor linked with general intellectual maturity accounts for the ability 
to judge differently between associated and neutral pictures. This would explain why 
the younger individuals with typical development showed a weaker effect (or even no 
effect) compared with older individuals. It would also explain why VMA predicts 
performance in individuals with autism/Asperger's syndrome and individuals with 
MLD. 
Nonetheless, it remains a possibility that a feature of the procedure primed 
individuals with autism to pair atypically coloured objects with their normal colour. 
According to Happe (1994a, 1999), weak central coherence, and by implication `less 
capture by meaning', is connected with cognitive style rather than a deficit in 
processing information. She would not predict that the ability to be influenced by 
background information is missing, but that background information exerts less 
influence than in individuals without autism. Weeks and Hobson (1987) found 
evidence to support the idea of such a processing style in autism. They presented 
participants with photographs of individuals who differed in their sex, age, emotional 
expression, or the type of hat they were wearing. Those with autism were more likely 
than comparison participants to sort the photos by hat type than by facial expression. 
However, subsequent trials showed that some of the participants with autism were 
able to sort by facial expression when prompted. Presumably, this required more 
sophisticated processing of the stimuli, which is likely to involve integration of 
various facets of information. For example, what can we gather from the expression 
in the eyes and mouth in combination? 
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Perhaps the procedure inadvertently primed participants to consider background 
information in Experiment 5: 1, albeit to an extent that was insufficient to elicit 
preference for the associated colour in reception children. Participants were asked to 
identify the picture on each card prior to pairing it with a colour. Naming the object 
might trigger attributes associated with it, such as the appropriate colour (Davidoff & 
Mitchell, 1993; Mitchell et al., 1996). This initial verbal identification may act as a 
prime to use a semantic strategy. Participants might have been more likely to select 
the visually matching colour if they had not been required to name the picture first. 
A further study asking participants to name the object after they chose a colour would 
eliminate this possibility. A larger sample of individuals with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome would also be useful. If a weak preference for a visual strategy does exist, 
a larger clinical group would be more likely to reveal this. Also, it would allow us to 
assess more accurately whether visually-based pairing is more common in one or 
other of the autistic sub-populations. 
Experiment 5: 2 
5: 6 Method 
Subjects. Similar population groups were tested in Experiment 5: 2, though more 
individuals were included in the subgroups of participants with autism. None had 
participated in Experiment 5: 1. Those with autism and Asperger's syndrome were 
diagnosed by clinicians according to standard criteria (DSM-IIIR, 1987 and DSM IV, 
1994). The BPVS was used once again to determine verbal ability in the clinical 
populations (Dünn et al., 1982). Table 5: 3 shows the subject characteristics for 
Experiment 5: 2. The 21 individuals with autism were approximately matched for 
verbal mental ability with a group of 21 individuals with moderate 
learning 
difficulties. There were also 21 participants with Asperger's syndrome. Since 
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typically developing children in year 3 and year 6 performed similarly in the previous 
experiment, only reception and year 3 participants were included in Experiment 5: 2. 
Procedure. The same stimuli from Experiment 5: 1 were used in the current study. A 
similar procedure was used, except that subjects were asked to identify the objects 
after they had paired all 24 cards with a colour of their choice. 
Table 5: 3 
Subject characteristics for Experiment 5: 2 
Group CA (y; m) VMA(y; m) 
Autistic (N=21) 
Mean 12; 11 8; 10 
SD 1; 11 3; 4 
Range (9; 3-16; 10) (2; 11-15; 11) 
Asperger's (N=21) 
Mean 13; 2 12; 3 
SD 1; 11 3; 4 
Range (9; 5-16; 4) (7; 9-19; 6) 
MILD (N=21) 
Mean 13; 2 7; 8 
SD 1; 9 1; 10 
Range (9; 8-15; 8) (4; 3-10; 10) 
Reception (N=19) 
Mean 5; 8 
SD 0; 2 
Range (5; 0 
-5; 6) 
Year 3 (N=19) 
Mean 8; 3 
SD 0; 3 
Range (7; 10-8; 9) 
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5: 7 Results and Discussion 
Unless stated otherwise, analyses were carried out on data from trials where a 
participant had subsequently identified the picture on the card. Two percentage 
scores were calculated for each participant. The scores represented the number of 
visual pairings out of the pictures identified correctly, with one score for the 
associated condition and the other for the neutral condition. Histograms (Figure 5: 5) 
show that the distributions were similar to those in Experiment 5: 1. On the neutral 
condition most individuals made visual pairings (Histogram 1). On the associated 
condition (Histogram 2) the responses were bimodally distributed, due to participants 
either making a fairly high or low number of visual pairings. As in Experiment 5: 1, it 
seems background knowledge strongly influenced pairings in some individuals but 
not in others. Because it was difficult to recruit larger samples of participants with 
autism and Asperger's syndrome in Experiment 5: 2, they were classified differently 
in the subsequent analyses unless stated otherwise. 
i 
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Figure 5: 5 
Histograms showing distribution of responses on both conditions for 
Experiment 5: 2 
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A mixed ANOVA was carried out including participant group (5) and order (2) as 
between subject factors and condition (2) as a within subject factor. Results showed a 
significant effect of condition F(1,84)=79.99, p <. 001, as well as a significant 
condition by group interaction F(4,84)=5.50, p <. 01. Further analyses were carried 
out to compare between groups for each condition independently to clarify the 
interaction. There was a significant difference between groups on the neutral 
condition F(4,100)=2.49, p<. 05. A post-hoc Tukey's test revealed that the reception 
group made significantly more visual pairings than the MLD group (P<. 05). Groups 
also differed significantly on the associated condition F(4,100)=2.97, P<. 05. Post-hoc 
analysis showed that participants in the reception group used a visual pairing strategy 
significantly more than those with Asperger's syndrome (p<. 05). Wilcoxon analyses 
were carried out to check if participants judged differently between condition within 
each group. As indicated in Figure 5: 6, all groups made significantly more visual 
pairings on the neutral than on the associated condition (p<. 05 in all cases). 
Figure 5: 6 
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The analyses was repeated on the full set of data, including trials where individuals 
made identification errors. The results were the same as those obtained in the 
previous set of analyses, with the exception that on the post-hoc one-way ANOVA 
for the neutral condition the p-value fell just below significance F(4,100)=2.39, 
p=. 056. 
As in Experiment 5: 1, analyses were carried out to investigate if any groups had a 
majority who preferred to pair visually. The number of individuals pairing visually 
on more and fewer than 50 percent of the trials for each condition (Table 5: 4) was 
calculated. A significant majority matched over 50 percent of the cards visually in all 
groups (excluding MLD) on the neutral condition (. p<. 05 in all cases). In the MLD 
group an equal number of individuals fell above and below 50 percent. On the 
associated condition, although the majority of individuals with autism and those in 
the reception group made more visual pairings over 50 percent, this was not 
significant. The majority of individuals with Asperger's syndrome, MLD, and year 3 
made visual pairings on fewer than 50 percent of trials. This was significant only in 
participants with Asperger's syndrome (p<. 025). 
i 
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Table 5: 4. 
Frequency of individual responses for Experiment 5: 2 
Group condition exactly 
50% 
below 
50% 
above 
50% 
x2 p value 
autistic associated 0 9 12 0.2 ns 
neutral 1 5 15 4.06 p<. 05 
MLD associated 0 14 7 1.72 ns 
neutral 1 10 10 0 ns 
reception associated 1 5 13 2.72 ns 
neutral 2 2 15 8.48 p<. 005 
year 3 associated 0 12 7 0.84 ns 
neutral 3 2 14 7.56 p<. 01 
Asperger's associated 1 16 4 6.05 p<. 025 
neutral 2 1 18 13.48 p<. 005 
Note: All the analyses in the above table have 1 degree of freedom and have been 
adjusted using Yate's correction for continuity. 
A multiple regression analysis was carried out to. see if verbal ability predicted 
performance in the clinical groups. Differences in percentage scores (between 
conditions) were calculated for each individual whose data were entered into the main 
analysis. Participants with autism and Asperger's syndrome were combined into a 
single group as they had been in Experiment 5: 1. Chronological age was entered in 
the first step: R2 =. 02. In the second step, autistic subgrouping (autistic/ Asperger's) 
was added, which led to a significant increase in the `explained' variance: R2=. 30, 
F(1,39)=15.39, p<. O1. In the third step, VMA was entered, which led to a further 
significant increase in `explained' variance: 2=. 38, F(1,38)=5.03, p<. 05. Another 
regression was carried out entering these same variables in a different order. CA was 
again entered first. In the second step when VMA was added there was a significant 
increase in R2 =-x. 26, F(1,39)=12.65, p<. 01. There was also a significant increase in 
the final step when autistic subgrouping was entered R2 =. 38, F(1,38)=7.31, p<. 01. 
Apparently, autistic subgrouping predicted selection strategy independently of VMA. 
In particular, individuals with Asperger's syndrome judged differently between 
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associated and neutral conditions to a greater extent than participants with autism, and 
this could not entirely be explained by differences in VMA. 
In the MLD group, chronological aged was entered in the first step (R2=. 03) and 
VMA in the second: R2 =. 27, F(1,18)=4.41, p<. 05. As in Experiment 5: 1, VMA 
accounted for variance associated with the tendency to judge differently between 
conditions independently of other predictors. 
5: 8 General discussion of experiments 5: 1 and 5: 2 
With the exception of reception children in Experiment 5: 1, more participants within 
each group chose a colour that visually matched the depicted object in the neutral 
(e. g. a red car) than in the associated (e. g. a blue banana) condition. These two 
conditions differed according to whether or not background knowledge of the object's 
typical colour could feed into the decision process. It seems participants with autism 
and Asperger syndrome successfully utilised background knowledge when pairing 
stimuli. There was no sign of `less capture by meaning' compared with participants 
who did not have autism. 
The results are consistent with Pring and Hermelin (1993), but also extend their 
findings in several ways. First, unlike in Pring and Hermelin's study, a visually based 
strategy would not have conflicted with fine attention to detail. In our study, 
participants could have paired the presented object (e. g. a blue banana) with a 
stimulus of identical colour (a blue patch of colour). It is notable that participants 
with autism preferred to pair with the associated colour regardless of that fact. 
Second, our findings cover more typical samples with autism, whereas Pring and 
Hermelin tested savant artists. Third, it was demonstrated that in a within-participant 
basis that those with autism judge differently between stimuli which have an 
associated colour and those which do not. Evidently, participants with autism are not 
influenced by background knowledge ad hoc, but only when appropriate. 
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If participants with autism had not judged differently between objects with and 
without an associated colour, this could either be interpreted at a pragmatic or a 
conceptual level. They might have suppressed the influence of background 
knowledge on thinking they were supposed to pair according to surface properties. 
Given that such a pragmatic interpretation is highly legitimate, and indeed that it 
could explain the judgments of children approximately age 5 in Experiment 5: 1, it 
seems particularly notable that participants with autism paired objects with colours 
according to background associations. 
Irrespective of patterns in the group data, some participants did not judge differently 
between conditions. In the associated condition, the data were bimodally distributed, 
with some choosing the visually matching colour and others choosing the 
semantically associated colour. Interestingly, VMA significantly predicted colour 
selection in the clinical populations. Thus, it appears that an over-riding preference to 
use surface information is generally linked with intellectual immaturity. However, in 
Experiment 5: 2 participants with autism were less likely than those with Asperger's 
syndrome to judge differently between associated and neutral conditions. This could 
not be explained entirely by group differences in VMA. 
There is a need to reconcile our finding that individuals with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome utilise background knowledge, with studies that suggest otherwise (Frith & 
Hermelin, 1969; Pring Hermelin, & Heavy, 1995; Shah & Frith, 1983; Frith & 
Snowling, 1983). I have already raised the possibility that cues inherent in the 
procedure led participants to pair pictures in the associated set with the object's 
normal colour. In Experiment 5: 1, participants named the pictured objects before 
selecting a colour, which may have invoked a verbally-based association between 
object name and object colour (Davidoff & Mitchell, 1993; Mitchell et al., 1996). 
This could have prompted participants to select the normal colour in preference to the 
presented colour. Indeed, Tager-Flusberg (1991) found that cueing in the retrieval of 
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word lists elicited semantically based processing in autism. In cued recall, 
participants performed similarly whether or not they had autism. In free recall, 
individuals with autism did not perform as well as participants in comparison groups. 
Arguably, individuals without autism formed links between items in the list, which 
facilitated recall. Perhaps those with autism did not form links unless they were 
prompted to do so by the cue. However, many individuals with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome systematically selected the normal colour in Experiment 5: 2, despite the 
fact that they did not name the pictures until completing the pairing. Hence, they were 
influenced by background knowledge even in the absence of the cue connected with 
naming objects initially. 
Still, the requirement for participants to choose a colour out of a set of 2 in both 
experiments could in itself serve as a cue. Although one colour was not intrinsically 
more conspicuous than another, the very fact that the normal colour was present could 
have alerted participants to the possibility of choosing it. Perhaps individuals with 
autism and Asperger's syndrome would have shown stronger preference for a visual 
pairing had they not been presented with a forced choice involving the normal colour. 
Even so, this potential cue was not sufficient to prompt selection of the normal colour 
in children aged 5, suggesting that it was not a particularly potent cue. At the very 
least, participants with autism must have been sufficiently attuned to background 
information to benefit from a very weak cue. 
Further evidence suggesting that individuals with autism are attuned to background 
knowledge was reported by Ameli, Courchesne, Lincoln, Kaufman, and Grillon 
(1988). Participants were presented either with a set of pictures showing common 
objects or abstract designs. Later, they were shown the same set of pictures plus an 
additional unfamiliar item, which they were asked to single out. Individuals with and 
without autism were less likely to identify the new stimulus when the figures were 
abstract designs. Relative to individuals without autism, the performance of those 
with autism deteriorated to a greater extent for abstract designs than for meaningful 
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pictures. Ironically, it seems they were even more affected by background knowledge 
than individuals without autism. 
In the studies just cited, it seems individuals with autism were influenced by 
background knowledge when presented with a static display. Perhaps any weakness 
in using background knowledge to aid judgments would be apparent in a more 
complex task in which they had to processes sequential information, as in text 
comprehension or understanding the plot of a movie. In support of this possibility, 
Frith and Snowling (1983) reported a striking tendency for individuals with autism to 
pronounce ambiguous homographs according to their common meaning rather than to 
the meaning suggested by the textual context. 
Conclusion 
Prior research and theory suggests that individuals with autism might not be 
influenced by background knowledge to the same extent as individuals without 
autism (e. g. Frith, 1989). Accordingly, it was predicted that participants with autism 
would tend to select a visually matching colour for an incongruously coloured object 
in preference to the object's typical colour. This prediction was not supported: 
Individuals with autism were just as likely to select the normal colour as individuals 
without autism. At least in this task, background knowledge featured in processing. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
General discussion and conclusions 
6: 1 Summary 
Each experimental study has been presented and the findings have been discussed 
individually. In this chapter I will discuss the implication of these findings as a 
whole. I will begin by summarising the main findings from each of the studies. 
6: 2 Summary of findings from the visual illusion study 
Experiment 3: 1 
An attempt was made to replicate Happe's findings showing that individuals with 
autism were less susceptible to illusions than those without autism I modified 
Happe's procedure using a computer task as a more sophisticated measurement of 
illusion susceptibility. I also extended on Happe's study by including a group of 
individuals with Asperger's syndrome. Individuals with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome were found to be just as susceptible to illusions as individuals without 
autism when asked to manually adjust parts of the stimuli to appear the same on 
the computer. 
Interpretation 
Coherence does not appear to be weak at very low levels in autism However, our 
failure to replicate previous findings (Happe, 1996) may have been a result of 
differences in procedure. In Happe's study (1996) individuals were required to 
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make a verbal response, while in our task they were asked to make a manual 
response. It is possible that non-susceptibility to illusions may be confined to 
verbal responses made by individuals with autism 
Experiment 3: 2 
I wanted to ensure that the failure to replicate Happe's findings was not a result of 
methodological differences. Therefore, the same illusions were presented in 
Experiment 3: 1 on cards and participants were asked to give verbal judgements 
about their appearance. For instance, they were asked if two lines appear to be the 
same or different in size. I also included two additional conditions (illusion 
different and control different) which showed both illusion and control stimuli so 
that they were physically different in size. Individuals with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome were susceptible to illusions when presented in this manner. 
Interpretation 
These findings suggest central coherence is intact at very low-levels in autism 
They are just as susceptible to illusions whether required to respond verbally or 
manually. By chance, it is possible that those with autism in our study had 
exceptionally strong coherence ability which resulted in them being susceptible to 
illusory effects. Perhaps, Happe unwittingly selected a sample with unusually low 
levels of coherence. 
6.3 Summary of findings from perception battery study 
Experiment 4: 1 
I presented individuals with a battery of tests (believed to be associated with 
coherence ability) as well as the visual illusion computer task. Individuals with 
autism performed significantly better than verbal mental age matched controls on 
the block design, embedded figures and Rey complex figure test. Performance on 
these 3 tasks correlated with one another. However, performance on these tasks 
did not strongly predict degree of susceptibility to illusions. 
Interpretation 
Unlike the illusion task, the block design, embedded figures, and Rey complex 
figure task are testing the same ability (i. e. possibly coherence). Superior 
performance on these tests by the autistic group provides evidence 
for weak 
coherence at a visuo-spatial constructional 
level. The fact that performance on the 
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visuo-spatial tasks did not predict susceptibility provides further evidence that the 
illusions are not a good measure of coherence. 
6.4 Summary of findings from visual and semantic processing study 
Experiment 5: 1 
Participants were asked to pair pictures with the colour it went best with. For 
example, they were shown a blue banana and asked to select either a blue or 
yellow patch. They could rely on their background knowledge and choose the 
semantically related colour. Alternatively they might choose to pair pictures with 
the visually matching colour. Individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome 
were like comparison groups in using a semantically driven strategy to pair 
objects with colours. The only exception was children aged 5 who preferred to 
select the visually matching colour. 
Interpretation 
Individuals with autism and Asperger's syndrome prefer to pair objects and 
colours according to background knowledge rather than visual properties of the 
stimuli. This is inconsistent with the idea of weak central coherence that 
suggests those with autism neglect meaningful context and show different patterns 
of attentional focus (less capture my meaning). However, those with autism and 
Asperger's syndrome might have been primed to pair semantically because they 
were asked to identify each picture initially. Perhaps, participants made a verbal 
association between the name and the typical colour of the target object. 
Experiment 5: 2 
The same procedure was followed as in Experiment 5: 1, except this time 
participants were asked to identify each picture only after they had paired it with a 
colour. This would eliminate any priming effect that might arise from naming. A 
preference to pair semantically persisted in those with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome even when they were not asked to identify the object initially. 
Interpretation 
Individuals with autism prefer to attend to semantic rather than visual information 
even when not primed initially by naming the object. These findings again fail to 
support the idea that background knowledge is less salient to an individual with 
autism as the theory of weak central coherence would predict. It remains a 
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possibility that neglecting meaningful or contextual information is specific to 
particular tasks. 
6: 4 Discussion 
Having summarised findings from each study individually I will now consider the 
implications they carry for the theory of weak central coherence in more detail. 
Happe (1999) argues that coherence is weak in autism at three different levels: 
perceptual, visuo-spatial constructional, and verbal-semantic. At different points 
in this thesis I have considered each of these levels. Therefore, in the following 
section I will discuss our findings in relation to these levels described by Happe. 
Perceptual coherence 
Evidence from Experiments 3: 1,3: 2, and 4: 1 suggests that individuals with autism 
are not less susceptible to illusions. This demonstrates that coherence is intact at a 
very low perceptual level in autism which contradicts Happe's (1996) findings. In 
Experiment 4: 11 proposed that individual differences in coherence ability might 
explain the conflicting findings between our study and Happe's. I argued that 
coherence ability could vary in the autistic and non-autistic populations, resulting 
in subgroups differing in susceptibility to illusions. Happe's study might therefore 
have recruited those individuals with autism who had extremely weak coherence. 
This explanation was ruled out however since no relationship between good 
performance on visuo-spatial tasks (associated with WCC) and susceptibility to 
illusions was found. These results are quite damaging to the claim that illusions 
are actually testing coherence. 
How then can Happe's finding that individuals with autism were not susceptible to 
illusions be explained? It could be that some individuals with autism are less 
susceptible to illusions. However, Experiments 3: 1,3: 2, and 4: 1 indicate that this 
finding is not universal to all those with autism. Our findings also suggest that 
non susceptibility to illusions is not related to those tasks which 
have been argued 
most strongly to test weak central coherence (block design and embedded figures 
test). Thus, the mechanisms that allow us to perceive illusions, appear to be 
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different than those that influence performance to be an obstacle on visuo-spatial 
tasks. 
Perhaps visual illusions are not the best stimuli to use as a test of coherence at 
very low levels as there is still much debate as to how they actually operate. In 
Happe's study (1996) she presented individuals with illusions of various types. 
For example, she incorporated the Poggendorff which is an orientation illusion 
and the Ponzo which is a size illusion. The fact that she included illusions from 
various categories makes it even more difficult to believe coherence is the 
principal underlying mechanism for all of her stimuli. Even illusions of the same 
classification can vary in how they operate as there is a multitude of factors that 
may contribute to the illusory effect. These factors should be considered as they 
may interact with or even override coherence mechanisms. 
In my investigations I chose to use only four size illusions (Muller-Lyer, Ponzo, 
Hat, and Titichener's circles) to minimise other possible explanations. However, I 
still failed to find a significant relationship between performance on these 
illusions. Size illusions have often been argued to operate on depth cues such as 
retinal disparity, convergence-accomodation, linear perspective, element and 
interspace size or frequency, overlay, and elevation (Day, 1972; Gregory, 1966). 
If these cues which normally help us to preserve the size constancy of an object 
are manipulated, then the apparent size of the object will be distorted. For 
example, our eyes have become accustomed to seeing objects which are indicated 
to be further away as smaller in size. If this rule is violated, as in the Ponzo 
illusion the object in the distance may look larger than an object of the same size 
in the foreground. 
Mechanisms ether than depth cues may also explain how size illusions work. For, 
example a study by Williams and Enns (1996) found that the effects of framing 
and depth were additive for the Hat illusion. One version of the Hat 
illusion is 
formed from two lines of equal length, one horizontal and one vertical. The two 
lines intersect to form an `L' shape. The framing effect account argues that a line 
enclosed in a large frame appears to be shorter than a 
line of equal length in a 
small frame (Kunnapas, 1955). Kunnapas (1955) says that the ends of the vertical 
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line are closer to the visual field boundary than the ends of the horizontal line, 
thus the vertical line appears longer. The size-constancy-scaling hypothesis, as I 
already discussed, argues that the vertical line is perceived as receding from the 
observer therefore it appears to be elongated even though it is the same size as the 
horizontal line. In order to determine which account best explained how this 
illusion operates Williams and Enns (1996) presented orthogonal variations in 
framing and depicted slant to individuals and asked them to judge whether or not 
the vertical line appeared longer. The manipulation of slant direction is said to 
influence strategies of pictorial-depth perception which may result in distortions 
of size. They found that the effects of framing and slant were independent and 
additive. This suggests that the illusory effect is determined by at least two 
different mechanisms. This demonstrates how an explanation of visual illusions 
may not be so straight forward. Since several mechanisms may cause the illusion, 
systematic manipulation of each factor is needed to understand to what extent 
each is contributing to the effect. Some illusions may rely on certain mechanisms 
more than others, which may explain why no correlation was found between the 
illusions in study 4: 1. 
Another variable that may make it even more difficult to interpret susceptibility to 
illusions is age. Some effects of illusions are known to increase with age while 
others decrease (Piaget, 1969). It might be that during development there is a shift 
from reliance on one perceptual mechanism to another. For example at an early 
age we might rely on retinal disparity to maintain size constancy, then use 
perspective cues at a later age. Thus, if an illusion operates primarily on retinal 
disparity than we would expect that younger individuals would be more 
susceptible to the illusion than older individuals. There was indeed a tendency for 
the effect of the Muller-Lyer illusion to decrease with age in experiment 3: 1 and 
4: 1. Thus, it is possible that this may also explain why there was little correlation 
between the illusions. 
If coherence were deficient at low levels in those with autism, one might expect 
them to have similar problems to individuals with integrative agnosia This 
condition is caused by brain injury suffered as an adult that results in difficulty 
recognising objects due to an incapacity to integrate the various parts (Humphreys 
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and Riddoch, 1987a, 1987b; Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987). A case study of an 
autistic savant (E. C. ) by Mottron and Belleville (1993) demonstrated that E. C. 
showed normal perceptual analysis of shapes and objects, unlike those with 
integrative agnosia. Included in the battery of tests they carried out were tasks 
requiring the identification of fragmented figures as well as perception of 
illusions. E. C. showed no problems with integrating the components to perceive 
the gestalt in either of these tasks. It could be that those with autism may have 
integration deficits, but not as severe as an individual with integrative agnosia. If 
problems with integration were present at birth, then cerebral plasticity may allow 
for alternative processes to compensate for difficulties in this area. Thus, those 
with autism might show coherence deficits of a slightly different nature than an 
individual with integrative agnosia. 
Alternatively, Mottron and Belleville (1993) suggest that the theory of weak 
central coherence may not adequately explain the perceptual problems in autism 
They argue that difficulty with integrating elements into wholes is not a problem, 
rather it is a breakdown in the relationship between the local and global levels. 
This had become known as the theory of Hierarchical organisation. Evidence to 
support this comes from performance on the Navon (1977) task that looks at 
hierarchical organisation. Mottron and Belleville (1993) presented an autistic 
savant with the hierarchical task to investigate global/local processing of 
information. This task presents a larger unit (global) which consists of many 
smaller parts (local). The two levels may be congruent such as a large C made up 
of smaller C's. In this condition Mottron and Belleville (1993) found that the 
autistic savant (E. C. ) made more local than global errors like control participants. 
When presented with incongruent stimuli (a large C made up of small O's), E. C. 
showed an increase in the number of global but not local errors. The results lead 
Mottron and Belleville to conclude that individuals with autism process 
information at the global level in a normal way, and the global does not have any 
special status over the local level. 
This theory makes different predictions than the theory of WCC. It suggests that 
individuals with autism are capable of handling visual information at both the 
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global and local levels, however it is the relationship between these two levels 
which is impaired. 
Further evidence to support the hierarchisation deficit account comes from 
findings showing how those with autism judge and draw impossible figures 
(Mottron and Belleville, 1993; Mottron, Belleville and Menard, 1999). Perception 
of the local parts of an impossible figure will result in the coherent perception of 
the object. In order to perceive the "impossibility effect" one needs to integrate 
the local parts of the figure into a global percept. Mottron and Belleville (1993) 
asked individuals to judge whether a figure was possible or impossible. They 
found that an autistic savant made more errors than controls on judging impossible 
figures (e. g. Devil's fork and Penrose triangle). That is the individual with autism 
said the impossible figures were actually possible. In a later study Mottron, 
Belleville, and Menard (1999) asked 10 non-savant autistic individuals to draw 
impossible figures. They predicted that those with autism should experience less 
difficulty copying impossible figures because they would have difficulty relating 
the elements of the figure. Thus, an individual who would relate the local parts to 
the whole figure would find it quite confusing as they would perceive the 
"impossibility effect". They found that those with autism were less sensitive to 
geometric impossibility and thus took less time to draw them in comparison to 
control participants. 
Happe (1996) argues integration of parts to form a whole is what is required to 
perceive the illusions in her study. However, perception of impossibility also 
requires one to perceive the interaction between the local and global levels. The 
fact that those with autism seem unimpaired in their perception of visual illusions 
but do have problems perceiving impossibility (studies 3: 1,3: 2 and 4: 1; Mottron 
and Belleville, 1993; Mottron, Belleville and Menard, 1999) suggests that 
perceptual abnormalities may not be a result of weak central coherence. Also, 
those with autism were able to draw the impossible figure as a whole, rather than a 
haphazard collection of fragments. This shows that coherence is not completely 
absent as they were capable of integrating pieces to form an intact figure. 
However, a deficit relating between the local and global level (Hierarchisation 
deficit) may still stand as an explanation. Further research is needed to see if 
159 
individuals with autism only display perceptual abnormalities when one needs to 
perceive a relationship between the two levels. 
Another possible explanation for why our findings differ from Happe's might be 
differences in procedure. In Experiment 3: 1 individuals were asked to make 
manual adjustments when judging the illusory stimuli, whereas in Happe's (1996) 
procedure individuals made verbal judgements. Aglioti, DeSouza, and Goodale 
(1995) found differences in susceptibility to illusions according to whether an 
individual was required to make an explicit judgement of size or to reach out for 
the illusory stimulus. This study demonstrates that different ways of responding 
can indeed elicit different outcomes. However, in Experiment 3: 2 when 
participants were asked to make a verbal response as in Happe's study, individuals 
with autism were still just as susceptible to illusions as comparison groups. It 
must be noted that in Experiment 3: 2 there were additional conditions that her 
experiment did not have. This included control and illusion conditions showing 
the lines or circles to be judged as physically different. In Happe's study none of 
the stimuli for the size illusions (illusions or controls) were actually different. It is 
not exactly clear why those with autism might not be susceptible to illusions as a 
result of this difference. It is somewhat odd to think that the mere addition of 
"physically different" conditions in our study would cause an individual to be 
susceptible to an illusion. Perhaps those individuals in Happe's study had a bias 
to say "same". 
Happe may have indeed stumbled across some individuals with autism who are 
not susceptible to illusions, but in light of our findings there is little evidence to 
suggest this is related to weak central coherence or characteristic of those with 
autism. In sum, our findings indicate that those with autism and Asperger's 
syndrome do not have deficits in coherence ability at a low perceptual level. 
Visuo-spatial coherence 
In Experiment 4: 1 those with autism were superior to those without autism of the 
same verbal mental age on the block design, embedded figures, and Rey complex 
figure test. The only exception was in performance on the recognition trial of the 
Rey figure test where there were no significant differences in performance 
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between groups. However, the recognition trial did not correlate as strongly with 
the other tasks suggesting it does not involve visuo-spatial skills to the same 
extent. These findings are consistent with weak central coherence at a visuo- 
spatial constructional level which supports previous research (Shah and Frith 
1983; 1993). However, no superiority effect was found in those with Asperger's 
syndrome on these tests in comparison to control participants of a similar age. 
This conflicts with Jolliiffe and Baron-Cohen's (1997) study that found 
exceptional performance in those with Asperger's syndrome on the embedded 
figures test. It is possible that visuo-spatial superiority is not found in younger 
individuals with Asperger's syndrome. Those in our study had a CA of 11; 10 and 
VMA of 9; 11, whereas the individuals in Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen's study had a 
CA of 30; 9 with average intelligence. 
Perhaps, superior visual spatial skills in individuals with Asperger's syndrome 
develop in time through experience. If in childhood an individual has difficulty M 
making sense of the social world, they may become increasingly reliant on visual 
aspects of their environment. For example, if an individual is having difficulty 
following the plot of a play they may instead turn their attention to the curtains or 
background scenery. In time this could result in an exceptionally refined visual 
spatial system. This might explain why there was no evidence of superior visuo- 
spatial skills in younger individuals with Asperger's syndrome in Experiment 4: 1. 
Another possible reason our findings are not fully consistent with previous 
findings may be our use of the adult version of the embedded figures test with a 
younger population. However, the manual says that testing children with this 
version is acceptable. Furthermore, this would not explain why those with 
Asperger's syndrome in our study also failed to excel on the other visuo-spatial 
tests (block design and Rey figures test). 
Overall, our findings provide evidence that individuals with autism do better in 
comparison with mental age matched controls on visuo-spatial tasks. This is 
consistent with the theory of weak central coherence suggesting that there are 
deficits at a visuo-spatial constructional level as Happe (1999) described. 
However, superior ability on these tasks can also be explained in other ways. 
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An account of superior spatial ability has been suggested by Jolliffe and Baron- 
Cohen (1997) as an explanation for superior performance in those with autism and 
Asperger's syndrome on the embedded figures test. In addition, Plaisted, 
O'Riordan, and Baron-Cohen (1998b) also proposed that superior visual-spatial 
skills might explain why individuals did better on a conjunctive search task. This 
task requires an individual to identify a target letter (grey X) amongst other letters 
on a computer screen. The other letters share only one feature with the target 
letter (Le. shape or colour). In order to perform well on a conjunctive search task 
one needs to be able to integrate features of the target (e. g. shape & colour) in 
order to be able to identify it as uniquely different from the others. Figure 6: 1 
illustrates an example of the task. Plaisted, et al. (1998b) argue that the 
exceptional performance of the autistic group on this task shows that they do not 
have problems integrating features as the theory of WCC would predict. One 
suggestion they make is that superior visuo-spatial skills might account for their 
results. However, this explanation was not supported when they failed to find a 
correlation between performance on the block design test and the conjunctive 
search task. 
Figure 6: 1 
Conjunctive search task 
11 it 
TX 
x 
TXT 
Another problem with this explanation is that Shah and Frith (1993) argue that 
performance on the block design is not necessarily spatial in nature. They 
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presented individuals with autism with the block design test but included stimuli 
with obliques and rotated some test items to see if these factors influenced 
performance. If those with autism had superior visuo-spatial skills then these 
manipulations should not matter. Shah and Frith (1993) did find that those with 
autism did significantly better than control groups when they had to visually 
segment the design in order to reconstruct it. However, they found that obliques 
and rotated designs affected individuals with autism to the same extent as those 
without autism. It was concluded that the superiority effect in those with autism 
was a result of exceptional segmentation skills rather than an overall visuo-spatial 
ability. Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1997) suggest superior segmentation skills or 
superior visuo-spatial skills may explain exceptional performance of those with 
autism on the embedded figures test. Our findings on the visuo-spatial tasks in 
Experiment 4: 1 might be explained by either of these suggestions. However, it is 
uncertain which of these possibilities is more likely to be correct as the block 
design, embedded figures test, and Rey complex figure test are all visuo-spatial 
tasks and all would require segmentation to some extent. 
Alternatively, it has been proposed that individuals with autism may process 
unique features extremely well and common features poorly (Plaisted, O'Riordan, 
Baron-Cohen, 1998b). They argue this would explain good performance on the 
conjunctive search task, embedded figures, and block design as all require 
superior item detection. In each of these the individual needs to find the 
appropriate target that is a unique combination or integration of features. I already 
discussed earlier how individuals with autism could find the target in a 
conjunctive search faster than control participants. This target item was unique 
from all other stimuli even though it shared some common features with the other 
stimuli. This may have stood out to an individual with autism as the "odd man 
out. On the embedded figures test one needs to find a target shape which is a 
unique combination of lines which are shared with different surrounding 
distracter 
shapes. Plaisted et al. 1998b argue that this can therefore 
be thought of as a within 
dimension search task which also requires some coherence ability like the 
conjunctive search task. An individual would need to be able to integrate lines or 
shapes to be able to identify the target figure. 
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Plaisted et al. argue that good processing of unique features can also explain 
superior performance on the block design test. However, this task differs in some 
important ways. An individual needs to find the correct block face to match part 
of a design. This is why Plaisted et al. (1998b) argue that good item detection 
skills would assist performance. However, before an individual could search for 
the appropriate block face they would need to first visually segment the design 
into parts in order to know what design they were looking for. This is slightly 
different than the conjunctive search task and the embedded figures task where the 
unique target is known to the individual beforehand. If an individual were good at 
item detection but poor at segmentation skills they might not be successful at the 
block design task. A good ability to segment in combination with exceptional 
ability to process unique features may however account for block design 
superiority. It may also be difficult to extend Plaisted et al's (1998b) argument to 
explain why I found those with autism did better than mental aged matched 
controls on the Rey figure copy test. Drawing is a complex task which requires an 
individual to perceive the figure, construct a representation, hold it in working 
memory, and finally make decisions about how to begin copying the figure. Fine 
motor skills may also influence performance on this task. It is unclear why 
superior detection of unique features would benefit an individual when there is no 
single target to identify. The person would need to focus attention on each 
element of the figure at some point in order to reconstruct it. The idea that 
individuals with autism show atypical perceptual skills because they process 
unique features well and common features poorly is still tenuous. This account 
needs to consider more carefully how it might explain superior performance on 
tasks such as the block design and good drawing ability in autism 
Verbal-semantic coherence 
Finally the implications of these findings for the idea of coherence deficits at a 
semantic-verbal level must be considered. According to 
Frith (1989) a deficit in 
the central thought processes would cause an individual to show abnormalities 
in 
their direction of attention. She argues this explains clinical reports of autistic 
individuals attending to minor features in their environment while ignoring more 
important ones. In other words they focus on less relevant details at the expense of 
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attending to the meaningful context. In Experiments 5: 1 and 5: 2 individuals with 
autism and Asperger's syndrome were just as likely to rely on semantic context as 
those without autism when pairing pictures with colours. This is inconsistent with 
previous literature suggesting that those with autism attend to different less 
meaningful aspects of a picture (Pring, Hermelin, and Heavey, 1995; Weeks and 
Hobson, 1987; Frith and Hermelin, 1969). However, our results are consistent 
with Pring and Hermelin's showing that meaning is just as salient to those with 
autism as those without it. Furthermore our study extends their findings to non- 
savant autistic populations. The outcome of these experiments questions the 
extent to which the theory of weak central coherence can predict how individuals 
with autism will process meaningful context. It also negates the earlier notion of 
"less capture by meaning" (Shah and Frith, 1983) which has now become 
encapsulated within the theory of weak central coherence. Brian and Bryson 
(1996) point out that those with autism may find embedded figures relatively easy 
in comparison to control participants because of "less capture by wholeness" or 
"less capture by meaning". They criticise previous findings on this test for not 
considering each of these alternatives individually. The theory of WCC does 
often conflate these two explanations. Future research in this area needs to be 
more specific about whether it is exploring how an individual with autism 
processes "meaning" or "wholeness". 
The evidence makes it difficult to claim that individuals with autism have 
problems with coherence at a semantic-verbal level as Frith (1989) and Happe 
(1994a; 1999) argue. It seems those with autism neglect meaningful context only 
under some conditions. A more systematic investigation is needed to identify 
particular situations in which individuals with autism fail to process context or 
attend to different less important features. It may be that it is a specific type of 
context that individuals have difficulty processing. For example, the jigsaw 
puzzle task used in Pring, Hermelin and Heavey's experiment (1995) depicted 
people and animals. Perhaps, those with autism failed to use the meaningful 
content of the picture because it was aversive to them. Individuals with autism 
have been known to report that faces are often confusing and sometimes even 
frightening for them to look at (Grandin, 1995). They might be more likely to 
benefit from meaningful information if it were not social in nature. If they only 
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had problems processing context when there was a social component this may 
indicate a deficit more with socio-cognitive processing rather than coherence. 
Another reason for inconsistent findings in the literature might be that different 
tasks make it easier for an individual with autism to see a need to attend to 
meaningful context. Perhaps meaningful information does not immediately jump 
out to individuals with autism. However, given the appropriate cues they might 
utilise it in the same way as those without autism. I raised this idea in Experiment 
5: 1 suggesting priming cues from initially naming the stimuli may have allowed 
those with autism to employ a semantic strategy. However, this explanation was 
ruled out in Experiment 5: 2 when participants were required to name the stimuli 
after the procedure and they still preferred the semantically related colour. The 
fact that reception aged children did prefer the visually matching colour 
demonstrates that the task did allow for alternative responses to be made. Thus, 
one cannot say that the task would only yield a semantic response from 
individuals. It is still possible that the design of our study may have been easier 
for individuals with autism to attend to meaningful information in favour of visual 
properties. Our task required an individual to make a choice between two colours. 
Perhaps in doing this attention was drawn to the two ways of doing the task. 
When individuals are presented with a jigsaw puzzle and asked to solve it they are 
not told they can either match up the lines or use the content of the picture to help 
them solve it. They are simply left to complete the puzzle any way they like. If a 
failure to process contextual information is restricted to particular circumstances, 
the theory of weak central coherence would need to specify the conditions when it 
would be a problem. 
A study by Plaisted, Sweetenham, and Rees (1999) offers evidence that 
individuals with autism are capable of global processing if their attention is 
overtly primed. They presented individuals with two forms of the Navon task 
(1977). One type was a divided attention task and the other a selective attention 
task. They found that individuals with autism were successful at processing the 
global shape in the selective attention task but not in the divided attention task. In 
the selective attention task the individual was told to attend to one particular level. 
However, in the divided attention they had to search both levels for a particular 
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target. Thus, they concluded that those with autism show typical global 
processing when their attention was cued to a particular level. If differences in 
task procedure can affect whether an individual with autism can process globally 
or not at a perceptual level, this may also be able to explain mixed findings at a 
semantic level. 
If individuals with autism are capable of global processing when their attention is 
directed by a cue, this may suggest their difficulties lie more with executive 
functioning. Perhaps, automatically their attention is drawn to the local level but 
they have difficulty then shifting their attention to the global level unless primed 
to do so. 
For example, Tager-Flusberg (1991) found individuals with autism were able use 
meaning to assist recall of words when given a cue such as "fruit". When the cue 
was not given they did not recall the related words (e. g. apple, pear) better than 
non-related words (e. g. car, chair) as those without autism did. In this case with a 
simple cue those with autism were able to focus on the thematically related words. 
Performance on an ambiguous homograph test might also be explained by 
problems with executive functioning (Snowling and Frith, 1986). When asked to 
read sentences such as 'The actor took a bow". Participants gave the more 
common but incorrect pronunciation of the word "bow". Frith (1989) and Happe 
(1994a) argue this is a result of their failure to take the context of the sentence into 
account. However, another explanation could be that individuals with autism 
cannot help but give the preponent response. 
Further research is needed to determine which of these possibilities, if any, may 
explain the inconsistent findings of how individuals with autism process 
meaningful context. Until then it is perhaps premature to conclude that coherence 
may be weak at a semantic-verbal level at least until other explanations are ruled 
out. 
Altogether, these investigations failed to find problems with coherence at the three 
levels (perceptual, visuo-spatial constructional, and semantic-verbal) Happe 
(1999) describes. I did not find that individuals with autism perceived visual 
illusions differently than those without autism Neither were differences found 
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between these populations in their preference to use semantic information to pair 
objects with colours. These findings suggest that problems with coherence may 
not extend to low perceptual levels or to higher semantic-verbal levels. One might 
ask if this poses a problem for weak central coherence as an explanation of 
perceptual, social, and language abnormalities found in autism 
Frith's original formulation of weak central coherence assumed a certain level of 
local cohesion was intact in autism (Frith, 1989). Our findings in Chapter three 
support this. Basic abilities that individuals with autism do have demonstrate this. 
For example, most higher-functioning individuals with autism can read. This 
would involve the ability to perceive a relationship between letters to form a word 
as well as seeing a relationship between words to form a sentence. They can also 
recognise pictures and objects which would require the integration of lines and 
features. Thus, a deficit in coherence at low levels does not seem a likely 
explanation for perceptual abnormalities in autism. 
The evidence of deficit in coherence at a visuo-spatial constructional level appears 
to be more stable. Experiment 4: 1 not only found superior performance in autism 
on the block design, embedded figures, and Rey figure test (excluding recognition 
trial), but also found they correlated. This raises the question whether individuals 
with autism are simply better at visuo-spatial tasks or whether they excel in this 
area because of weak central coherence. 
Finally, our findings in chapter five suggest that individuals with autism attend 
and utilise meaningful information in a similar way to those without autism. This 
appears to undermine the idea of WCC as an explanation of language and social 
abnormalities. The theory of WCC needs to be more specific in what areas it 
predicts there to be a problem at the semantic-verbal level. Also, other possible 
explanations of deficits at this level (i. e. socio-cognitive deficits) need to be ruled 
out. 
6: 5 Conclusion 
The theory of weak central coherence needs refining in order to account for our 
failure to find evidence of coherence at a very low perceptual level and at a 
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semantic verbal level. If the theory cannot be modified to make more specific and 
accurate predictions then alternative theories (hierarchisation theory, superior 
visual spatial skills, enhanced discrimination of unique stimuli, socio-cognitive 
deficits) may offer a more suitable explanation of features of autism. 
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Appendix 3: 1 Visual illusion program in Turbo pascal 
Hat illusion 
program prog0l; { v1.0 } 
{ (C) 1997 Dept. of Psychology 
Birmingham University 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
UK 
Written in TurboPascal 7.0 
uses 
graph, crt; 
var 
size : integer; 
rkey : char; 
condition : integer; 
condition_list : array[l.. 100] of integer; 
runloop : integer; 
stimno : integer; 
i, j, k : integer; { Common loop variables } 
Results : array[ 1.. 100 ] of integer; 
myOutfile : Text; 
my_OutputName : String; 
myInfile : Text; 
my InputName : String; 
{ *********************************************************** } 
procedure ClearAllArrays; 
begin 
for i :=1 to 100 $o begin 
Results[ i] 
.=0; 
end; 
end; 
*********************************** ** ****** ** ******************** ** * ***** } 
procedure GetUserlnfo; 
begin 
ClrScr; 
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Writeln('Visual Illusion Program'); 
Writeln('----------------------- 
'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln('< 
- 
decrease size'); 
Writeln('> 
- 
increase size'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln('n 
- 
next trial'); 
Writeln('Q 
- 
Quit and log results'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln('Note: The maximum number of trials is limited to 100'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Write('Enter Name of Input file 
Readln(my InputName); 
Write('Enter Name of Results file 
Readln(my OutputName); 
Assign(my_Outfile, myOutputName); 
ReWrite(my Outfile); 
Assign(my_Infile, my_InputName); 
Reset(my Infile); 
stirnno :=0; 
While not Eof(my_infile) do begin 
inc(stimno); 
readln(my_infile, condition_list[stimno]); 
end; 
end; 
{********************** ** *********** ** ************************************I 
procedure HR; 
var 
GraphDriver 
GraphMode 
begin 
GraphDriver 
GraphMode 
InitGraph(Gr 
end; 
: integer; 
. 
integer; 
.= 
vga; 
.= 
vgahi; 
aphDriver, GraphMode, "); 
{ ***************************** } 
{} 
procedure draw_changing_stimulus; 
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var 
x, y : integer; 
yPos, xPos : integer; 
begin 
{1 the global position of the changing stimulus } 
yPos := 280; 
xPos := 260; 
{2 the length of the lines } 
x 
.= 
50; 
y 50; 
{3 erase the old stimulus } 
setfillstyle(0,1); 
bar(xPos+x, O, xPos-x, 500); 
{4 draw the new stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle (0,0,1) ; 
line( xPos, yPos, xPos+100, yPos); 
line( xPos, yPos, xPos, yPos-size); 
end; 
procedure draw changing stimulus pcontrol; 
va r 
x, y : integer; 
yPos, xPos : integer; 
begin 
x 
.= 
50; 
y := 50; 
{global position of control stimulus} 
yPos 260; 
xPos 240; 
{erase old stimulus} 
setfillstyle(0,1); 
bar(xPos+x, 0, xPos-x, 500); 
i 
{draw new stimulus} 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle (0,0,1) ; 
line( xPos, yPos, xPos, yPos-size); 
I 
end; 
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procedure draw fixed_stimulus pcontrol; 
var 
x, y: integer; 
yPos, xPos: integer; 
fixed_size : integer; 
begin 
{1 the size of the fixed stimulus } 
fixed size : =50; 
x := 50; 
y 50; 
{global position of control stimulus} 
yPos 350; 
xPos := 360; 
{erase old stimulus} 
setfillstyle(0,1); 
bar(xPos+x, 0, xPos-x, 500); 
{draw new stimulus} 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle (0,0,1) ; 
I 
line( xPos, yPos+fixed_size, xPos, yPos-fixed_size); 
end; 
{ ****************r******************************************************** 
{ ************************************************************************* } 
procedure LogTrial; 
begin 
Results[ Runloop ] :_ (size *2) +1; 
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size := 50; 
{ if we want the changing stimulus to have a random start length } 
size := random(100)+25; 
end; 
{******** ** * ** ************************************************************} 
procedure ResultsToDisk; 
begin 
for i1 to stimno do begin 
writeln( my_outfile, Condition_list[ij, ' ', Results[ iI); 
end; 
end; 
{** ** ** *** * ** MAIN PROGRAM ******* ** *** ** * ** ** } 
begin 
randomize; 
ClearAllArrays; 
GetUserlnfo; 
size := 50; 
{ if we want the changing stimulus to have a random start length } 
size := random(l00)+25; 
HR; { Set up graphics mode } 
rKey 
._ 
'X'; 
for runloop :=1 to stimno do begin 
condition := condition list[runloop]; 
cleardevice; 
repeat 
case condition of 
1: begin 
draw changing stimulus; 
end; 
2: begin 
draw 
_changing_stimulus_pcontrol; draw 
_fixeq 
stimulus_pcontrol; 
end; 
end; 
rkey := readkey; 
if rkey = ', ' then dec( size ); 
if rkey = '. ' then inc( size ); 
I 
if size <1 then size :=1; 
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if size > 125 then size := 125; 
if rkey = 'n' then LogTrial; 
until (rkey = 'n')- 
rkey := 'X'; 
end; 
ResultsToDisk; 
CloseGraph; 
Close( myinfile ); 
Close( my outfile ); 
end. 
Muller-Lyer Illusion 
program prog02; { v1.0 } 
{ (C) 1997 Dept. of Psychology 
Birmingham University 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
UK 
Written in TurboPascal 7.0 
uses 
graph, crt; 
va r 
size : integer; 
rkey : char; 
condition : integer; 
condition list : array[1.. 100] of integer; 
runloop : integer; 
stimno : integer; 
i, j, k : integer; { Common loop variables } 
Results : array[ 1.. 100 ] of integer; 
my_Outfile : Text; 
my_OutputName : String; 
my Infile : Text; 
r 
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my_InputName : String; 
) 
procedure ClearAllArrays; 
begin 
for i :=1 to 100 do begin 
Results[ i]. 
=0; 
end; 
end; 
{******************* ** ****************************************************} 
procedure GetUserlnfo; 
begin 
ClrScr; 
Writeln('Visual Illusion Program'); 
Writeln( -----------------------')" 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln('< 
- 
decrease size'); 
Writeln('> 
- 
increase size'); 
Writeln; 
Write? n (' n- next trial') ; 
Writeln('Q 
- 
Quit and log results'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln('Note: The maximum number of trials is limited to 100'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Write('Enter Name of Input file 
Readln(my InputName); 
Write('Enter Name of Results file 
Readln(my OutputName); 
Assign(my_Outfile, my_OutputName); 
ReWrite(my Outfile); 
Assign(my_Infile, my_InputName); 
Reset (my Infile); , 
stimno 
._ 
0i 
While not Eof(my_infile) do begin 
inc(stimno); 
readln(my_infile, condition_list[stimno]); 
end; 
I 
end; 
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(} 
procedure HR; 
var 
GraphDriver : integer; 
GraphMode : integer; 
begin 
GraphDriver := vga; 
GraphMode 
.= 
vgahi; 
InitGraph(GraphDriver, GraphMode, 
end; 
procedure draw_changing_stimulus; 
var 
x, y: integer; 
yPos, xPos : integer; 
begin 
{1 the global position of the changing stimulus } 
yPos 200; 
xPos := 320; 
{2 the length of the arms } 
X 
.= 
20; 
y := 20; 
{3 erase the old stimulus } 
setfillstyle(1,0); 
bar(50, yPos-Y, 590, yPos+y); 
{4 draw the new 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle(0,0 
line( xPos-size, 
line( xPos-size, 
line( xPos-size, 
line( xPos+size, 
line( xPos+size, 
end; 
stimu 
, 
l) ; 
yPos, 
yPos, 
yPos, 
yPos, 
yPos, 
lus } 
xPos+size, yPos); 
xPos-size-x, yPos-y); 
xPos-size-x, yPos+y); 
xPos+size+x, yPos-y); 
xPos+size+x, yPos+y); 
procedure draw-fixed-stimulus; 
var 
x, y : integer; 
yPos, xPos : integer; 
fixed_size integer; 
begin i 
(1 the size of the fixed stimulus } 
fixed size := 50; 
{2 the global position of the changing stimulus } 
yPos 280; 
xPos := 320; 
{3 the length of the arms } 
x := 20; 
y 
.= 
20; 
{4 draw the stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle(0,0,1); 
line( xPos-fixed size, 
line( xPos-fixed size, 
line( xPos-fixed size, 
line ( xPos+fixedsize, 
line( xPos+fixed size, 
end; 
yPos, xPos+fixedsize, yPos); 
yPos, xPos-fixed size+x, yPos-y); 
yPos, xPos-fixed size+x, yPos+y); 
yPos, xPos+fixedsize-x, yPos-y); 
yPos, xPos+fixed_size-x, yPos+y); 
procedure draw_changing_stimulus_nobar; 
var 
x, y: integer; 
yPos, xPos : integer; 
begin 
{1 the global position of the changing stimulus } 
yPos := 200; 
xPos := 320; 
{2 the length of the arms } 
x 
.=0; 
y 
.=0; 
{3 erase the old stimulus } 
setfillstyle (1,0) ; 
bar(50, yPos-Y, 590, yPos+y); 
{4 draw the new 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle(0,0 
line( xPos-size, 
line( xPos-size, 
line( xPos-size, 
line( xPos+size, 
line( xPos+size, 
stimu 
, 
1); 
yPos, 
yPos, 
yPos, 
yPos, 
yPos, 
lus ) 
xPos+size, yPos); 
xPos-size-x, yPos-y); 
xPos-size-x, yPos+y); 
xPos+size+x, yPos-y); 
xPos+size+x, yPos+y); 
end; 
procedure draw_fixed_stimulus_nobar; 
var 
x, y : integer; 
yPos, xPos : integer; 
fixed_size : integer; 
begin 
{1 the size of the fixed stimulus } 
fixed size := 50; 
{2 the global position of the changing stimulus } 
yPos 280; 
xPos := 320; 
{3 the length of the arms } 
x 0; 
y 
.=0; 
r 
(4 draw the stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
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setlinestyle(0,0 
line( xPos-fixed 
line( xPos-fixed 
line( xPos-fixed 
line( xPos+fixed 
line( xPos+fixed 
end; 
yPos, xPos+fixedsize, yPos); 
yPos, xPos-fixed size+x, yPos-y); 
yPos, xPos-fixed 
_size+x, 
yPos+y); 
yPos, xPos+fixed_size-x, yPos-y); 
yPos, xPos+fixed_size-x, yPos+y); 
11) ; 
_size, 
size, 
size, 
size, 
size, 
{ ************************************************************************ } 
{ ******************************************** ** ** *** ***** } 
procedure LogTrial; 
begin 
Results[ Runloop ] :_ (size *2) +1; 
size := 50; 
f if we want the changing stimulus to have a random start length } 
size := random(100)+25; 
end; 
{ ** ****** ************ ** ** ** ** *********** ** **** ** *********************** *** } 
procedure ResultsToDisk; 
begin 
for i :=1 to stimno do begin 
writeln( my_outfile, Condition_list[i], ' ', Results[ i]); 
end; 
end; 
{*********** MAIN PROGRAM******* } 
begin 
randomize; 
ClearAllArrays; 
GetUserlnfo; 
size := 50; 
F 
( if we want the changing stimulus to have a random start length } 
size := random(100)+25; 
HR; { Set up graphics mode } 
rKey 
._ 
'X'; 
for runloop 1 to stimno do begin 
condition condition_list(runloop]; 
cleardevice; 
repeat 
case condition of 
1 begin 
draw-fixed-stimulus; 
19E 
draw 
- 
changing-stimulus; 
end; 
2: begin 
draw 
_fixed 
stimulus_nobar; 
draw 
_changing_stimulus_nobar; end; 
end; 
rkey := readkey; 
if rkey = ', ' then dec( size ); 
if rkey = '. ' then inc( size ); 
if size <1 then size :=1; 
if size > 125 then size := 125; 
if rkey = 'n' then LogTrial; 
until (rkey = 'n'); 
rkey := 'X'; 
end; 
ResultsToDisk; 
CloseGraph; 
Close( myinfile ); 
Close( my outfile ); 
end. 
Ponzo illusion 
program prog02; { vl. O } 
{ (C) 1997 Dept. of Psychology 
Birmingham University 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
UK 
Written in TurboPascal 7.0 
i 
uses 
graph, crt; 
va r 
size : integer; 
rkey : char; 
I 
19 
condition : integer; 
condition list : array[1.. 100] of integer; 
runloop : integer; 
stimno : integer; 
i, j, k : integer; { Common loop variables } 
Results : array[ 1.. 100 ] of integer; 
my_Outfile : Text; 
myOutputName : String; 
myInfile : Text; 
my_InputName : String; 
{* ** ************* ** * ** *********************************** ** ** * ** **********I 
procedure C1earAllArrays; 
begin 
for i :=1 to 100 do begin 
Results[ i] 
.=0; 
end; 
end; 
{******************* ** * ** * ** ************* ** ************** ** ***************} 
procedure GetUserInfo; 
begin 
ClrScr; 
Writeln('Visual Illusion Program'); 
Writeln(I 
------------------------ 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln('< 
- 
decrease size'); 
Writeln('> 
- 
increase size'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln('n 
- 
next trial'); 
Writeln('Q 
- 
Quit and log results'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln('Note: The maximum number of trials is limited to 100'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Write('Enter Name of Input file 
Readln(my InputName); 
Write('Enter Name of Results file 
Readln(my OutputName); 
Assign(myOutfile, 
myoutputName); 
ReWrite(my Gutfile); 
Assign(my_Infile, 
myInputName); 
Reset(my_Infile); 
stiinno :=0; 
While not Eof(myinfile) do begin 
inc (stimno) ; 
readln(my_infile, condition_list[stimno]); 
end; 
end; 
{********* ** *************** ** ********** ** *** ** **** ** * ** ****** ** ******** ** } 
procedure HR; 
var 
GraphDriver : integer; 
GraphMode : integer; 
begin 
GraphDriver vga; 
GraphMode := vgahi; 
InitGraph(GraphDriver, GraphMode, 
end; 
{ ************************************************************************* } 
{ ************************************************************************* } 
procedure draw-changing-stimulus; 
var 
x, y : integer; 
yPos, xPos : integer; 
begin 
{1 the global position of the changing stimulus } 
yPos 280; 
xPos := 320; 
{3 erase the old stimulus 
setfillstyle(1,0); 
bar(xpos-round(size/2)-1, yPos-round(size/2)- 
1, xpos+round(size/2)+1, yPos+round(Size/2)+1); 
{4 draw the new stimulus } 
setcolor (15) ; 
setlinestyle (0,0, ]r) ; 
circle(xpos, ypos, round(size/2)); 
end; 
procedure draw_fixed_stimulus; 
var 
x, y : integer; 
1ý 
yPos, xPos, ylPos, xlPos, x2Pos : integer; fixed_size 
: integer; 
begin 
{1 the size of the fixed stimulus } fixed_size := 50; 
{2 the global position of the fixed stimulus } 
yPos 120; 
xPos := 320; 
{4 draw the new stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle (0,0,1) ; 
circle(xpos, ypos, round(fixed size/2)); 
y1Pos : = 80; 
xlPos : = 350; 
x2Pos : = 290; 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle (0,0,1) ; 
line(x1Pos, ylPos, xlPos+100, ylPos+280); 
line(x2Pos, ylPos, x2Pos-100, y1Pos+280) 
end; 
procedure draw_changing_stimulus_pcontrol; 
var 
x, y : integer; 
yPos, xPos : integer; 
begin 
{1 the global position of the changing stimulus } 
yPos 280; 
xPos := 320; 
{3 erase the old stimulus } 
setfillstyle(1,0); 
bar(xpos-round(size/2)-l, yPos-round(size/2)- 
l, xpos+round(size/2)+1, yPos+round(Size/2)+1); 
{4 draw the new stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle (0,0,1) ; 
circle(xpos, ypos, round(size/2)); 
end; 
/ 
procedure draw fixed_stimulus_pcontrol; 
va r 
x, y : integer; 
yPos, xPos, y1Pos, xlPos, x2Pos : integer; 
fixed_size : integer; 
begin 
{1 the size of the fixed stimulus } 
21 
fixed_size 
:= 50; 
{2 the global position of the fixed stimulus } 
yPos := 120; 
xPos := 320; 
{4 draw the new stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle (0,0,1) ; 
circle(xpos, ypos, round(fixed size/2)); 
y1Pos := 80; 
xlPos := 350; 
x2Pos := 290; 
end; 
procedure LogTrial; 
begin 
Results[ Runloop ] 
._ 
(size *2) +1; 
size := 50; 
( if we want the changing stimulus to have a random start length } 
size := random(100)+25; 
end; 
{******* ** ** ** *********** ** ********** ** ******************* **************** } 
procedure ResultsToDisk; 
begin 
for i :=1 to stimno do begin 
writeln( my_outfile, Condition_list[i], ' ', Results[ i]); 
end; 
end; 
{ *********** MAIN PROGRAM****************** } 
begin 
randomize; 
C1earAllArrays; 
GetUserlnfo; 
size := 50; 
{ if we want the changing stimulus to have a random start 
length } 
size := random(100)+25; 
HR; { Set up graphics mode } 
rKey 
._ 
'X'1 
for runloop :=1 to stimno 
do begin 
2( 
condition := condition list[runloop]; 
cleardevice; 
repeat 
case condition of 
1 begin 
draw fixed stimulus; 
draw 
- 
changing-stimulus; 
end; 
2: begin 
draw 
_fixed 
stimulus_pcontrol; 
draw 
_changing_stimulus_pcontrol; 
end; 
end; 
rkey := readkey; 
if rkey = then dec( size ); 
if rkey = '. ' then inc( size ); 
if size <1 then size :=1; 
if size > 125 then size := 125; 
if rkey = 'n' then LogTrial; 
until (rkey = 'n'); 
rkey 
._ 
'X'; 
end; 
ResultsToDisk; 
CloseGraph; 
Close( myinfile ); 
Close( my outfile ); 
end. 
Titchener illusion 
program prog02; { vl. O } 
{ (C) 1997 Dept. of Psychology 
Birmingham University 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
UK 
i 
Written in TurboPascal 7.0 
uses 
graph, crt; 
var 
size 
rkey 
integer; 
char; 
condition : integer; 
condition_list : array[1.. 100] of integer; 
runloop : integer; 
stimno : integer; 
i, j, k : integer; { Common loop variables 
Results : array[ 1.. 100 ] of integer; 
my-Outfile : Text; 
my-OutputName : String; 
my Infile : Text; 
my-InputName : String; 
{ ************************************************************************* } 
procedure ClearAllArrays; 
begin 
for i :=1 to 100 do begin 
Results[ i] :=0; 
end; 
end; 
f********* 4r 16 ************** ** **********************************************I 
procedure GetUserInfo; 
begin 
ClrScr; 
Writeln('Visual Illusion Program'); 
Writeln( ------------------------- 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln('< 
- 
decrease size'); 
Writeln('> -increase size'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln('n next/trial'); 
Writeln('Q Quit and log results'); 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln (I Note: The maximum number of trials is limited to 100 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Writeln; 
Write('Enter Name of Input file 
Readln(my_InputName); 
Write('Enter Name of Results file 
Readln(my_OutputName); 
Assign(my_Outfile, my_OutputName); 
ReWrite(my Outfile); 
Assign(my_Infile, myInputName); 
Reset(my Infile); 
Stirnno :_0; 
While not Eof(my_infile) do begin 
inc(stimno); 
readln(my_infile, condition_list[stimno]); 
end; 
end; 
{ ** ******* ** ************** ** ************ ** ** ** ******** ** ** ******** ** ******) 
procedure HR; 
var 
GraphDriver : integer; 
GraphMode : integer; 
begin 
GraphDriver vga; 
GraphMode vgahi; 
InitGraph(GraphDriver, GraphMode, 
end; 
I 
{ **** ** * ******** ******* * ************* ************************ ************* } 
{ ************************************************************************* } 
procedure draw-changing_stimulus; 
var 
x, y : integer; 
ypos, xpos, ylPos, xlPos, x2Pos, y2Pos, y3Pos, x3Pos, y4Pos, x4Pos, 
y5Pos, x5Pos, y6Pos, x6Pos : integer; 
fixed_size: integer; 
begin I 
11 the global position of the changing stimulus 
fixed size: =30; 
yPos 280; 
xPos := 125; 
y1Pos 300; 
xlPos := 165; 
2( 
y2Pos 330; 
x2Pos : = 125; 
y3Pos : = 300; 
x3Pos : = 85; 
y4Pos 255; 
x4Pos : = 165; 
y5Pos : = 230; 
x5Pos 125; 
y6Pos 255; 
x6Pos : = 85; 
(3 erase the old stimulus I 
setfillstyle (1,0) ; 
bar(xpos-round(size/2)-l, yPos-round(size/2)- 
i, xpos+round(size/2)+l, yPos+round(Size/2)+l); 
{4 draw the new stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle(0,0,1); 
circle(xpos, ypos, round(size/2)); 
circle(xlpos, ylpos, round(fixedsize/3)); 
circle(x2pos, y2pos, round(fixedsize/3)); 
circle(x3pos, y3pos, round(fixed size/3)); 
circle(x4pos, y4pos, round(fixedsize/3)); 
circle(x5pos, y5pos, round(fixedsize/3)); 
circle(x6pos, y6pos, round(fixed_size/3)); 
end; 
procedure draw-fixed-stimulus; 
var 
x, y : integer; 
yPos, xPos, ylPos, xlPos, x2Pos, y2Pos, y3Pos, x3Pos, y4Pos, x4Pos, 
y5Pos, xSPos, y6Pos, x6Pos : integer; I 
fixed_size : integer; 
begin 
{1 the size of the fixed stimulus } 
fixed size := 30; 
{2 the global position of the fixed stimulus } 
yPos 280; 
xPos := 425; 
ylPos : = 313; 
x1Pos 485; 
y2Pos 340; 
x2Pos 425; 
y3Pos 313; 
x3Pos : = 365; 
I 
y4Pos := 247; 
x4Pos := 485; 
y5Pos 220; 
x5Pos 425; 
y6Pos 247; 
x6Pos : = 365; 
{4 draw the new stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle (0,0,1) ; 
circle(xpos, ypos, round(fixed size/2)); 
circle(xlpos, ylpos, round(fixedsize/1)); 
circle (x2pos, y2pos, round(fjxed size/i)); 
circle(x3pos, y3pos, round(fixed size/1)); 
circle(x4pos, y4pos, round(fixedsize/1)); 
circle(x5pos, y5pos, round(fixed_size/1)); 
circle(x6pos, y6pos, round(fixed size/1)); 
end; 
procedure draw-changing-stimulus-pcontrol; 
var 
x, y : integer; 
yPos, xPos : integer; 
begin 
{1 the global position of the changing stimulus 
yPos 280; 
xPos 125; 
13 erase the old stimulus 
setfillstyle(1,0); 
bar(xpos-round(size/2)-l, yPos-round(size/2)- 
1, xpos+round(size/2)+l, yPos+round(Size/2)+l); 
{4 draw the new stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle (0,0,1) ; 
circle(xpos, ypos, round(size/2)); 
end; 
procedure draw-fixed_stimulus_pcontrol; 
var I/ 
x, y : integer; 
ypos, xpos, ylpos, xlPos, x2Pos : integer; 
fixed_size : integer; 
begin 
{1 the size of the fixed stimulus 
fixed_size := 30; 
{2 the global position of the fixed stimulus } 
yPos := 280; 
xPos 
.= 
425; 
{4 draw the new stimulus } 
setcolor(15); 
setlinestyle(0,0,1); 
circle(xpos, ypos, round(fixed_size/2)); 
end; 
procedure LogTrial; 
begin 
Results[ Runloop ]: 
_ 
(size *2) +1; 
size := 50; 
I if we want the changing stimulus to have a random start length 
size := random(45)+25; 
end; 
{******* **** ********************************************* ** ************ *** } 
procedure ResultsToDisk; 
begin 
for i :=1 to stimno do begin 
writeln( my-outfile, Condition_list[il, ' ', Results[ i 
end; 
end; 
{ *********** MAIN PROGRAM ************** } 
begin 
randomize; 
ClearAllArrays; 
GetUserlnfo; 
size := 50; 
I 
{ if we want the changing stimulus to have a random start length 
size := random(45)+25; 
HR; { Set up graphics mode } 
rKey 
._ 
'X`: i 
for runloop 1 to stimno do 
begin 
condition := condition_list[runloop]; 
cleardevice; 
repeat 
case condition of 
1 begin 
draw fixed stimulus; 
draw changing_stimulus; 
end; 
2: begin 
- 
draw 
- 
fixed_stimulus_pcontrol; 
draw 
- 
changing_stimulus_pcontrol; 
end; 
end; 
rkey := readkey; 
if rkey = ', ' then dec( size ); 
if rkey = '. ' then inc( size, ); 
if size <1 then size :=1; 
if size > 70 then size := 70; 
if rkey = 'n' then LogTrial; 
until (rkey = 
rkey 
._ 
'X'; 
end; 
ResultsToDisk; 
C1oseGraph; 
Close( my infile ); 
Close( my outfile ); 
end. 
r 
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Appendix 4: 1 5timilli for Rey complex rigure recognition task 
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209 
10. " 11. 12. 
. 
210 
15. 
16. 17. 18. 
211 
19. 
21. 
20. 
22. 
23.24. 
212 
ppendix_5: 1 Stimuli for Experiments 5: 1 and 5: 2 
Colour-associated cards 
Object TOR Bottom 
1. ) strawberry red yellow 
2. ) lemon red yellow 
3. ) frog red green 
4. ) fire engine brown red 
5. ) banana yellow blue 
6. ) carrot blue orange 
7. ) tree green orange 
8. ) pumpkin orange green 
9. ) chocolate yellow brown 
10. ) policeman blue brown 
11. ) monkey brown green 
12. ) pool orange blue 
Neutral coloured objects 
Object Top Bottom 
1. ) car red blue 
2. ) toothbrush orange green 
3. ) cup red yellow 
4. ) button green brown 
5. ) balloon orange red 
6. ) bicycle yellow blue 
7. ) kite blue orange 
8. ) lorry blue red 
9. ) door brown yellow 
10. ) ball yellow brown 
11. ) sock green brown 
12. ) shirt orange green 
i 
